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LEXIS-NEXIS® Academic

December 18, 1987, Friday, Late City Final Edition

SECTION: Section A; Page 39, Column 1; Editorial Desk

LENGTH: 890 words

HEADLINE: How to Prevent Endless War in Central America

BYLINE: By William M. LeoGrande; William M. LeoGrande, a specialist in Latin America, is associate professor of political science at the American University.

DATELINE: WASHINGTON

BODY:
Like the ghosts of Christmas escorting Ebenezer Scrooge through Dickens's ''A Christmas Carol,'' Maj. Roger Miranda Bengoechea, a Nicaraguan defector, has provided a glimpse of what the future holds in store if we continue on our present course in Central America.

Major Miranda brought with him into exile the Sandinistas' five-year plan for their armed forces. With a key Congressional vote on aid to the contras coming up soon, the State Department was eager to present him to the media. In prearranged briefings, he described a Sandinista plan that calls for a continuation of the rapid military buildup that began with the contra war in 1981 and, concomitantly, a greater reliance on military aid from Cuba and the Soviet Union.

Though nothing in this plan departs significantly from Nicaragua's national security policy over the past several years, the projection of it into the 1990's conjures up a grim image of Central America caught in a spiraling arms race - each nation seeing in the weaponry of its neighbors a threat to its own security, each diverting precious resources from the tasks of economic reconstruction to preparations for war.

Like most military strategists, the Sandinistas have planned for the ''worst case.'' Their projected buildup is based on the presumption that the contras, with United States assistance, will continue fighting, that Washington will remain implacably hostile and that direct United States intervention, as in Grenada, will always be possibile.

In short, the Sandinistas' military plans envision exactly what the Reagan Administration is advocating: a continuation of American policy unchanged. Major Miranda has shown us the future we can expect if President Reagan gets his way.

This sobering vision of a region permanently haunted by the specter of war need not come true. The Sandinistas are not likely to carry out the military plans Major Miranda describes if the assumptions on which they are based no longer hold. Negotiations, regional and bilateral, are the only means of changing those assumptions and making the five-year plan obsolete.

Major Miranda's disclosures should make us all the more determined to press for the success of the Central American peace accord. The accord, drafted by Oscar Arias Sanchez, the Costa Rican President and 1987 Nobel Peace Prize laureate, has been implemented gradually since it was signed by five Central Americans last August. President Arias has called on the United States not to undermine the agreement by giving more aid to the contras before the presidents meet in January to review the progress of the accord.

That accord still offers the best hope for bringing the contra war to a political conclusion rather than having it drag on for years to a military denouement. It also offers the best hope for stabilizing relations between Nicaragua and its neighbors.

The report of Nicaragua's planned buildup also highlights the urgency of expanding the Central American negotiations to include security issues such as the size of regional armies and the sophistication of their weaponry, and the presence of foreign military troops and advisers.

These are issues that Central Americans and the Contadora countries - Colombia, Mexico, Venezuela and Panama - wrestled with for several years before the Arias accord was signed. On several occasions, they came close to agreement only to be stymied by opposition from Washington. A security accord embodying the 1984 or 1986 Contadora proposals would explicitly prohibit the sort of Nicaraguan military buildup Major Miranda foresees.

But even a security agreement among the Central Americans is no substitute for direct talks between Nicaragua and the United States. The Sandinistas, given the history of their country, are convinced that ultimately they will have to confront American military forces directly -just as their namesake, Gen. Augusto Sandino, did in the 1920's and 30's.

So long as they harbor that expectation, they will view a large military establishment and a close relationship with Cuba and the Soviet Union as indispensable to their survival. Direct negotiations leading to a nonaggression pledge from the United States and the normalization of diplomatic and economic relations offer the only prospect of easing the Sandinistas' perception of threat. In the past, the Sandinistas have expressed a willingness to limit their armed forces in exchange for such assurances from the United States. It is time to test their sincerity.

During the summit meeting, Mikhail S. Gorbachev hinted that the Soviet Union might be willing to curtail its military involvement in Nicaragua if America halted aid to the contras. His offer indicated that the Soviet Union would prefer to avoid paying for a second Cuba if there were a reasonable diplomatic alternative. On the other hand, the Nicaraguan military's five-year plan shows that if the United States insists on stepping up military aid to the contras, the Soviet Union is prepared to respond in kind.

We have before us a vision of two futures, now more clearly defined than ever before - one, peace arrived at through diplomacy; the other, a nightmare of endless war fueled by the superpowers. As with Ebenezer Scrooge, a more enlightened sense of our self-interest can prevent our nightmare from coming true.

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