Case Number: 362
Identifier: ANDREEVA
Description: Andreeva Bay Nuclear Waste
I. Identification
1. The Issue
In February of 1982 a radiation leak occurred in the Soviet
Union. The leak took place at a spent nuclear fuel storage
facility at the Andreeva Bay Storage Base on the Kola Peninsula in
the Arctic region of the Soviet Union. The base itself has been in
operation since the early days of the Soviet nuclear submarine
program. Andreeva Bay is believed to house enough nuclear material
that environmental groups consider it hundreds of times more
dangerous than the 1986 Chernobyl explosion. Because of the
secrecy that permeated the Cold War, the Soviet Government kept
this information classified not only to its own people but also to
the rest of the world.
2. Description
Andreeva Bay, on the Kola Peninsula in north western Russia,
is the Russian Northern Fleet's largest storage facility for
radioactive waste and spent nuclear fuel. It has been in operation
since the late 1950s, the beginning of the Russian nuclear
submarine program. Spent fuel assemblies from all Northern Fleet
shipyards are sent to Andreeva Bay. At present, there are
approximately 21,000 assemblies and 12,000 meters3 of solid and
liquid radioactive waste stored there. (Vicini 1995, 1)
The main storage facility is known as Building 5. The site
was built in 1962 and contains two storage pools. They are 60
meters long, 3 meters wide, and 6 meters deep, with an overall
volume of 1,000 meters3. The building itself is a double layered
concrete structure, with the inner wall lined with steel plates.
The fuel is stored side by side in containers weighing 350
kilograms. At the time of the accident, there were approximately
2,550 containers holding between 12,750-17,850 spent fuel
assemblies which translates into 54-76 reactor cores. (Nilsen 1995,
14)
During a 1982 inspection of the pools, it was observed that
water levels in one of the pools had dropped below required levels.
The pool had ruptured and penetrated the steel and concrete
building. Nuclear specialists from the Northern Fleet conducted
tests and were able to determine that the pool was leaking 30
liters of radioactive water per day. A containment plan was
devised by the North Fleet as the leak intensified. By April water
was flowing from the building at a rate of 100 liters per day.
Radiation levels were: ground/air in vicinity of leaking water 15
milligray (mGy) per hour(1.5 Rad/h); bottom of pool 150
megabecquerel (MBq)/liter (4 X 103 Curies (Ci)/l); and drained
water was measured at 110MBq/l (3 X 103 Ci/l). (Nilsen 1995, 14)
The containment plan was not finalized until August 1982. The
decision called for pouring 600 meters3 of concrete along the walls
and floor of the pool in order to seal the crack. In addition,
attempts would be made to filter the water already streaming from
the building to prevent further pollution of the surrounding land
and sea. The bay leading to the Barent Sea, on which the base is
situated, is no more than 350 meters from storage facility.
(Nilsen 1996, 14)
The solution proved to be ineffective. By September the leak
had increased to 30 tons of radioactive water per day. As such,
the containers were in danger of becoming uncovered. The fleet
decided to place a lid of concrete, iron and lead over the pool.
Further measures adopted in February of 1983 by the Ministry of
Defense included covering the entire leak site in concrete,
preparing the spent fuel in the second pool for removal, building
a pipeline to both pools to empty and replace the current water,
building a new facility to house the spent fuel from the two pools
and, finally, the complete decontamination of the area surrounding
Building 5. (Nilsen 1995, 16)
As attempts were being made in November to cover the pool, the
second pool ruptured. The exit rate of the water rapidly
increased to 10 tons per day. By December, the first pool had been
covered, and the water level maintained at a level of 3 meters.
However, the second pool was still leaking, though at a reduced
rate of 3 tons per day. Fresh water was being pumped in to counter
balance the leak. (Nilsen 1995, 17)
By June work began on removing the spent fuel assemblies.
Some of the containers were stored at a solid waste tank on the
base and others were transported to a storage facility in Siberia.
The entire process took over six months, however, some of the
assemblies had broken through their containers and fell to the
bottom of the pools. The radiation levels of these assemblies
were too high to be properly handled, so their recovery was
postponed for two years.
As it turned out, work on the remaining fuel assemblies could
not begin until 1989. Specialists from the Soviet government
formed a 14 person team to remove and transport the remaining
assemblies. It is believed that the new containers were moved to
the solid waste storage facility on the base. Approximately half
of the members of this team received twice the highest permissible
annual dose rate of radiation of 50 millisieverts (mSv) (5 rem).
(Nilsen 1995, 18.)
According to the environmental group Bellona, it is believed
that 3000 meters3 of water escaped from Building 5. The
radiological activity of this water was in the order of 110
tetrabecquerel (tBq) (3,000Ci.) Through radiation tests conducted
in 1995, the radiation appears to have been limited to the area
surrounding Building 5. The brook from the building is
contaminated, but there appears to be no signs of this occurring in
the bay which leads to the Barents Sea only 350 meters from the
site. (Nilsen 1996,17)
Building 5 itself is no longer in use. It is, however, in
very poor condition. In fact, much of the original equipment used
in daily operations remain in the building. This equipment is
considered to be medium to high level waste. Measures of
radiation in some parts of the covered pools are as high as 40 R/h.
(Nilsen 1996, 18)
The implications of the accident at Andreeva are obvious. The
amount of water suspected to have leaked implies that there was a
significant amount of radiation released into the environment. As
already stated, there has been no detection of radiation in the
Barents Sea off of the Kola Peninsula.(Johnston 1992, 3) However,
the fact remains that at one point, over 100 tons of water per day
was leaking from the facility. The base itself is likely to be
highly contaminated, and there is a possibility that this radiation
could make its way down into underground water tables in the
region. As such, this area of Russia will likely remain irradiated
for some time to come. The longer the government waits, the more
expensive and difficult cleanup will be for the already financially
pressed Russian government and the more harm will come to the
region.
3. Related Cases
Czech N-Plant [MOCHO] Case
Russia N-Sub [RUSSNUKE] Case
Russia Nuclear Exports
TEMELIN N-Plant Case
ESTONIA Nuclear Case
Chernobyl Case
URAL Case
ARCTIC Case
Siberia Nuclear Pollution [SIBNUKE] Case
JAPANSEA Case
LUCKY Case
4. Keyword Clusters
(1) Nuclear
(2) Radiation
(3) Russia
5. Draft Author: Michael Goulet, December 1996
II. Legal Cluster
6. Discourse and Status: DISAGREE and ALLEGE
There have not been any direct legal complaints made against
Russia for the accident at the spent nuclear fuel storage plant in
the Andreeva Bay Nuclear Waste storage facility. Russia did not
admit to the spill until 1993 and the admission came as a result of
allegations made by the Norwegian Environmental group Bellona.
This particular accident, as well as the overall mismanaged and
mishandled nuclear waste problem in the former Soviet Union is of
extreme importance to its neighbors.
7. Forum and Scope: Russia and MULTILATeral
There has been no actual studies of radiological contamination
of the ground surrounding Building 5. It is, however, very likely
that it is contaminated when one considers that over 3000 meters3
of radioactive water is believed to have escaped from the pools.
The brook near the facility has been determined to have high levels
of radiation. The bay near the building, and leading out of a
fjord in to the Barents Sea does not appear to be contaminated.
However, due to the amount of the nuclear material at this base and
the hazardous storage practices, it is very unlikely that the
region as a whole to not be contaminated. As such, Norway and
Finland could quite possibly be influenced due to their proximity
to Russia. The most obvious area in which these countries could
experience problems would be in the seafood industry.
8. Decision Breadth: 1 (Russia)
There is potential for this accident to effect many other
countries. If accurate studies are allowed to be conducted on and
near this restricted Russian naval facility, the number of parties
will increase. The most likely additions would be Norway and
Finland. If the environmental impact of nuclear waste becomes part
of multilateral trade or foreign aid pacts, then the parties
involved will obviously expand to include all the signatories.
9. Legal Standing: TREATY
The Soviet Union/Russia, is a member of International Atomic
Energy Agency. Through its obligations to the IAEA, notification
of a nuclear accident is required of member states. This did not
occur. In addition, Russia is also a signatory to the 1972 London
Dumping Convention. Due to the fact that the water from the
storage base leads into international waters, the nation is
required to notify the other signatories. Again, the Soviets did
not do this.
Finally, Russia signed the International Convention on Nuclear
Safety in 1994, and signed agreements of safety at the Group of 7
nuclear Summit in Moscow in 1996. These agreements, while lacking
specific police action, agree to help prevent the spread of nuclear
contamination and pollution. They also look for greater
transparency into the actions of nuclear powers. (Sachs 1993, 1)
Finally, the new Russian Constitution, signed into law in 1993,
states that the government is required to make known any
environmental problems that may affect the citizenry. Thus, while
Russia has been much more open about its nuclear problems than the
Soviet Union, there is still much to be done.
C. GEOGRAPHIC FILTERS
10. Geography
Continental Domain: Europe
Geographic Site: Northern Europe
Geographic Impact: Russia
11. Sub-national Factors: Yes
As a whole, the Soviet Union tended to react indifferently
towards its nuclear problems. Many environmental groups have
provided information highlighting the cases of Soviet nuclear
accidents during the Cold War that Moscow did not report. These
incidents went unreported not only to the rest of the world, but
also to the Soviet nuclear industry. This was done so that the
Soviet nuclear program would not be regarded as faltering or
ineffective. Propaganda took precedence over safety.
In addition, the Russian nuclear inspectorate, Gosatomnadzor
(GAN) created in 1991 to insure the safety of Russian nuclear
facilities has had serious þturfþ battles with the military. One
of its earliest reports was highly critical of the militaryþs
handling of nuclear waste. In a 1993 report, it found many
problems with the Naval bases in the Arctic region. Following this
report, the Ministry of Defense restricted GANþs access to all
military bases. (Mardini 1995, 1)
According to these few examples of nuclear þin-fightingþ in
the Soviet Union, the actions of the North Fleet are not
surprising. The Fleet decided on the actions to be taken at
Building 5. When its solution failed, the Ministry of Defense
responded. Though accurate assessments can not be made, it seems
to have worked. There appears, however, to be no specific reaction
from the Central Committee in Moscow in regards to informing the
public.
12. Type of Habitat: OCEAN
D. TRADE FILTERS
13. Type of Measure: Regulatory Standard
14. Direct vs. Indirect Impact: INDirect
15. Relation of Measure to Impact
a. Directly Related to Product: YES [SEA LIFE]
b. Indirectly Related to Product: YES
c. Not Related to Product: NO
d. Related to Process: YES [HABITAT]
This leak occurred in very close proximity to an international
water way. As such, there could possibly be a direct impact on the
fishing industry. In addition, due to the overall nuclear waste
problem in Russia, there will likely be an indirect effect on other
aspects of the economy. Most notable of these would be the
traditional economic inputs of land, labor and capital. Finally,
the process of economic production will be hindered by radiological
contamination.
16. Trade Product Identification: Seafood
17. Economic Data
Costs of decontaminating the area around Andreeva Bay are
likely to be very high. Due to the secrecy surrounding both this
incident and Soviet/Russian military and nuclear installations,
exact figures concerning radiation released, contamination area and
cleanup costs cannot be determined. Taken as a whole the costs to
the economy from the Soviet nuclear program would be more than a
burden for an industrialized country, let alone a country that is
basically underdeveloped. As such, interesting inferences can be
drawn from the expected cleanup costs of the U.S. nuclear program.
There is a great deal of speculation, but expected costs to the
U.S. Government range from $200-600 billion, with some experts
citing figures upwards of $1 trillion. (Vartabedian 1994, A1)
18. Degree of Competitive Impact: Low
Aside from the storage facility leak at Andreeva Bay, Russia
has also admitted to dumping nuclear fuel in to the Barents Sea.
Until now, there has been no report of radioactivity in sea life.
19. Industry Sector: FOOD
20. Exporters and Importers: Norway and Japan
Norway is the leading exporter of all types of seafood (fresh,
smoked, shell etc.) Many nations import a large amount of seafood
from Norway. The leading importer would be Japan, followed by the
United States, England, and Singapore. (International Trade
Statistics Yearbook: Vol II. 1995, 13)
E. ENVIRONMENTAL FILTERS
21. Environmental Problem Type: Pollution, Sea
The storage leak at Andreeva Bay is small when compared to the
geographic coverage of the Chernobyl nuclear reactor explosion in
1986. However, due to the fact that radioactivity may have leaked
into the fjords of the Bay leading to the Barents Sea, the Arctic
waters may have been affected. The land itself around Building 5,
and the entire base, would appear to be impacted in some way by the
leak.
22. Species Information: Various sealife
23. Impact and Effect: High and Product
Because there can be no verification of increased radiation in
the water of the Bay and, subsequently, the Barents Sea, the impact
is considered low.
24. Urgency and Lifetime: High and Thousands of years
25. Substitutes: RECYCling
Better handling of nuclear waste in Russia is of the utmost
importance. Until storage facilities are actually observed and
tested and the actual amount of waste determined, then no decisions
can be made as to what the most viable solutions are.
VI. OTHER FACTORS
26. Culture: Yes
There is a belief that the Russians are xenophobic and
secretive people. Culture, in regards to this particular issue is
taken at a more specific level, that of the geo-political
historical period. As already stated, this accident took place
during the Cold War. In fact, the 1980s is seen by many as the re-
emergence of Cold War tension after the era of Detente. As such,
the ideological confrontation with the United States prevented
Moscow from releasing the information to the rest of the world.
27. Human Rights: Yes
The human rights of every human being in this region of the
world have been and continue to be violated by the absolute secrecy
that has surrounded this accident. The problem cannot be laid to
rest until a complete report on what happened at Andreeva Bay is
issued and adequate steps are taken to deal with the associated
costs to the public and the environment.
28. Trans-Boundary Issues: Yes
It is likely that other nations would be effected by the
accident at Andreva Bay if the radiation that escaped from the
storage pools reached the Barents Sea. Specifically, Norway would
be the nation most likely to feel radiological impacts due to its
proximity to the accident site.