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| Case Number: 480 |
| Case Mnemonic: CHINADAM |
| Case Name: 3 Gorges and History |
I. Identification
Dam in today's Peoples Republic with the Grand Canal system in Imperial
China. Both projects were developed with the objective of increasing
trade and economic development within China. From this historical comparison
we may be able to draw certain parallels and distill key lessons from which
to gain insight into the true costs as well as the benefits in both the
long and short term, of the extremely controversial project on the Yangtze
(Chiang Jiang) River.
The Grand Canal underwent two major periods of development. The first period was during the Sui-Tang era (589-960 AD), in which the canal system consisted of two branches linked to the Yellow River. The northern branch extended from the vicinity of Luoyang on the Yellow River to Zhojun near present day Beijing. The second leg extended from the Yellow River to the southeast through the Huai River basin to the Yangtze River region. The second stage of development was during the Yuan dynasty period (1279-1367 AD).1 This period of Mongol domination saw the canal repositioned to follow a more direct north-south line between the capital at Beijing (The capital was moved to the Beijing area to ease communication with their steppe homeland and far-flung western conquests.) and the economically vital Yangtze River valley, thus facilitating their control over an expansive Asian Empire.2
The original Sui Dynasty construction, begun in 548 AD, connected and expanded upon pre-existing canals and waterways to form one unified system of intra-state communications and transport. This system promoted vast changes in territorial expanse, increased population flows to the south and east, as well as the corresponding economic development and expansion in those regions, not to mention innovations in bureaucratic institutions. It allowed the short lived Sui Dynasty and its successor Tang to exert centralized authority over a large area. This resulted in a dramatic increase in the size and importance of the public granary system by overcoming the logistical difficulties inherent in moving tons of grain from the south and east to the northern capitals. In doing so, they were able to integrate northern and southern China in to a single political-economic entity. After this first system was completed in 608 AD, the Grand Canal was filled with fleets of boats moving in vast convoys to and from the capital and it provided increased access to the southern ocean and the lucrative trade with the kingdoms of Southeast Asia.3
The Tang Dynasty's contribution to the Grand Canal System consisted primarily
of management, maintenance and administrative systems that enhanced the
efficiency of the system as well as improvements in the physical make-up
of the canal itself. This, in tern, increased central government
control over the country. At its height, over 424,000 tons of grain
were shipped to the capital each year on the canal, not to mention the
mountains of other goods that plied the waterway.4 The effectiveness
of the Grand Canal laid the ground work for the strength of future dynasties
and of the imperial system as a whole. Eventually the Grand Canal
became a symbol of the imperial system itself. As fared the canal,
so fared the dynasty.5
The Yuan Dynasty of the Mongols oversaw the final
major change to the canal system. When the Mongols moved the capital
to the Beijing area in northern China, to facilitate communications with
the greater Mongol Empire, it became necessary to shift the canal along
a straight north-south axis. This was an incredible engineering feat
in that it crossed the Shandong peninsula, an area of much higher elevation,
requiring the construction of numerous locks and gates. Amazingly
this was accomplished within the first twenty years of the Dynasty. (completed
circa 1299 AD)6
The Chinese have, over time built dikes and other flood control measures to try and alleviate the seasonal floods. The end result of these projects was actually increased silting, which led to an even higher higher river bed and even more cataclysmic floods. Another technique used to prevent silting was the narrowing of the river channel. This increased the speed of the river's flow which did reduce the amount of silting but also dramatically weakened and stressed the river the river banks and the dike system which led to breaches and again, catastrophic floods.8
The Grand Canal itself was constructed in the traditional
Chinese manner for all large scale projects. This included the mass
mobilization of the local population, forced labor, incredible hardship,
great loss of life and a ruthless, driving administration. Some historians
estimate that as many as five million men were pressed into service in
some instances. Another aspect of the human toll can be found in
the monstrous death tolls that resulted from the floods along the canal
system. Additionally, these floods had the secondary impact of disrupting
the grain transportation and storage system. This could lead to mass
starvation in the wake of a canal disaster further skyrocketing the death
toll.9
The construction of
the Three Gorges Dam on the Yangtze (Chiang Jiang) River began in 1994.
It is intended to control flooding, produce much needed hydroelectric power,
and increase the navigable portions of the river facilitating the expansion
of commerce. If and when it is completed it will be almost a mile wide
and stand over 575 feet tall creating a reservoir stretching over 350 miles
with a depth of over 500 feet and a surface area of over 1084 square kilometers.
The dam will have a planned annual electrical power generation capacity
of 84.68 billion kilowatt hours or one eighth of China's total in 1996,
providing power to central and eastern China. If the seventeen year project
stays on track it will be completed in 2011 at an estimated cost of $24.5
billion.10
The construction of the Three Gorges project is planned in three phases. The first phase was the building of a 790 meter long by 60 meter high coffer dam on the Yangtze River and the diversion cannel to carry shipping around the project. These were completed in November of 1997. The second phase, which consists of the construction of the main dam, ship locks and the installation of power generation equipment is to be completed over the next six years. The third and final phase is planned for 2004 to 2009 and includes the production and installation of the remaining 12 turbo generators.11
The dam's power generation potential of 84.68 billion kilowatt hours is the energy equivalent of burning 50 million tons of coal or 25 million tons of crude oil. The switch to cleaner hydroelectric power would have the effect of cutting 100 million tons of carbon dioxide, up to two million tons of sulfur dioxide, ten thousand tons of carbon monoxide, 370, 0000 tons of nitrogen oxide and 150,000 tons of dust annually from the atmosphere. The cost savings from the swath to hydroelectric power are estimated to equal the costs of the project within three years of full operation. The Chinese government estimates that the resulting energy output from the dam will generate up to 520 billion yuan in industrial output per year and thus millions of desperately needed jobs.12
Project proponents in Beijing estimate that the massive
reservoir that will be formed behind the dam will even have an impact on
the climate of the surrounding region, slightly moderating the winters
and cooling the summers by a degree or two. The more stabile and
moderate climate
will facilitate the large scale planting and cultivation of citrus trees.13
Additionally, once completed, the project would benefit the area around
the reservoir economically by increasing river traffic and trade which
could help the poorer interior catch up to the rapidly developing coastal
areas. This project is expected to push economic development further
into China's interior. River traffic and commerce on the Yangtze
is expected to quintuple with the increased trafficability the ship locks
and deep reservoir will provide. The project is designed to
greatly enhance flood control measures on the river, providing a safer
and more productive life for the 15 million people and 1.5 million hectares
of farmland in the lower Yangtze flood plains.14
The Yangtze River is the third longest river in the world
and one of China's main transportation arteries. It is also a river
prone to large scale and regular flooding, much like its northern cousin
the Yellow River. Historically the Yangtze has overflowed its banks,
resulting in large scale flooding approximately once every ten years since
the Han Dynasty (206 BC).
The Three Gorges Dam project has become a symbol of national unity and strength for the ruling communist party and thus many of the controversies surrounding the project are glossed over or ignored. In an address to the engineers of the dam, then Premier (now Chairman of the National Peoples Congress) Li Peng, himself a power engineer by training, said the scale of the project was proof to the world of China's new found strength. "The damming of the Yangtze is of great political and economic significance ... It proves to the whole world the Chinese people's capability of building the worlds first rate hydroelectric project." The construction of the dam has thus become as much a celebration of Chinese nationalism and its political leadership as it is a massive power and engineering feat. This makes dealing with many of the problems of the project all the more difficult.15
There has been a tremendous effect thus far on the local population. To date, 179 factories and 82,300 people have been relocated; 6,937 hectares of new land have had to be developed for housing as a result of the project. Estimates are that up to 1.2 million people will ultimately have to be relocated because of this project. Some 365 towns in Sichuan and Hubei provinces will eventually be inundated by the reservoir and 1,599 industrial, mining and other enterprises will have to be relocated. Additionally, an estimated 31,000 hectares of farmland will be lost to the reservoir in a country already suffering from a severe shortage of arable land.16
Another factor that must be considered when assessing the feasibility of constructing a large dam are the effects of global warming and climate change. Dams and their containment capacity are built on calculations of expected annual and seasonal rainfall and river flows. As the effects of global warming take hold there are likely to be changes in these patterns. Even small changes in climate can cause major changes in river flow, resulting in increased sedimentation, floods and even the extreme of dam bursts.17
The project planners are also taking geologic risks. An independent geologic assessment concluded that "... rock strength properties were over estimated, as the permanent ship lock walls are prone to failure [slides] ... which would invariably result in injuries and damages to ship traffic and the locks themselves ... the weaker than expected state of the underlying bedrock suggests that the granite has a higher density of fractures than assumed, raising the possibility of higher rates of seepage beneath and around the dam wall with associated foundation instability." This, combined with the fact that the dam sits astride a seismically active area does nothing to increase confidence in the project.18
The sedimentation issue, much like that of the Grand Canal, is of serious concern. Sediment buildup behind the dam and throughout the reservoir would effect the overall storage capacity of the reservoir. The loss of storage capacity would directly result in the degradation of the projects flood control capability. The high rate of sediment deposit has already affected the diversion channel and is expected to compromise operation of the dam sooner and more seriously than had been planned.19
Not only will the surrounding population be effected by
this project but so will much of the Yangtze plant and animal life, such
as the endangered white flagg dolphin and the Chinese sturgeon as well
as numerous archeological
treasures.
Opposition to the project is widespread. Within China, opposition
has largely been silenced by the government, but was dramatically expressed
in the National Peoples Congress, largely a "rubber-stamp" body, by the
unprecedented one third who did not vote for the project when it was approved
in 1992. Other concerns expressed by the Chinese opposition include
the effect of a military strike on the dam, the insufficiency of arable
land on which to resettle displaced persons, water degradation issues as
well as the tremendous costs of the project. Critics suggest that
a number of small and medium sized dams on the upper Yangtze and its tributaries
would be more cost effective, generate power more quickly and cheaply while
forcing the resettlement of less than 200,000 people.20
China, of course, cannot tackle this immense project on its own. Foreign expertise, technology and financing are all critical elements in the Three Gorges project. Over the last several years, a coalition of environmental, developmental and human rights groups around the world (NGO's) have been campaigning against the project, calling attention to its environmental as well as its social impact. As a result of their efforts, the US National Security Council concluded that the federal government should avoid involvement in the project. In May 1996, the US Export - Import Bank announced that it would not support loans to US companies pursuing Three Gorges contract and the US Bureau of Reclamation withdrew its support of the project. Additionally, the World Bank, the leading supporter of hydroelectric projects around the world, has declined to participate and three attempts to secure international financial support have failed since 1994.21
Because of the influence of these NGO's, US corporations
have lost out on huge Chinese government contracts. Of the 26 massive
hydroelectric turbine units to be used in the project, 14 will be supplied
by foreign firms. The contract for the first eight turbines, worth
$240 million, went to a European and Canadian consortium. By being involved
in the first round of contracting, these firms may be at an advantage when
it comes to bidding on contracts for elements of the entire power transmission
network. Thus the cost, in lost potential business, to US corporations
could climb even higher.22
II. Legal Clusters6. Forum and Scope: China and Unilateral
The forum for the Three Gorges project is domestic. With most internal opposition having been suppressed, the arena has become internal CCP power struggles rather than the legal contests one would expect in the west. Although this is a domestic issue, the influence of international environmental groups on foreign financing and support for this project does give it an international flavor and has an indirect impact.
7. Decision Breadth: Number of Parties Affected: 1
8. Legal Standing: Law
The Three Gorges project was officially approved
by the National Peoples Congress in April 1992.
III. Geographic Clustersb. Geographic Site: East Asia
c. Geographic Impact: Peoples Republic of China
As briefly mentioned above, the Grand Canal actually linked a series of smaller canals and waterways into a vast transportation and communication system stretching from Beijing in the north, the Yellow and Yangtze river basins and Shanghai in the south. The Three Gorges is the general name for the Qutang, Wuxia and Xiling gorges on the Yangtze River. The region affected stretches from Chongqing, China's most populous city, in the west, to the dam construction site near Yichang as well as the feeder rivers behind the dam as well as the flood plains down river.
10. Sub-National Factors: Yes
The dislocation of 1.2 million people and over 1500 industries by the Three Gorges project will create resettlement and economic issues/disputes between the struggling interior provinces and the more prosperous coastal regions. This, coupled with the already large transient population and labor pool, will exaserbate the instability and dislocations resulting from the privatization of inefficient state owned industries and the end of the "iron rice bowl." This could result in massive social unrest in addition to political and economic instability.
11. Type of Habitat: Temperate
IV. Trade Clusters13. Direct v. Indirect Impacts: Indirect
Because US firms are not involved in the construction of the dam or in providing power generation technology, they could be at a disadvantage in the competition for lucrative follow on infrastructure projects, such as the power distribution network.
14. Relation of Trade Measure to Environmental Impact
a. Directly Related to Product: No
b. Indirectly Related to Product: Yes - Energy
c. Not Related to Product: No
d. Related to Process: Yes - Habitat Loss
15. Trade Product Identification: Power/Power Generation Equipment
16. Economic Data: None
17. Impact of Trade Restriction: Low
Despite of the lack of US participation in and support for the Three Gorges project, it continues to move forward with the assistance of European and Canadian firms.
18. Industry Sector: Utility
The major trade product in the Three Gorges case is power and power generation equipment. High tech turbo generators will be imported along with the capability to construct and maintain them. This will greatly impact and upgrade China's overall utility industry not to mention the supply additional energy requirements for continued economic growth and modernization.
19. Exporters and Importers: China and Many
While no Chinese exports will directly result from this project, traditionally, the construction of massive public works projects such as this have require massive imports of technology and capital to the developing nation.
V. Environment Clusters21. Name, Type, and Diversity of Species
Name: Many
Type: Many
Diversity: Wide
This project will have a dramatic impact on a wide variety of species. By drastically altering the natural environment all plant and animal species living in the affected area will be impacted. Of particular note are the white flagg dolphin and the Chinese sturgeon.
22. Resource Impact and Effect: High and Scale
While increasing the amount of clean hydroelectric power available for economic growth, the project will also result in the loss of arable land, damage fish stocks and increase the danger from earthquakes and floods.
23. Urgency and Lifetime: High and 100's of Years
The urgency of this issue is immediate and the economic, social and environmental impact of this project will be long lasting and far reaching. With the coffer dam complete, this project is well on its way to completion. It will dramatically alter the landscape and by some accounts the climate, of southern China and the immediate impact on the already endangered Yangtze dolphin will be dramatic.
24. Substitutes: Like
Many experts agree that a safer, more efficient and cost effective approach would be to build several smaller dams on the tributaries of the upper Yangtze. These would have a much reduced impact on the environment, displace far fewer people and industries and actually cost less to construct. These dams could even be completed and producing at maximum output in far less time than the current project will require.
VI. Other FactorsThere is a strong tradition in China of massive public works projects that come to symbolize the power and legitimacy of the state. The Grand Canal is one such project as is the Three Gorges Dam. The effective operation of the canal system and the flood control measures associated with it, became symbols of the imperial system. As fared the canal, so fared the Dynasty. The construction of the Three Gorges Dam has taken on a similar symbolism and will only stop if its political supporters, namely former Premier Li Peng, fall from grace. Aside from the symbolic aspects, as mentioned above, the construction of the Three Gorges Dam and the resulting reservoir will submerge over 800 cultural and historic relics and sites will be lost, not to mention some of the most majestic scenery in the world. While the construction of the canal system resulted in a flourishing of China and Chinese culture, the ultimate effect of the Three Gorges project remains to be seen.
26. Trans-Boundary Issues: No
27. Rights: Yes
It goes without saying that the construction and maintenance of the Grand Canal system resulted in innumerable human rights abuses over hundreds of years. The forced labor required in that gargantuan effort, under often intolerable conditions was horrific. The forced resettlements stemming from the construction of the Three Gorges project and the resulting social and economic turmoil will undoubtedly have a negative impact on the lives and livelihood of 1.2 million people.
28. Relevant Literature:
1. Engineers Warn of Looming Fiasco at World’s Most Destructive Dam. (Nov 4, 1997) International Rivers Network (online) http://www.irn.org/irn/programs/3g/pr971104.html
2. Sklar, Leonard S. and Luer, Amy L. (Oct 17-18, 1997) Report on a Site Visit to the Three Gorges Dam. (online) http://www.irn.org/irn/programs/3g/sklar.html
3. “Three Gorges Dam Update” (Nov 1, 1997) International Rivers Network (online) http://www.irn.org/irn/programs/3g/update971101.html
4. “Three Gorges Project and China’s Economy” (Nov 4, 1997) (online) http://prchina.net/Cgi-Bin/Press.pl?gorges03
5. McCully, Patrick. (Dec 2, 1997) “Climate Change Dooms Dams”, Environmental
News Network (online) 6. “Some Facts about the Three Gorges Project” (Nov 1, 1997) (online)
http://www.prchina.net/Cgi-Bin/Press.pl?gorges04
7. “Money softens blow of having to quit ancestral homes” (Nov 6, 1997)
South China Morning Post (online)
http://www.scmp.com/news/special/threegorges/Dam.asp?Article_Id=19971106145228385
8. “Power to the Yangtze” (Nov 6, 1997) South China Morning Post (online)
http://www.scmp.com/news/special/threegorges/Dam.asp?Article_Id=1997110519908906
9. “Dam will not harm eco-environment”. (online)
http://solar.rtd.utk.edu/~china/cdaily/nov09/11090401.html
10. “Mighty Yangtze yields to dam.” (Nov 11, 1997) South China Morning
Post (Online)
http://www.scmp.com/news/special/threegorges/Dam.asp?Article_Id=19971111035837777
11. “Proof of new strength” (Nov 11, 1997) South China Morning Post.
(online)
http://www.scmp.com/news/special/threegorges/Dam.asp?Article_Id=19971111044021383
12. “Foreign firms in win-win contract.” (Nov 6, 1997) South China Morning
Post (online)
http://www.scmp.com/news/special/threegorges/Dam.asp?Article_Id=19971105175608345
13. Myers, Ramon H. (1980) The Chinese Economy Past and Present., Wadsworth,
Inc. Belmont, CA
14. Tregear, T.R. (1980) China: A Geographic Survey., Halsted Press.,
New York, NY
15. Marks, Robert. (1993) Conference on the History of the Environment
in China: A brief report for CITAS. (online)
http://weber.u.washington.edu/~citas/documents/reports_b
16. Hartwell, Robert M., (1994) Fifteen Centuries of Chinese Environmental
History: Creating a Retroactive Decision-Support System. CITAS and the
University of Pennsylvania (online)
17. Leonard, Jane Kate.(1996) Controlling from Afar: The Daoguang Emperor’s
Management of the Grand Canal Crisis, 1824-1826., Center for Chinese Studies.,
The University of Michigan., Ann Arbor, MI
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