I. Identification
needs
of temporary agricultural workers as dictated by Mexican law. This
web page will present the case that due to the clout of U.S. agriculture,
Congress weakly enforced the law and purposely ignored violations of the
program ranging from violations of basic human rights to the influx of
massive illegal immigration. Although civil rights groups, church
organizations and labor unions opposed the measure (for albeit distinct
reasons) long before it ended in 1964, a decrease in the U.S. farm population
as well as farmer dissatisfaction with the program was needed to bring
it to an end. From the beginning, U.S. agriculture lobbied against
government regulation and monitoring of living conditions, minimum wages
and various other safeguards put in place on behalf of migrant laborers.
With the Bracero safety net out of the way, U.S. farmers could, as they
do today, continue enjoying plentiful, willing, if illegal, workers at
dramatically lower cost.
Second, the United States was deeply entrenched in WWII. Food procurement was seen first as a security measure (vital to the war effort), and second as an economic one. The acute agricultural labor shortage due to the draft, a shift of domestic workers toward better paid "war jobs" and increased demand for food drove farmers to “call their Congressmen” with regards to the labor shortage. 3
Another important factor that motivated the establishment of the LIP was precedent. During WWI, in 1917, just months after Congress passed legislation to more actively restrict the flow of Mexican nationals across the border, temporary agricultural workers were exempted from the restriction as a concession to farmers. Over 200,000 laborers signed contracts with growers and crossed into the United States from 1917 to 1923 to assist in the labor shortage of that era.4 This first Bracero-like program was ushered out as the Great Depression arrived. This period witnessed a mass exodus of Mexican laborers with five Mexicans emigrating for every one that immigrated.5
Lastly, American lawmakers in 1942 had been irrevocably shaped by their experience in the Great Depression. The widespread, abject poverty the United States experienced in the years between the two World Wars made lawmakers extremely cautious with matters of food supply.
While understanding the motivations for the initiation of the program provides insight, explaining its long term survival is a much greater challenge. Perhaps even more perplexing is the program’s continuation despite major malfunctions such as human rights abuses, skyrocketing illegal immigration and farmer discontent.
In 1942 the Farm Security Administration (FSA) set about trying to
solve the problem of labor distribution by setting up the domestic Migratory
Camp Program. It was believed at the time that there was no domestic
shortage 
of
labor, rather, that it had to be coordinated to more efficiently serve
farmers' needs.6
Labor unions argued the labor shortage was an invention of farmers in order
to convince government officials of their need for less expensive, foreign
labor. On January 23, 1942 the FSA signed an agreement to cooperate
with the U.S. Employment Service (USES) in the organization of transportation,
temporary housing, food and even childcare for migrant laborers. Because
there was no central authority for farm labor at that time, coordination
was less than desirable and the American Farm Bureau Federation later accused
the MCP of being old fashioned, clumsy and inadequate.7
Having exhausted his efforts to organize sufficient domestic labor, Secretary of Agriculture, Claude Wickard, was left to do nothing less than find a new labor source. With that in mind, he left for Mexico City to begin executive agreement negotiations with the Mexican government on the importation of Mexican nationals for employment in agriculture. What came of this bilateral negotiation was "the most comprehensive farm labor contract in the history of American agriculture."8 In what was formalized in 1951 as Public Law 76, imported male laborers were to be provided with individual contracts supervised by the FSA that guaranteed minimum standards of housing (including laundry, bathing, toilets and waste disposal), a minimum wage of $0.30 per hour, at least 30 days of work upon arrival, free transportation and other essential living and labor criteria.
Only one year after the signing of the agreement, the American Farm Bureau Federation, recommended in H.R. 96 (later, P.L. 45) that:
“the administration of this program be decentralized as far as possible so as to enableIn essence, the AFBF asked (and in April 1943, received) that the Bracero program be stripped of its provisions for laborers, leaving only a skeleton of the original agreement. That core consisted of U.S. farmers’ only concern: adequate labor.
each State and each county to develop programs best adapted to the needs of their area,”
and “that all workable, hampering restrictions and controls, including the fixing of
minimum wages, restrictions of hours, housing standards, unionization of workers be
immediately discontinued.”9
The Mexican government had wisely insisted on minimum working standards for their citizens but could do little to monitor U.S. compliance with them. Evidence of this was demonstrated in the “El Paso Incident” in October 1948 when local INS officials unilaterally opened the U.S.-Mexican border at El Paso to eager migrant workers.10 Even though WWII had been over for three years, farmers’ demands for cheap labor could apparently not be quenched in compliance with the agreement. Mexico City’s response to such blatant violation of the agreement was immediate abrogation. The State Department answered with a note of apology but U.S. farmers continued to recruit illegal workers even before the two countries reached another agreement.11
Concern for migrant labor conditions on U.S. farms was justified. The FSA was drastically under funded and provided, for example, “two inspectors, head quartered at Portland, OR, [to be responsible for monitoring] all the Braceros working in Utah, Idaho, Oregon, Washington and Montana.”12 There are countless testimonies of legally contracted Braceros experiencing widespread disregard for inadequate housing, food, health care and even fair pay. The majority of recruits came from “the rural, least developed, and more isolated regions” of Mexico with very little, if any, background in English. This basic factor allowed farmer and recruiter manipulation of records and contracts, as well as contributed to the overall bewilderment of laborers. Climate was the most immediate challenge for many Braceros who arrived in regions such as the Northwest. Finding appropriate clothing for an Oregonian spring in southern Mexico proved difficult and growers were not expected provide them.13
Why was so little done to ensure U.S. compliance with the Bracero agreement on issues of basic human rights? Even with huge organizations such as the AFL-CIO in opposition to the migrant labor exploitation that was inherent to the Bracero program, it was renewed consecutively throughout the administrations of 5 presidents. Why were borders not better patrolled in order to prevent the massive influx of illegal immigrants? The simple answer is that it was not in the United States’ interest to do so. Braceros “constituted about 25 percent of the farm labor force in California, Arizona, New Mexico and in Texas,” contributing not only to the vital food production of that period but also to increasing U.S. dominance in agriculture. While recruitment and transportation of legally contracted Braceros cost American taxpayers roughly $450 for each of the 4.5 million legal laborers, it spurred the long term migration of millions of illegal workers (at no direct cost to taxpayers) who continue to support U.S. farming. These workers meet the almost insatiable demand for inexpensive labor on U.S. farms.15
Table 1 demonstrates how the number of Bracero contracts consistently waned as time progressed while the number of Mexican nationals entering the United States did not. Instead of openly encouraging illegal immigration, a move that would have estranged Mexico City, lawmakers chose to maintain at least the skeleton of the agreement (as amended by H.R. 96) and loosely monitor its execution. This trend continues today as border patrols, scrutiny of farmers' hiring practices and punitive measures for employment of illegal workers demonstrate Congress' disinterest in controlling labor migration. (H.R. 2202)
| 1949 | 1953 | 1964 | 1965 | 1970 | 1974 | |
| Braceros | 107,000 | 201,380 | 177,736 | 20,284 | 0 | 0 |
| Legal Immigrants | 7,977 | 18,459 | 34,448 | 40,686 | 44,821 | 71,863 |
| Illegals
Apprehended |
233,485 | 676,602 | 43,844 | 55,349 | 277,377 | 709,959 |
The continued power of agriculture to influence Congress on migrant labor issues cannot be underestimated despite the increased influence of human rights organizations, labor unions and the Mexican American community on Capitol Hill. Programs reminiscent of the LIP appear in Congress almost annually. The most recent attempt was the failed 1997 Pombo Amendment to H.R. 2202, an amendment aimed at changing the current “Immigration and Nationality Act to improve deterrence of illegal immigration.” (H.R. 2202) The amendment moved "to create a new nonimmigrant category for temporary agricultural workers admitted pursuant to a labor condition attestation." (Pombo Amendment) In other words, members of Congress once again attempted to revise increased control of immigration to exclude laborers necessary to farmers. Although only roughly 3% of the 105th Congress’ constituents are dependent on agriculture, 180 Congressmen voted in favor of the amendment.16
The Bracero program adhered to the most basic economic principle
of supply and demand. It exploited the bountiful supply of willing
Mexican labor, offered Mexican nationals a chance to improve their buying
power, relieved the Mexican government of excess workers and met U.S. farmers'
great demand for inexpensive labor. This flexibility and mobility
of labor created an undisputed world leader in the market, justifying and
prolonging the U.S. agriculture-Mexican labor relationship. It did
not, however, fulfill its promises to the laborers themselves. Instead
of encouraging a mutually advantageous relationship, the LIP became a tool
of exploitation that perpetuated decades of dependency, poverty and estrangement
in the Mexican American community. Hispanic Americans now constitute
the poorest section of American society, witnessing a drop in annual income
between 1989 and 1998 of 14%.17
American born or not, the majority of Hispanics (a majority of whom are
of Mexican descent) in the United States do not enjoy the affluence they
and their forefathers helped create.
II. Legal
Clusters
III. Geographic
Clusters
NORTH
AMERICA, however, Braceros labored throughout the continental
IV. Trade
Clusters
required
to be provided by the employer for laborers. Lastly, the Bracero
program provided an indirect subsidy by ensuring a cheap labor source for
farmers, which made U.S. agriculture more competitive on the global market.18
| 1942 | 1945 | 1948 | 1951 | 1953 | 1956 | 1958 | 1960 | 1964 |
| $123.168 | $164.067 | $207.478 | $279.3 | $305.6 | $350.8 | $367.4 | $414.5 | $510.1 |
Employment
One of the major downfalls of the FSA was its inability to control or monitor the reality of agricultural labor migration during its Labor Importation Program. According to official record, 4.5 million Braceros earned roughly $100-110 million annually from 1942 to 1964.20 These numbers may reflect, however, simply a move away from documented employment under the jurisdiction of the FSA and growth in its illegal variety (see Table 1). For the purpose of comparison, the Table 3 provides the average number of persons employed in agriculture overall for selected years during the Bracero Program.
Table 3
| 1942 | 1945 | 1948 | 1951 | 1953 | 1956 | 1958 | 1960 | 1964 |
| 11,458 | 10,813 | 11,080 | 9,546 | 8,864 | 7,853 | 7,503 | 7,057 | 6,110 |
Case importer: U.S. government, U.S. farmers
Leading Importers and Exporters (U.S. $): Although precise statistics could not be found before the deadline of this project, another example of labor importation in history is the German importation of Turkish nationals after WWII. This arrangement also lead to a situation similar to that in the United States of long term immigration and Turkish immigrants making up one of the poorest classes in German society.
VI. Other
Factors
in
American society. The greatest of these problems has been the battle
over language as more and more children of Mexican descent enter American
schools. In California especially, there has been a progressive move
toward bilingual education
in at least the first few years of elementary school, to allow children
of Spanish speaking parents to adjust to English. Elsewhere the picture
is not so hopeful. Hispanic Americans make up the poorest
group in American society, are surprisingly underrepresented in the
U.S. government despite the fact that they constitute 11.2% of the total
population, and are currently experiencing a whereby subsequent generations
receive less schooling than their parents.21
