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2004 PRIMARY TURNOUT LOW

GROUPED PRIMARIES LOWER THAN INDIVIDUALS

BETTER SELECTION METHOD NEEDED

WASHINGTON, March 9 – Contrary to some published reports and with the singular exception of the New Hampshire Democratic primary which set a new record high, Democratic turnout in the party's Presidential primaries through Super Tuesday was generally low – in the aggregate, the third lowest on record.

Republican Presidential primary turnout was the lowest on record. Turnout in Presidential primaries in those states which held primaries for the nominee of both parties was the second lowest on record, barely eclipsing the record set in 1996.

In all, an estimated 14,500,000 eligible citizens or 7.2 percent of the national eligible electorate participated in the Presidential primaries through Super Tuesday. Only an estimated 10,300,000 citizens or 5.1 percent of the 200,482,000 eligible Americans nationally participated in the selection of Sen. John Kerry as the Democratic nominee. (Estimations made necessary by more than one million still uncounted absentee ballots in California.)

A comparatively high turnout, greater than either 2000 or 1996 and perhaps equaling or exceeding the 58.1 percent turnout of 1992 is expected in November. But turnout is not expected to reach the 60 percent plus levels of the 1960s.

These are some of the highlights of a report issued today on Presidential primary turnout (and other issues) by the Committee for the Study of the American Electorate (CSAE), a non-partisan, non-profit research organization specializing in voter turnout issues.

Among the other highlights and lowlights of this report:

-Democratic turnout (an estimated 10.3 million) constituted 11.4 percent of the eligible electorate in the 20 states which held primaries through Super Tuesday, higher than the 9 percent which voted in the uncontested 1996 Presidential primaries and the virtually (after New Hampshire) uncontested primaries in 2000 in which 10.1 percent of the eligible electorate voted. But it was lower than the turnout for every other Presidential primary season in these states and more than 50 percent lower than the primary turnouts of 1968 and 1972.

-Republican turnout (an estimated 4 million) constituted 6.6 percent of the eligible electorate in the 11 states which held GOP primaries a smaller percentage than in any primary season including the uncontested Reagan renomination primaries (7.2 percent), the uncontested Nixon renomination primaries (11.3) and more than 50 percent below the GOP Presidential primary apex of 14.9 in 1980.

-Turnout in the 11 states which had primaries in both parties was an estimated 12.6 million or 20.8 percent of the eligible electorate in both parties eclipsing only the 20.4 percent turnout in 1996, when President Clinton ran unopposed, and more than a third lower than the primary seasons of 1964, 1972, 1976 and 1980, all of which eclipsed 30 percent turnout rates.

-Democratic turnout reached a legitimate record high in New Hampshire where 23.5 percent of eligibles turned out as compared to the previous high of 20.2 in 1992. Three other states could claim "records" but those claims are somewhat specious. Arizona had a "record" turnout of 6.4 percent of eligibles but that was in comparison to only one other Democratic primary held in that state, a virtually uncontested race in 2000 that garnered 2.6 percent of eligibles. Delaware had a "record" turnout of 5.6 percent of eligibles compared to 2 percent turnouts in the uncontested and virtually uncontested races on 1996 and 2000 respectively. And South Carolina could claim a "record" of a 9.5 percent turnout against the only other Democratic primary held in the state in 1992 at 4.4 percent.

-Democratic turnout reached real record lows in Connecticut at 5.4 percent of eligibles and in New York also at 5.4 percent. Another "record" low was set in Virginia where only 7.5 percent of eligibles voted. But there had been only one other Virginia Democratic primary - in 1988 when 8.3 percent of eligibles voted.

-Vermont, in a posthumous (for his candidacy) show of support for Gov. Howard Dean, recorded its second highest turnout ever at 16.5 percent of eligibles as compared to the high of 19.4 in 1984.

-Republican turnout reached legitimate record lows in New Hampshire (7.2 percent of eligibles

as compared to the previous low of 10.6 in 1984), Oklahoma (2.6 versus 5.0 in 2000), Tennessee (2.2 versus 2.4 in 1984), Massachusetts (1.54 versus 1.57 in 1984), Wisconsin (4.0 versus 8.7 in 1984) and California (an estimated 10.7 versus 11.3 in 1984). Missouri was also at a “record” low at 2.9 percent of eligibles voting, but there have been only two other GOP primaries in the state (in 1988 and 2000, both with turnout rates over 10 percent). The GOP barely avoided another low primary turnout record in Rhode Island where only 0.34 percent of eligibles cast their ballots, but that actually beat the party's 1984 turnout where only 0.32 percent of eligibles voted.

Democratic turnout was a record in New Hampshire and a near record in the Iowa caucuses in part because of the enormous amount of time and money spent in those states, the latter (money) a record, because competing in those contests involved retail campaigning and mobilization and because Democrats (along with some independents and Republicans) are united in their distaste for President George W. Bush, had the time to comparison shop and were propelled to the polls by that animus.

That turnout fell off sharply after those contests was not surprising. The campaign moved immediately (within one week) to grouped contests (see below) which were underfunded (resources having been severely depleted by Iowa and New Hampshire), which had to be conducted through television ads and one-shot visits to get free media coverage, which minimized grassroots mobilization and in which candidates other than Sen. Kerry could compete in only a limited number of states. It is not, therefore, surprising that the two highest turnouts in Democratic primaries were recorded in New Hampshire (23.5 percent) and Wisconsin (20.5), both the only primaries on their respective days.

It is also not surprising that after a primary campaign in which voter involvement was limited to six weeks and which was conducted in only 20 of the 50 states and which was a brief wholesale campaign in most of them, in almost all polls, between 20 and 30 percent of Americans still do not know enough about either Sen. Kerry or Sen. John Edwards to determine whether they have a favorable or unfavorable opinion of either. But this truncated schedule, created by the Democratic Party, may come back to haunt it, as it gives the GOP five months to define Sen. Kerry before he has his optimum opportunity to present himself in the best light at the Democratic national convention.

What continues to be disturbing is the low level of voter turnout – between 30 and 50 percent lower than turnouts in the 1960s and 70s. What seems apparent is that the religion of civic duty, which brought large percentages of the electorate out to vote regardless of what was at stake, has been severely undermined. Primary turnout should not be as high as general election turnout. Primaries are for the active and interested of each party (with, in some cases of open or semi-open primaries, some augmentation by independents and voters from the opposition party). But the level of disinterest in these primaries and in attachment to these parties augurs ill for the American political system.

HIGHER FALL TURNOUT LIKELY

Turnout levels and trends in Presidential primaries are not a predictor of general election turnout. Primary turnout increased between 1984 and 1988 (24.0 percent of eligibles to 25.9) but general election turnout fell in 1988 to the lowest level since 1924. Primary turnout declined between 1980 and 1984 (26.9 to 24.0) but general election turnout increased slightly in the 1984 general election.

It is virtually inconceivable that general election turnout will not go up in 2004, likely to be equal or higher than the level reached in 1992 when 58.1 percent of the eligible electorate voted.

The Bush Presidency is the most polarizing of any since that of Lyndon Johnson. Election 2004 will be played out on the field of major issues and strong emotions. The public will be called upon to adjudicate deep differences in almost every area of public concern. Both same-sex marriages and the upcoming trial of Saddam Hussein are likely to be side-shows buried in a major national debate over the direction of the nation in both the domestic and foreign arenas.

There are precisely four things which could erode any potential turnout increase: the economy could start producing a 250 - 300,000 net job gain each month, the situation in Iraq could stabilize with no further violence and the emergence of real democracy and large quantities of weapons of mass destruction could be found in Iraq along with credible evidence of pre-war ties to Al Qaeda. That would rob the debate of the three most contentious issues: whether the economic policies of the Bush Administration were actually benefitting the citizenry; whether the money, lives and limbs spent in Iraq were necessary; and whether the President can be trusted in what he says.

The fourth is the tenor of what, now that the primaries are over, will be a very long campaign. It is in President Bush's interest to run a relentlessly negative campaign against Senator Kerry (while attempting to rekindle the memory of the unity behind his leadership created in the immediate aftermath of September 11, 2001). His campaign would like to make Sen. Kerry the issue and to depress turnout, whose growth this year will not benefit the President. It is not in Sen. Kerry's interest to respond in kind, at least in his television advertising campaign. But should he do so, the public (and particularly the public that is not strongly identified with either major political party) may come to believe that neither candidate is worthy and a larger percentage than now seems likely may eschew the ballot box. (Sen. Kerry might look to the example of former Colorado Gov. Roy Romer, who in his re-election campaign announced that he would not run produced negative ads, spoke about the issues directly in his advertising and won his election handily.)

But whether the turnout increase is large or small, turnout this fall will not reach the mid-60 percent levels of the 1960s. There are two concrete indicators that demonstrate this: Contrary to public impression, the turnout for last year's California recall election was not, at 47.1 percent of the electorate, particularly high, despite the deep divisions in the state, the massive media coverage, the enormous amounts of money poured into it and the star quality of the elected

governor. And the most recent survey of incoming college freshmen (a group more likely to vote than the non-college attending 18-year-olds), conducted by the Higher Education Research Institute at the University of California at Los Angeles showed that interest in politics among this group had risen slightly to 34 percent from its nadir of 29 percent four years ago. However, interest in politics among the same group in the 1960s was 60 percent.

Too much has happened over the past 40 years to depress civic engagement: the erosion of trust in political leadership; the decline in the quality of education and in the quantity of civic education; the weakening of the nation's integrating institutions – the schools, the churches, the unions and the political parties; the fragmentation and atomization of American society – physically through suburbanization, the Interstate Highway System and the strip mall, among other things; politically through single-issue and identity politics, and, most profoundly, by modern media which likes to claim it brings the world community into the living room but brings the citizen into his or her living room and fragments shared knowledge along channel lines and websites; the decreasing coverage of politics and increasing cynicism about it in the media; the execrable conduct of our political campaigns; and a set of dominant values that emphasize individual material acquisitiveness, hostility to government and consumer or libertarian choice, to name but a few.

These deep societal trends will not be reversed in one election, but one can hope that the scope of the issues in this election will, at least in 2004, engage a larger slice of the American citizenry.

Below are two commentaries on the primary process the nation has gone through.

INDIVIDUAL VERSUS GROUPED PRIMARIES

Before 1988 and after the reform commission chaired by then North Carolina Gov. Jim Hunt which reversed some of the more egregious excesses of the reform commission chaired by Sen. George McGovern in the aftermath of the 1968 nomination battle, the Democratic Party and the nation had settled into a fairly coherent nominating process of sequential individual primaries over a four month period, beginning in late February and ending in the first week in June – leavened by the appointment of existing elected and party office-holders comprising about 20 percent of the convention delegates.

In 1988, Southern Democratic state chairpersons, unhappy with the 1984 landslide defeat of Vice President Walter Mondale and the consequent loss of many leadership positions in Southern states, attempted to exert some clout on the selection of the next nominee by grouping their primaries and moving them forward on the electoral calendar (the first Super Tuesday). The result was a disaster for them. Of the 15 primaries that day, the Rev. Jesse Jackson won five, the “northern liberal” candidate Gov. Michael Dukakis won five and the “Southern” candidate, then Sen. Al Gore won only five.

But this did not stop other states from having the same idea – moving up their primaries to

theoretically exert more influence on who would be the party's nominee. This led to an ever-shortened campaign and an ever-greater grouping of primaries, which was further exacerbated this year, when, in the belief that it was in the Democratic Party's interest to end the primary season as early as possible, the party eliminated what had been a window of a few weeks between the Iowa caucuses and the New Hampshire primary and allowed seven states to hold primaries and caucuses a week later.

The result has been lower turnout in the primaries which are grouped, due to campaigns run largely through television advertising with little personal contact and grassroots mobilization, often with diminished resources to conduct these campaigns, lesser information about the candidates and consequent progressively lower voter turnout when compared to primaries which are held individually.

Since 1988, turnout was higher in grouped primaries than in individual ones in only one year, 1992.

Using only competitive Presidential primaries in which no incumbent was seeking renomination:

-Democratic turnout in the 2004 individual primaries (including the District of Columbia non-binding primary) averaged 16.2 percent of the eligible vote, while average turnout in grouped primaries was 10.3 percent of the eligible vote.

-Democratic turnout in the 2000 individual primaries was 11.3 percent of eligibles as opposed to 10.6 in the primaries which were grouped. Republican turnout in individual primaries was 19.1 as compared with 14.3 percent in the grouped primaries. In states which held primaries for nominees of both parties turnout was 29.6 for individual primaries as opposed to 24.2 for grouped primaries.

-In 1996, Republican turnout for individual primaries was 12.3 percent of eligibles while turnout in grouped primaries was 8.5.

-In 1988, turnout in states which held primaries for nominees of both parties had a turnout of 28.7 percent of eligibles compared to a turnout of 23.0 in grouped primaries. Democratic primary turnout was 16.6 for individual primaries compared to 15.3 for grouped primaries. GOP turnout was 10.0 in individual primaries as compared to 7.7 in grouped primaries.

-In the one exception that may prove the rule, Democratic turnout in 1992 individual primaries was 8.0 percent, as compared to 11.9 in grouped primaries.

The preponderance of the evidence suggests that it is not only the front-loading but also the grouping of primaries which undermines the nominating system – a consideration to be taken into account before one seeks remedy in a system of spaced but group primaries such as the rotating regional primary system suggested by the National Association of Secretaries of State.

THERE MUST BE A BETTER WAY

In early January, Sen. John Kerry rolled the dice. Despite being far behind in all the public opinion polls, he lent his campaign \$6.4 million from his personal wealth and concentrated all his resources on the caucuses in Iowa and the first in the nation primary in New Hampshire. It was a gamble that paid off handsomely.

It paid off because Gov. Howard Dean squandered the \$41 million he raised, spreading those resources across the nation; lost his lead in the polls by a series of ill-thought out statements and relentless press criticism; engaged in a suicidal battle of negative advertising with and against Rep. Richard Gephardt and failed to balance his clear and vigorous advocacy on issues with his moderate and effective record of governance in Vermont so that he appeared more of a protest candidate than a potential President. It paid off because Gen. Wesley Clark abandoned Iowa for New Hampshire and because Sen. John Edwards, who might have benefitted equally from the collapse of the Dean campaign, did not devote commensurate resources to the first two contests. (It also paid off because of Kerry's relentless campaigning on the electability issue, undercutting Dean, and the week that Sen. Edward Kennedy spent in Iowa campaigning for Kerry.)

But Kerry's gamble was successful in large measure because of a primary schedule which gave an enormous advantage to the winner of the first two contests. With barely a week between the New Hampshire primary and seven contests across the nation, Kerry could ride a wave of free publicity and augmented funding to campaign in all states, while his rivals could only concentrate limited resources on two states, to keep their hopes barely alive. Additional free publicity and funds for Kerry and limited time and resources for the other candidates provided enormous advantages for Kerry in sewing up the race on Super Tuesday.

The Democrats, it says here, got lucky. They emerged from this truncated process with a capable candidate, a plausible potential President and a unified party. They did so, in large measure, because the differences between the Democratic candidates were minuscule compared to their differences with the President and thus there was a minimum of internecine hostility. But by truncating the process, they lost the advantage they had in the daily coverage of criticism of the President and his policies, propelled themselves into a four-month dead period before the national conventions in which citizen interest will decline, the opposition will have the opportunity to define the nature of the race and the party will have to remobilize its supporters.

In a larger sense, the 2004 nominating process is an accident waiting to happen and the evolution of this process from the first post-1968 reforms has produced the least desirable method of selecting the nominees of the two major parties for the highest office of the most powerful nation in the world.

Why is the process so bad? Let us count the ways:

1. By frontloading and grouping the primaries, it makes it mandatory for candidates to raise large sums of money early, because of this forces, candidates to announce and begin their campaigns and fundraising at least a year prior to the first vote being cast, restricts candidacies to the well-known, the wealthy or those with access to the moneyed and, as in this year, makes it desirable for candidates to opt out of the Presidential public financing system.
2. This, in turn, creates a year-long ersatz campaign during which the media, rather than the electorate, sits in judgement on the candidacies and colors the outcome.
3. The influence of winning Iowa and New Hampshire becomes exaggerated beyond any reasonable proportion. Because there is no time between these two contests and the first grouped primaries, it becomes impossible for any but the winner of those contests to effectively raise money, counter the free publicity of that winner and compete effectively in the contests to follow. At least in 2000 President Bush had the individual primaries in South Carolina and Michigan following his New Hampshire defeat to recoup his losses. One can only imagine what would have happened if this truncated system had been in place had Pat Buchanan actually bested the first President Bush in 1992 in New Hampshire.
4. A six week campaign is not an adequate length of time to evaluate and re-evaluate the merits of a potential candidate and should one establish his or her primacy within those six weeks and later be found to have major defects, there is no reasonable democratic recourse, such as a late entering candidacy.
5. By grouping the primaries after Iowa and New Hampshire, it emphasizes the least desirable forms of campaigning – 30-second ads – and de-emphasizes the most desirable – personal contact and grassroots mobilization.
6. The six-week campaign leaves the majority of the nation out of the decision-making process altogether and, to a great extent, without knowledge about the personalities, character, qualifications and policy positions of the nominees, unless they are sitting Presidents.
7. The current system renders the national conventions of both major parties as relatively meaningless exercises in political propaganda, inviting the media to do what they have been progressively doing – reducing and eliminating coverage.
8. This system leaves the nation with a five month dead period before the major party conventions, diminishing political interest and forcing a remobilization in the fall.

In 2000, the Delaware Republican Party chairman offered a plan which would address all of these concerns. What he proposed was that the primary process be re-elongated to what it had been before – a four month campaign and scrutiny of the candidates. What he proposed was that the states with the fewest delegate votes have an initial month between mid-February and mid-

March to hold their primaries. Those with the second fewest delegate votes would have the next month to hold their primaries and the ensuing months would allow those with the second most and the most delegates to hold their primaries.

Under such a system, candidacy would not necessarily be limited to the rich, the famous and the connected, but would allow a modestly financed candidate to enter the race and, if successful, raise money for ensuing contests. It would end the long ersatz campaign. It would reduce or eliminate the worst of the grouping of primaries and permit a much greater amount of retail campaigning. It would permit reasoned scrutiny of the candidates and allow for re-evaluation. It would permit candidates to determine their own geographical strategies and allow for late entering candidacies. It would help to sustain voter interest throughout the election year.

Under such a system, those with primaries in the first and second tier would likely winnow out the field, leaving the ultimate decision to the larger states, or if that fails to produce a winner, the national convention which would continue to have a bloc of party leaders. It would put the decision-making in the hands of the voters rather than the media. And it would likely allow all candidates to stay within the Presidential financing system, rather than opting out.

This plan was supported by the rules committee of the Republican Party in 2000 and by the Republican National Committee, before being waylaid by nominee George W. Bush who did not want to have a rules floor fight on the national convention floor. It was supported, for awhile, by a majority of the Democratic rules committee before Vice President Al Gore, at the behest of some of his staff and some large state party leaders, scotched the plan.

Every Presidential election year since 1988, attempts have been made to right the wrongs of the previous nominating process. And every year, the system has been made worse. It is time to resurrect the Delaware plan and provide a durable basis for selecting the people who will lead the most powerful nation in the world.

NOTES AND SUMMARY CHARTS

1. What is Turnout: Turnout should be a simple calculation in which the numerator is the number of votes cast and the denominator is the number of citizens eligible to vote. But because of various anomalies in election statistics, some of which are outlined in detail below, this calculation is more complicated. By common usage, the numerator in every Presidential election year is the vote for President (even though that tally is usually about one percentage point lower than the actual number of citizens who go to the polls. It is lower because many states, although an ever-diminishing number, do not keep records of all those who go to the polls, the total ballots cast). In mid-term elections, the numerator is the total of votes for the statewide race in each state which draws the highest number of votes and the aggregate total of votes for U.S. House of Representatives in those states which do not have statewide races. (This total tends to be between 1 and 1.5 percentage points lower than the actual total ballots cast but is used for the same reasons – that many states do not compile total ballots cast figures.)

Turnout is **NOT** the percentage of those registered who voted. There are three basic reasons for this: a. Using registration as a denominator does not account for the whole of the electorate, including those who are not registered. Thus, it gives a false picture of true citizen engagement. b. Changes in registration law can dramatically affect the figures. If the nation adopts, as it did, a registration law that provides for national mail registration, registration at motor vehicle bureaus and at social service agencies, registration will go up but turnout of those registered will decline artificially by a greater amount than it does when using the entire eligible electorate as a denominator. c. Registration figures are subject to the fluctuations of election administration. If a state conducts a thorough purge of its registration lists close to election, its registration figures will be lower and thus its percentage of registered voting will be higher. But if registration lists are not so purged, as they are not in many states, the figures for registration will be higher and the turnout based on these inflated registration figures will be lower. Consider how distorted a turnout percentage using registration as a base would be in a state such as Alaska, which because of lack of regular list cleaning and potential flaws with the Census Bureau's estimates of the state's eligible population, registration figures are regularly in excess of 100 percent of the eligible vote.

2. The Eligible Vote – The Denominator for Determining Turnout: The eligible vote in this report is the number of people residing in the United States who are 18 years of age or over minus the number of non-citizens residing in the United States who are 18 years of age and over as of April 1. It is an interpolated figure from the 2000 Census, based on the methodology outlined below.

For years, CSAE and every other reputable organization working in this field had used the Census Bureau's estimates of November age-eligible population (VAP) to determine turnout. That figure came under legitimate criticism because it included non-citizens; convicted felons (in most states) and, in some states, ex-felons; and people deemed mentally incompetent in institutions who could not vote and did not include citizens residing in other countries, citizens

naturalized during the election year and the citizen portion of the Census' undercount, all of whom could vote but were not part of the VAP estimate. The Census Bureau has ceased providing its VAP estimates.

For years also, Dr. Walter Dean Burnham, professor emeritus at the University of Texas at Austin, has been producing a denominator of age-eligible citizens (age-eligible population minus age-eligible non-citizens, interpolated by state and nation from and between decennial Censuses). After some study of this matter, CSAE has come to believe that this denominator is the best for determining turnout, subject to the caveat below. It has come to this belief because of two factors:

1. Available data. One does not determine turnout simply for any given year but also as an historical comparison with previous years. Data for several of the issues involving the inadequacy of the age-eligible population (VAP) figures are either simply not available, not available in a timely manner, not available over a given period of history or not allocatable to the states. Data on convicted and incarcerated felons is only available for a fairly recent time period. State laws on whether convicted felons and ex-felons can vote are changing and have changed over time. There is no accurate set of figures on those deemed mentally incompetent. The number of American citizens residing abroad is ascertainable but the number of age-eligible has to be estimated and there are no figures which allow the allocation of these citizens by state. Naturalization figures come in too late, often a year or two after the election year, to be usable in any current population accounting. And while any given Census undercount can be allocated by state, one can only estimate how much of that undercount is of citizens as opposed to non-citizens.

2. The balance of the figures: In studying this statistical problem, CSAE has found that the most important issue is that of non-citizens. If one wants to have a relatively accurate picture of turnout, one must eliminate the non-citizens from the age-eligible population. On the other hand, the other adjustments to the denominator would not substantially differ from the denominator of citizen age-eligible population. In pursuing its inquiry into this topic, CSAE found that the factors which would lower the denominator – felons, ex-felons and people deemed mentally incompetent who can't vote – are roughly equal to two of the factors which would increase the denominator – citizens living in other countries and naturalization who could vote. If one added a ballpark figure for the number of citizens in the undercount who could vote, the factors in those years of an undercount, other than non-citizens, which would increase the denominator exceeds those which would reduce it.

The one caveat in adopting the Burnham methodology lock, stock and barrel is that Burnham interpolates from Census to Census. These Censuses are accurate as of April 1 of each decennial year for all of the past 50 years. (In prior years, Census results captured the population as of varying months.) In order to have more accurate figures for November, CSAE has, using the same methodology, projected citizen population to November. Thus, CSAE is using in this report and for all future reports on primaries, the April figure for age-eligible citizen population, but will use a November figure for the general election.

Methodology

Since the decennial census population figures are accurate as of April 1 in each census year, the VAP Burnham dataset calculates the difference in the required census figures between a base census year and the same figures as reported in the following census. To estimate the voting age population for the years between the censuses, the difference between them is simply multiplied by the number of months that have passed beyond April 1 of the base year and then added to the base year figure. For example, to arrive at the April 1, 1992 voting age population, the difference between the April 1, 1990 census population and the April 1, 2000 census population is multiplied by 24/120ths (for the 24 out of 120 months between the census counts) and added to the April 1, 1990 figure.

The process for arriving at the CSAE November Eligible figures is the same, except that the data is projected forward to November instead of April. To accomplish this, the multiplier is simply changed to the number of months that have passed since April of the base census year. For instance, to calculate the November 1996 voting age population, the difference between April 1, 1990 and April 1, 2000 is multiplied by 79/120ths and added to the April 1, 1990 count. The same interpolation process is applied to the decennial census counts of non-citizens of voting age in each state. Once estimates of the total voting age population and the non-citizen voting age population for each state have been calculated, the non-citizen figure is simply subtracted from the total to arrive at the appropriate figure.

Since the last decennial census occurred in 2000, it is necessary to project the figures forward to arrive at the voting age population for 2002 and 2004. To accomplish this, the difference between the 1990 and 2000 decennial censuses is used to establish a rate of growth. This rate of growth is then used to project forward based on the number of months passed since April 1990 out of the 120 months between the censuses. For instance, to obtain the voting age population for April 2004, the difference between April 1, 1990 and April 1, 2000 is multiplied by 168/120 and added to the April 1, 1990 total.

3. The Vote – Primaries: The vote totals in this report are final and unofficial (except Arizona, Delaware, Missouri, New Hampshire, Oklahoma, Virginia and Wisconsin, which are official) and provided by the chief election officer in each state. Final and official figures will be very close to those reported here, save for California which is still counting more than 1 million absentee ballots. The vote for President was the highest in all states, save two – California where the vote for ballot propositions on bond issues, spending limits and others exceeded the vote for President by about four percentage points; and in Ohio where the votes cast for Sen. George Voinovich's renomination exceeded the votes cast for President Bush by one percentage point. Because this is a report on Presidential primary turnout, the figures contained in this report are only with respect to that issue. Later reports will provide data on full turnout, including primaries for other offices and, where relevant, ballot propositions

In this report, CSAE has produced two frames of analysis of the primary turnout – individual state

charts and a collective set of charts of all the states which have held primaries. The collective charts are divided – including charts of all states which held primaries this year whether or not they had primaries in previous years, and of those states which held primaries this year's for which there is continuous data going back several years. The charts which are labeled total turnout are states which held primaries in both Democratic and Republican parties.

NOTE: The determination of primary turnout is not a perfect science. The tables in back reflect the figures for the votes which actually have been counted so far. The estimated numbers in the text of this report with respect to total votes in the primaries represent CSAE's best estimate of the votes which are likely to have been cast after all of these states issue their final figures and California's absentee ballots are counted. And long range comparisons with previous high turnout years represent CSAE's best judgement of how to compare turnout in the present with the more limited number of primaries which were held in previous years.

4. The Vote – Caucuses: CSAE does not track caucus voting totals. But it did ascertain that while the raw number of citizens participating in the Iowa caucuses was similar to the number which participated in 1988 (the high point for Iowa caucus turnout), the population of the state had grown sufficiently to make the percentage turnout lower than in 1988.

5. Individual vs. Grouped Primary Comparisons: In this part of CSAE's report, it attempted to compare turnout rates between those primaries which were the only primaries on a given date and those which were grouped with other states to give some indication of the relative impact on turnout of retail (grassroots intensive) campaigns versus the media campaigns which are necessitated when primaries are grouped. All comparisons are of primaries which were held before the races were decided in each year in each party.

6. Acknowledgments: Primary research for this report was done by Mark P. Harvey, CSAE research associate, who is also responsible for creating the denominator database for the analysis of November turnout. Organizing the analysis for this report was made profoundly easier by a custom database program developed by Samuel Schreiber, CSAE research associate emeritus. CSAE would also like to express its profound gratitude to Dr. Walter Dean Burnham, professor emeritus at the University of Texas at Austin, for sharing his database, helping to devise CSAE's new November denominator for the analysis of registration and turnout and for his continuing help to CSAE's work.

7. Culpability: The analysis contained in this report has been done by Curtis Gans, CSAE's director, who is solely responsible for any and all errors contained within.

SUMMARY CHARTS

1. Turnout Comparisons: Comparisons between Presidential primary turnout, as a percentage of eligible voters, in 2004 versus previous years. 2004 primary turnout is estimated due to an indeterminate number of absentee ballots, exceeding one million, still to be counted in California. Overall turnout is for those states with both Republican and Democratic primaries.

YEAR	OVERALL	DEMOCRATIC	REPUBLICAN
2004	20.8 (est.)	11.4 (est.)	6.6 (est.)
2000	26.4	10.1	14.9
1996	20.4	9.0	11.2
1992	24.9	12.7	10.1
1988	27.3	15.8	10.0
1984	23.9	15.4	7.2
1980	30.7	13.9	14.9
1976	32.0	19.3	12.6
1972	34.7	23.1	11.3
1968	27.7	24.3	11.2
1964	36.6	21.5	15.2

2. Individual Versus Grouped Primaries: Presidential primary turnout as a percentage of eligible vote in individual as compared to grouped primaries since 1988 during the period before the nominee was decided in those primaries which were contested within a give party (Total turnout is for those states which held nominating primaries in both parties):

YEAR	PARTY	INDIVIDUAL	GROUPED
2004	Democratic	16.2	10.3
2000	Total	29.6	24.8
2000	Democratic	11.3	10.7
2000	Republican	19.1	14.3
1996	Republican	12.3	8.5
1992	Democratic	8.0	12.2
1988	Total	28.7	23.0
1988	Democratic	16.6	15.3
1988	Republican	10.0	7.7