COINTELPRO
is the FBI acronym for a series of covert action programs directed against
domestic groups. In these programs, the Bureau went beyond the collection
of intelligence to secret action designed to "disrupt" and "neutralize"
target groups and individuals. The techniques were adopted wholesale from
wartime counterintelligence, and ranged from the trivial (mailing reprints
of Reader's Digest articles to college administrators) to the degrading
(sending anonymous poison?pen letters intended to break up marriages) and
the dangerous (encouraging gang warfare and falsely labeling members of
a violent group as police informers).
This
report is based on a staff study of more than 20,000 pages of Bureau documents,
depositions of many of the Bureau agents involved in the programs, and
interviews of several COINTELPRO targets. The examples selected for discussion
necessarily represent a small percentage of the more than 2,000 approved
COINTELPRO actions. Nevertheless, the cases demonstrate the consequences
of a Government agency's decision to take the law into its own hands for
the "greater good" of the country.
COINTELPRO
began in 1956, in part because of frustration with Supreme Court rulings
limiting the Government's power to proceed overtly against dissident groups;
it ended in 1971 with the threat of public exposure. In the intervening
15 years, the Bureau conducted a sophisticated vigilante operation aimed
squarely at preventing the exercise of First Amendment rights of speech
and association, on the theory that preventing the growth of dangerous
groups and the propagation of dangerous ideas would protect the national
security and deter violence.
Many
of the techniques used would be intolerable in a democratic society even
if all of the targets had been involved in violent activity, but COINTELPRO
went far beyond that. The unexpressed major premise of the programs was
that a law enforcement agency has the duty to do whatever is necessary
to combat perceived threats to the existing social and political order
....
7.
New Left. The
Internal Security Section had undergone a slow transition from concentrating
on the "Old Left"?the CPUSA and SWP?to focusing primarily on the activities
of the "New Left"?a term which had no precise definition within the Bureau.
Some agents defined "New Left" functionally, by connection with protests.
Others defined it by philosophy, particularly antiwar philosophy.
On
October 28, 1968, the fifth and final COINTELPRO was started against
this undefined group. The program was triggered in part by the Columbia
campus disturbance. Once again, law enforcement methods had broken down,
largely (in the Bureau's opinion) because college administrators refused
to call the police on campus to deal with student demonstrations. The atmosphere
at the time was described by the Headquarters agent who supervised the
New Left COINTELPRO:
During
that particular time, there was considerable public, Administration --
I mean governmental Administration?[and] news media interest in the protest
movement to the extent that some groups, I don't recall any specifics,
but some groups were calling for something to be done to blunt or reduce
the protest movements that were disrupting campuses. I can't classify it
as exactly an hysteria, but there was considerable interest [and concern].
That was the framework that we were working with .... It would be my impression
that as a result of this hysteria, some governmental leaders were looking
to the Bureau.
And,
once again, the combination of perceived threat, public outcry, and law
enforcement frustration produced a COINTELPRO.
According
to the initiating letter, the counterintelligence program's purpose was
to "expose, disrupt, and otherwise neutralize" the activities of the various
New Left organizations, their leadership, and adherents, with particular
attention to Key Activists, "the moving forces behind the New Left." The
final paragraph contains an exhortation to a "forward look, enthusiasm,
and interest" because of the Bureau's concern that "the anarchist activities
of a few can paralyze institutions of learning, induction centers, cripple
traffic, and tie the arms of law enforcement officials all to the detriment
of our society." The internal memorandum recommending the program further
sets forth the Bureau's concerns:
Our Nation is undergoing an
era of disruption and violence caused to a large extent by various individuals
generally connected with the New Left. Some of these activists urge revolution
in America and call for the defeat of the United States in Vietnam. They
continually and falsely allege police brutality and do not hesitate to
utilize unlawful acts to further their so-called causes.
The
document continues:
The New Left has on many
occasions viciously and scurrilously attacked the Director and the Bureau
in an attempt to hamper our investigation of it and to drive us off the
college campuses.
Based
on those factors, the Bureau decided to institute a new COINTELPRO.
8.
New Left Directives. The
Bureau's concern with "tying the hands of law enforcement officers," and
with the perceived weaknesses of college adminsitrators in refusing to
call police onto the campus, led to a May 23,
1968, directive
to all participating field offices to gather information on three categories
of New Left activities:
(1)
false allegations of police brutality, to "counter the wide?spread charges
of police brutality that invariably arise following student?police encounters";
(2)
immorality, depicting the "scurrilous and depraved nature of many of the
characters, activities, habits, and living conditions representative of
New Left adherents"; and
(3)
action by college administrators, "to show the value of college administrators
and school officials taking a firm stand," and pointing out "whether and
to what extent faculty members rendered aid and encouragement."
The
letter continues, "Every avenue of possible embarrassment must be vigorously
and enthusiastically explored. It cannot be expected that information
of this type will be easily obtained, and an imaginative approach by your
personnel is imperative to its success."
The
order to furnish information on "immorality" was not carried out with sufficient
enthusiasm. On October 9,
1968, headquarters
sent another letter to all offices, taking them to task for their failure
to "remain alert for and to seek specific data depicting the depraved nature
and moral looseness of the New Left" and to "use this material in a vigorous
and enthusiastic approach to neutralizing them." Recipient offices were
again instructed to be "particularly alert for this type of data" and told:
As
the current school year commences, it can be expected that the New Left
with its anti?war and anti?draft entourage will make every effort to confront
college authorities, stifle military recruiting, and frustrate the Selective
Service System. Each office will be expected, therefore, to afford this
program continuous effective attention in order that no opportunity will
be missed to destroy this insidious movement.
As
to the police brutality and "college administrator" categories, the Bureau's
belief that getting tough with students and demonstrators would solve the
problem, and that any injuries which resulted were deserved, is reflected
in the Bureau's reaction to allegations of police brutality following the
Chicago Democratic Convention.
On
August 28,
1968, a
letter was sent to the Chicago field office instructing it to "obtain
all possible evidence that would disprove these charges" [that the Chicago
police used undue force] and to "consider measures by which cooperative
news media may be used to counteract these allegations." The administrative
"note" (for the file) states:
Once again, the liberal
press and the bleeding hearts and the forces on the left are taking advantage
of the situation in Chicago surrounding the Democratic National Convention
to attack the police and organized law enforcement agencies .... We
should be mindful of this situation and develop all possible evidence to
expose this activity and to refute these false allegations.
In
the same vein, on September 9, 1968, an instruction was sent to all offices
which had sent informants to the Chicago convention demonstrations, ordering
them to debrief the informants for information "indicating incidents were
staged to show police reacted with undue force and any information that
authorities were baited by militants into using force." The offices were
also to obtain evidence of possible violations of anti?riot laws.
The
originating New Left letter had asked all recipient offices to respond
with suggestions for counterintelligence action. Those responses were analyzed
and a letter sent to all offices on July 6, 1968, setting forth twelve
suggestions for counterintelligence action which could be utilized by all
offices. Briefly the techniques are:
(1)
preparing leaflets designed to discredit student demonstrators, using photographs
of New Left leadership at the respective universities. "Naturally, the
most obnoxious pictures should be used";
(2)
instigating "personal conflicts or animosities" between New Left leaders;
(3)
creating the impression that leaders are "informants for the Bureau or
other law enforcement agencies";
(4)
sending articles from student newspapers or the "underground press" which
show the depravity of the New Left to university officials, donors, legislators,
and parents. "Articles showing advocation of the use of narcotics and free
sex are ideal";
(5)
having members arrested on marijuana charges;
(6)
sending anonymous letters about a student's activities to parents, neighbors,
and the parents' employers. "This could have the effect of forcing the
parents to take action";
(7)
sending anonymous letters or leaflets describing the "activities and associations"
of New Left faculty members and graduate assistants to university officials,
legislators, Boards of Regents, and the press. "These letters should be
signed `A Concerned Alumni,' or `A Concerned Taxpayer' ";
(8)
using "cooperative press contacts" to emphasize that the "disruptive elements"
constitute a "minority" of the students. "The press should demand an immediate
referendum on the issue in question";
(9)
exploiting the "hostility" among the SDS and other New Left groups toward
the SWP, YSA, and Progressive Labor Party;
(10)
using "friendly news media" and law enforcement officials to disrupt New
Left coffeehouses near military bases which are attempting to "influence
members of the Armed Forces";
(11)
using cartoons, photographs, and anonymous letters to "ridicule" the New
Left; and
(12) using
"misinformation" to "confuse and disrupt" New Left activities, such as
by notifying members that events have been cancelled.
As
noted earlier, the lack of any Bureau definition of "New Left" resulted
in targeting almost every anti?war group, and spread to students demonstrating
against anything. One notable example is a proposal targeting a student
who carried an "obscene" sign in a demonstration protesting administration
censorship of the school newspaper, and another student who sent a letter
to that paper defending the demonstration. In another[, an] article regarding
"free love" on a university campus was anonymously mailed to college administrators
and state officials since free love allows "an atmosphere to build up on
campus that will be a fertile field for the New Left."
None
of the Bureau witnesses deposed believes the New Left COINTELPRO was generally
effective, in part because of the imprecise targeting.