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In The Paradox of Representation, David Lublin offers an unprecedented analysis of a vast range of rigorous, empirical evidence that exposes the central paradox of racial representation: Racial redistricting remains vital to the election of African Americans and Latinos but makes Congress less likely to adopt policies favored by blacks. Lublin's evidence, together with policy recommendations for improving minority representation, will make observers of the political scene reconsider the avenues to fair representation.
Using data on all representatives elected to Congress between 1972 and 1994, Lublin examines the link between the racial composition of a congressional district and its representative's race as well as ideology. The author confirms the view that specially drawn districts must exist to ensure the election of African Americans and Latinos. He also shows, however, that a relatively small number of minorities in a district can lead to the election of a representative attentive to their interests. When African Americans and Latinos make up 40 percent of a district, according to Lublin's findings, they have a strong liberalizing influence on representatives of both parties; when they make up 55 percent, the district is almost certain to elect a minority representative.
Lublin notes that particularly in the South, the practice of concentrating minority populations into a small number of districts decreases the liberal influence in the remaining areas. Thus, a handful of minority representatives, almost invariably Democrats, win elections, but so do a greater number of conservative Republicans. The author proposes that establishing a balance between majority-minority districts and districts where the minority population would be slightly more dispersed, making up 40 percent of a total district, would allow more African Americans to exercise more influence over their representatives.
Richard H. Pildes, University of Michigan Law School:
An important book on some of the most vexing questions of race and politics we currently face. David Lublin brings an honest, careful, and systematic social scientist's approach to highly charged issues that are too often ideologically debated on both left and right with little knowledge of the actual facts. The findings of this timely book will be of considerable interest not just to academics but also to policymakers, journalists, consultants, and all those interested in how America's democratic institutions can best be designed to protect minority interests while preserving majority rule.
The creation of new majority-minority districts to advance minority representation has been one of the most controversial aspects of the Voting Rights Act since its inception in 1965. Advocates of racial redistricting deem it essential to the election of African-American and Latino representatives and the expression of minority political opinions in the halls of power. Opponents decry this policy as going beyond the original scope of the Act and perpetuating racial distinctions in both law and society. They further contend that African Americans and Latinos can win elections without the aid of racial gerrymanders and that drawing new majority-minority districts actually harm minority efforts to advance their policy goals by reducing minority electoral influence over all but a small subset of representatives.
Recent events have heightened the controversy over promoting minority representation through racial redistricting. Many states created new majority-minority districts with highly irregular boundaries during the 1990 redistricting round. The Supreme Court placed the entire racial redistricting strategy under a legal cloud by ruling in Miller v. Johnson that using race as the "predominant factor" in drawing district lines violates the Equal Protection Clause. This book provides a gauge of progress made under the Voting Rights Act by using statistical analysis to measure the empirical effect of racial redistricting on both the election of minority officials and public policy. This study should thus allow for assessment of the efficacy of advancing minority representation through racial redistricting.
In this work, I demonstrate the following:
1. Racial redistricting in the South has made the House less likely to adopt legislation favored by African Americans. Racial redistricting in the North generally does not have the same effect.
2. Racial redistricting results in the election of more Republicans unless mapmakers purposively adopt Democratic gerrymanders with bizarre district lines to avoid this outcome. The creation of new majority-minority districts assured that the Republicans won solid control of the House in 1994.
3. Black influence districts most strongly increase the responsiveness of representatives to black concerns if African Americans compose at least 40 percent of the population. African Americans usually cannot elect black representatives in 40 to 50 percent black districts without the aid of coalition partners, particularly Latinos, but their votes effectively veto the election of conservative representatives.
4. Excepting districts represented by northern Democrats, increases in the African-American population above and below the 40 percent black threshold raises the responsiveness of representatives in both white and black majority districts. Regional differences in the dispersion of blacks and ideology of whites explains this variation in responsiveness across regions. Southern Democrats pay close attention to the racial balance in their districts because of the relative conservatism of most southern whites compared to most southern blacks. The lack of responsiveness to changes in the black share of the population by northern representatives reflects that non-black liberals live in close proximity to black districts in the North. Representatives of these districts can maintain liberal policy stances regardless of the black share of the population because of high levels of white support for liberalism.
5. The election of more than token numbers of African-American and Latino representatives requires drawing majority-minority districts. The substantial increase in the election of African-American and Latino representatives over the past thirty years rests entirely on the creation of new black districts.
6. The so-called 65 percent rule is invalid. Some advocates of minority representation have argued that minorities must comprise at least 65 percent of the population in a district in order to assure the election of a black or Latino official. Empirical analysis indicates that 55 percent minority districts should elect minority representatives to the House in most portions of the country.
7. Increasing the percentage of Latinos in a district reduces the percentage of blacks required to promote the election of a black representative.
8. The percentage of Latinos in a district needed to assure the election of a Latino
representative rises as the percentage of citizens declines.
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The views and opinions expressed in this page are strictly those of the page author. The contents of this page have not been reviewed or approved by American University. If you have any questions about this page, please email David Lublin at dlublin@american.edu. This page was last updated on August 2, 1999.