LEXIS-NEXIS® Academic Universe

LEXIS-NEXIS® Academic Universe - Document

LEXIS-NEXIS® Academic

August 8, 1986, Friday, Home Edition

SECTION: Metro; Part 2; Page 5; Column 3; Op-Ed Desk

LENGTH: 941 words

HEADLINE: WHAT IS OUR POLICY IN NICARAGUA?;
REAGAN OWES ANSWERS BEFORE WE'RE COMMITTED TO PROXY WAR

BYLINE: By WILLIAM M. LEOGRANDE and KENNETH E. SHARPE

BODY:
The Senate soon will begin debate on President Reagan's request for $100 million in aid to the contras fighting the Sandinista government of Nicaragua. In June the House ended two years of opposition to contra aid by narrowly approving the President's proposal, so the Senate's deliberations will be the last opportunity for full debate before a major escalation of U.S. involvement.

Such a debate is badly needed. Although Congress has discussed contra aid a dozen times since 1983, it has been unable to get clear answers to the most basic questions about the objectives of the policy, its chances for success, its costs and the consequences of failure.

These are the questions that went unasked and unanswered in 1965 before the decision to commit U.S. troops to Vietnam. As David Halberstam recounted in his book "The Best and the Brightest": "In all those weeks (in early 1965) of debating about what to do . . . the principals never defined either the mission or the number of troops. It seems incredible in retrospect, but it is true. There was never a clear definition of what the strategy would be."

What is the purpose of the policy? At first the Administration insisted that its only aim was to interdict arms being smuggled from Nicaragua to guerrillas in El Salvador. When the expanding war in Nicaragua made this rationale implausible, it was replaced by a new one: pressuring Nicaragua to agree to a regional peace accord. When Nicaragua offered to sign such a treaty, the rationale shifted again. Now it is to force the Sandinistas to negotiate with the contras. Yet a strong suspicion persists that, behind the screen of official explanations, the real motive is to overthrow the Nicaraguan government.

What are the chances of success? This is a tough question to answer until we know what the policy is trying to achieve. If the goal is to force basic changes in Sandinista behavior -- reducing their military ties with the Soviet Union, curbing their arms buildup and broadening domestic liberty -- the past four years of war have been counterproductive. What reason is there to expect that a wider war will change this?

If the aim is to overthrow the Sandinistas, the Administration must explain why it thinks that the contras can succeed. The contras already have received more than $100 million in U.S. aid since 1982, yet have been unable to hold any territory, capture a sizable town or operate independently of their base camps in Honduras. Their meager efforts to build popular support have been crippled by atrocities, corruption and their ties to the hated dictatorship of Anastasio Somoza. How is this dismal record going to be reversed?

What will the policy cost? No one expects $100 million to alter the course of the war in Nicaragua. How much more will be needed, especially if Cuba and the Soviet Union respond by escalating their aid to the Sandinistas?

The cost must be figured not only in U.S. dollars and Nicaraguan blood but also in our relations with the rest of the world. Latin America virtually is unanimous in its opposition to the escalating war. None of our European allies support it. The Administration has defied the World Court and vetoed a U.N. Security Council resolution that simply called on us to obey the law. Rarely has the United States been so isolated on an issue of war and peace.

Among Americans, the war against Nicaragua has generated intense division and poisonous debate reminiscent of the McCarthy era. Grass-roots opposition, based largely in the nation's churches, is strong and growing. In opinion polls, opposition to Reagan's policy runs more than 2 to 1. To sustain it in the face of congressional resistance, he has resurrected the ghost of the Imperial Presidency by evading the spirit if not the letter of the law.

And, despite all the arguments about the requisites of national security and the imperative of protecting vital interests, there also is a certain moral price to be paid, as there was in Vietnam, when the most powerful country in the world lays waste to a small, poor nation of peasants.

Reagan owes us an estimate of what he thinks it will cost and how long it will take to succeed in Nicaragua. How much is he willing to pay, and how much is he prepared to make Nicaraguans pay?

What if the policy fails? Fueling the war in Nicaragua is a high-risk strategy. It has radicalized the Nicaraguan revolution, opened the door to Cuban and Soviet military influence, stimulated a regional arms race and increased the danger of regional conflict. Because the policy makes things worse in the short run, it creates its own rationale for escalation. But if the policy fails, it will leave Nicaragua and Central America much more polarized, militarized and dangerous than before.

What do we do if the contras are defeated? Is the President prepared to acquiesce, however grudgingly, to the existence of the Sandinista government? Or will he send U.S. troops to do the job that the contras are unable to do?

The Senate has a responsibility to demand answers to these questions before committing the United States to war by proxy. This week marked the 20th anniversary of the Gulf of Tonkin resolution, a reminder of the disastrous consequences that can follow when Congress fails to take its responsibility seriously. William M. LeoGrande and Kenneth E. Sharpe teach political science at American University and Swarthmore College, respectively. They are co-editors, with Morris Blachman, of "Confronting Revolution: Security Through Diplomacy in Central America " (Pantheon, 1986).
DR, MARINO, El Universal, Mexico City