



**Working Paper**  
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**The North American “Security and Prosperity Partnership”:  
An Evaluation**

Marcela Celorio\*

***I. Introduction***

Integration varies from region to region. Regionalization can be measured based on different parameters: the level of growth in socio-economic interdependence; the extent of shared values and cultural traditions; the number and types of formal institutional arrangements; and the degree to which a region displays a cohesive identity and projects it abroad.<sup>1</sup>

One of the most common indicators of regionalization results from geographical proximity and the increased economic interdependence among countries. To deepen integration, however, issues such as history, culture, asymmetries, and national interests, among others, need to be addressed. These issues are key elements in understanding why and how states want to increase cooperation, reach common goals, and find joint solutions to the problems they face.

Cooperation between states is essential to sustain our coexistence due to states' efforts to solve common problems. Sovereign states conceive and develop international law regarding cooperation. Sovereignty is understood as a basic characteristic of the State, not only when a State has no other option than to cooperate with other states in order to avoid international isolation, but also to conduct its basic functions. Globalization of international relations and irreversible interdependence have raised expectations about international cooperation.

Buzan has formulated an intriguing thesis called “mature anarchy.”<sup>2</sup> “Anarchy” refers to the absence of a central government in a world system of sovereign states.

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\*Marcela Celorio was a Diplomat-in-Residence at the School of International Service at American University and a Senior Fellow at the Center for North American Studies in the fall of 2005 when she conducted research for this paper. She was on leave as a Political Affairs Officer at the Embassy of Mexico in Washington D.C. Ms. Celorio is a lawyer and career member of the Mexican Foreign Service since 1999. The Center would like to thank Cementos de México, S.A., CEMEX, and the Ministry of Foreign Relations of México for supporting the position of Diplomat-in-Residence at American University. This paper does not necessarily represent the views of the Mexican government or any institution.

Buzan argues that, if states not only consolidate their own identity and legitimacy but also recognize and accept that of others, they will develop a society in which the benefits of fragmentation (sovereign entities) occur without the costs of continuous competition and instability.<sup>3</sup> Thus, the states in a “mature anarchy” must be firm in their own definition and capable of projecting their own internal coherence and stability (institutions and ideas) to the whole community of states.

The most “mature” or “strong” states recognize that cooperation has a positive impact on different areas, such as security – *i.e.*, the nation’s security interdependence. As a consequence, states consider their neighbor’s interests when they create their policies. Moreover, they acknowledge that their national security is interdependent and that an excessive, self-referential security policy could be self-destructive. At the same time, Buzan points out that the evolution of the international society is a slow and uneven process when it comes to reaching respective goals.

It is important to underline that, in order to cooperate effectively, reliance on the interest and the political support of each State is essential. States must have a real political willingness to cooperate.

This essay analyzes the role of the *Security and Prosperity Partnership for North America* (SPP) in the bigger context of regional integration. I will examine the initiatives, institutions, and tools that have had an impact on building a road to regional integration.

## ***II. The North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA)***

Although *NAFTA* has generated greater interdependence and interrelationships between the three countries, its influence has not shifted the model of relations that the United States maintains with its neighbors.<sup>4</sup> *Grosso modo* *NAFTA* is considered a success due to the substantial trade, investment growth, positive economic results, and the creation of formal dispute settlement provisions in six areas.<sup>5</sup> At the same time, *NAFTA* has shortcomings on managing trade relations and improving the region’s individual economies.<sup>6</sup> A lot needs to be changed in order to increase *NAFTA* efficiency and build the confidence required for the three countries to take advantage of the agreement.

In general, the dynamic in North America has been characterized by the relationship that the United States has with its northern neighbor, Canada, and with its neighbor to the south, Mexico. Each relationship has its own characteristics and particularities. Some observers have considered that proximity to the United States was an impediment for Canada and Mexico to discover each other. It was not until “the last decade that these two countries have taken advantage of the geopolitical condition and turned it into as a bilateral relationship.”<sup>7</sup>

In any case, *NAFTA* is the result of the will and commitment of Canada, Mexico, and the United States to create a North American free trade area with the goal of

deepening the economic and trade relations among the countries. Carlos Salinas de Gortari, the Mexican President when *NAFTA* went into effect in 1994, underlined that “the decision to intensify economic relations does not imply in any way dependence or political integration.”<sup>8</sup> Indeed, more than twelve years have passed and progress has occurred in economic rather than political integration.

Even though the treaty’s goal was clearly defined and limited, the countries recognized the need to create supranational institutions to deal with the environment and the development of the U.S.-Mexico border. They created the trilateral North American Commission on Environmental Cooperation (*NACEC*) and the North American Commission on Labor Cooperation (*NACLIC*); the US-Mexican Border Environmental Cooperation Commission (*BECC*); and the North American Development Bank (*NADBank*).<sup>9</sup>

*NAFTA* has also resulted in the study and analysis of the interdependence and integration of North America. However, this interest has been developing only in some governmental sectors, academia, and NGOs. Since the debate on *NAFTA* in the early 1990s, regional integration has been a subject of little interest to most of the people of the three countries.

### ***III. Declarations, Analyses and Initiatives on Regional Integration in North America***

In 1979, the president of Mexico, José López Portillo, stated rhetorically: “A North American common market is a dream that eventually might become a reality if the nations work on practical problems one at a time.”<sup>10</sup> His words did not translate into reality; on the contrary, the Carter-López Portillo administrations had different views about the bilateral relationship.<sup>11</sup> In 1980, during his presidential campaign, Ronald Reagan described a vision that included Mexico in the US-Canada Free Trade Agreement.<sup>12</sup>

At about the same time, the first analyses began on the extent of the bilateral trade agreements. Several analysts examined the effects of free trade on Canada and the U.S., but no analysis of any significance focused on Mexico. Sidney Weintraub was one of the first to examine the possibility of a free trade agreement between US and Mexico, pointing out that “Prosperity in either country is good for both.”<sup>13</sup>

The idea of deeper integration in North America in areas other than trade began to develop during the negotiations of *NAFTA*. For example, Robert A. Pastor’s book, “*Integration with Mexico: Options for U.S. Policy*,” discussed options available to the U.S. and its neighbors to enhance integration within *NAFTA* and beyond.<sup>14</sup> However, it was not until years later that the guidelines on the initial steps for the integration of North America were put into effect.

The first attempt to create an association based on more than trade for North America took place at the *Americas Summit*, in Santiago, Chile, April 1988. At the

meeting, the ministers of foreign relations recognized that trade, culture, travel, family ties, and trans-border cyberspace had created major links among their societies.<sup>15</sup>

In September 1998 in New York, Madeleine Albright, U.S. Secretary of State, Lloyd Axworthy, Minister of Foreign Affairs of Canada, and Rosario Green, Secretary of Foreign Affairs of Mexico, signed a “Declaration and a Memorandum of Understanding” on international cooperation and development. At the last of four meetings held after their agreement, which took place in Santa Fe, New Mexico, in August 2000, they discussed the importance of forging trilateral solutions to common problems in areas such as education and the prevention of natural disasters. They supported the idea of bringing together various leaders of the three countries in order to analyze different ways to create a North American association.

#### ***IV. From 2000 to the Security and Prosperity Partnership of North America***

The administration of President Vicente Fox incorporated into its National Development Plan the use of strategies to achieve regional harmonization as one way to balance foreign policy goals.<sup>16</sup> This foreign policy strategy drew strength as much from the Mexican Constitution as it did from a modern and pragmatic vision of a democratic Mexico that was emerging from the elections in 2000.

Administration policymakers drafted two guidelines for foreign policy: the construction of a strategic relationship with the United States, and more active Mexican participation in the shaping of a new international system.

Mexico tried to promote a long-term perspective, which included building an economic community in North America.<sup>17</sup> The intention was to adopt a long-term vision for the region that would create new institutions, allowing the free movement of capital, goods, services, and people. Since the first presidential meeting in Guanajuato, Presidents Fox and Bush agreed to begin consultations with the Canadians in order to consolidate an economic community in North America.<sup>18</sup>

In Québec, during the “Declaration of the North American Leaders,” Prime Minister Jean Chrétien, and Presidents George W. Bush and Vicente Fox committed their nations to “deepen a sense of community and examine options to strengthen further the North American partnership.”<sup>19</sup>

Unfortunately, the terrorists’ attacks of September 2001 caught the governments off guard. The priorities on each countries’ agendas changed, mainly for the U. S., and the countries faced the new context within their own circumstances, relying mostly on tools that are, essentially, bilateral. The Mexican government recognized the importance of collaborating with the United States and Canada to increase border control.<sup>20</sup> According to some analysts, Mexico even contemplated the creation of a *North American Security Area* as a useful instrument to improve the verification, control, and intelligence mechanisms in the region.<sup>21</sup>

First, the United States and Canada signed a 30-Point “Smart Border Declaration” to secure border infrastructure, facilitate the secure movement of people and goods, and share information.<sup>22</sup> Months later, focusing on similar goals, Mexico and the U.S. signed a 22-point “Border Partnership Agreement.”<sup>23</sup> The agreement occurred in the context of the International Conference on Financing for Development.<sup>24</sup> Mexico asked to be named the host country for this event because the country has long assigned a large significance to the linkage between development and security.<sup>25</sup>

**A. Discontinuity.** After the Québec summit, the trilateral initiatives and meetings of North American leaders stopped. Among the reasons were the political processes in each country, the diverse reactions to the terrorists’ attacks of September 2001, and the Iraqi conflict.

**(1) Internal political processes.** To say that domestic issues monopolize the attention of each country is nothing new, particularly when elections are taking place. The United States had congressional elections in 2002; in 2004, presidential elections allowed the Republican Party to consolidate its position with the reelection of George W. Bush.

In early 2006, Canadians elected a minority government led by a conservative, Prime Minister Stephen Harper, following the 2003 election of a liberal Prime Minister, Paul Martin, who replaced Jean Chrétien after three periods in government.

In 2003 Mexico held mid-term elections.<sup>26</sup> The 2006 presidential and congressional elections occur in a completely different political ambiance, relatively new for Mexicans, characterized by plurality, transparency, and greater equality. The elections represent an important occasion for the conservative forces to push their nationalistic agendas characterized by their opposition to a greater integration. As Ambassador Montaña states, nationalisms in all three countries are alive.<sup>27</sup>

**(2) 9/11.** The terrorist attacks of 9/11 redefined U.S. relations with the rest of the world, particularly with its neighbors: Canada and Mexico. Security issues have become a priority for the U.S. foreign policy agenda, taking on a strategic and symbolic value. At first, Chrétien’s government was publicly accused of not having reacted in an unconditional way like Tony Blair did, but Canada publicly showed its solidarity and worked hard to transform its security system and help its neighbor.<sup>28</sup> This effort strengthened the dialogue and cooperation that the U.S. and Canada have had for quite a while in security.

Mexico confronted a difficult situation. Only a few U.S. officials appreciated all the efforts of the Mexican government to show its support and willingness to cooperate. The media exacerbated the debate among the intellectual and political elites regarding the appropriate support for the U.S.<sup>29</sup>

This situation left the Americans feeling that Mexico could not give them, in one of the most difficult times, at least “a traditional Mexican hug.”<sup>30</sup>

This reaction, combined with the lack of an institutional framework and a complex cooperation model based on intermittent actions, directly affected the U.S.-Mexico agenda. There were continuous disagreements over the meanings of what actions to take, and what constituted threats to bilateral and regional security.<sup>31</sup> A lot of issues could not be dealt with; one was the initiative to promote a common vision of North America.

**(3) Iraq.** The war affected U.S. relations with Canada and Mexico. The partners and neighbors decided not to participate in the war due to their positions on multilateralism and the United Nations’ role in conflict resolution and maintenance of peace. According to former Ambassador Cellucci, the U.S. felt disappointed that Canada did not participate in the “Coalition of the Willing.” The Mexican government could not avoid the debate between opposing the American position and assuming the political and domestic costs of supporting the war. Mexico was about to conduct the important 2003 elections and internal affairs influenced the foreign policy-decision making.<sup>32</sup>

Although the context and the disagreements lead to a different vision, the dynamic of the relationships and the increasingly interdependent societies allowed the dialogue and the willingness to cooperate to continue, leading to positive results. Unfortunately, those results are insufficient.

**B. Continuity.** The search for new cooperation schemes that will provide countries with the tools to prevent, react to, and solve in an efficient way the problems that the region faces is, inevitably, never ending. Cooperation in North America is essentially bilateral. It seems as if each country reverts back to old habits of dealing with each other bilaterally. However, each one realized that bilateralism is not enough to deal with the global challenges that the region confronts.<sup>33</sup> They need to explore and adopt other types of relationships that will increase cooperation and create a stronger region, providing more benefits to the region’s countries.

Looking at the past 10 years, we can see that the only trilateral effort towards regional integration in North America that has succeeded has been *NAFTA*. Countries have been able to conceive and implement various initiatives and programs to increase cooperation in other areas, but these efforts have occurred only in the bilateral arena: the Smart Border Declaration and the New North American Alliance between United States and Canada; the Mexico-US Partnership for Prosperity and Border Partnership Agreement; and the Mexico-Canada Alliance, among others.

In this regard, even when there has been some trilateral progress in areas such as environment, labor, and energy; until now trade has been the only “driving force” towards North American integration. Increasing economic and trade interdependence represents just one of the first phases of integration and building a community. This step-

by-step process partly explains why some sectors of the government and public perceive the integration of North America as slow.<sup>34</sup>

**C. Recent initiatives.** Four years after the Québec Statement, the three leaders gathered with the specific goal to create a partnership for North America. The aim of the partnership is to increase security and prosperity, recognizing that the two are linked.<sup>35</sup> This agreement was entitled “The Security and Prosperity Partnership of North America.” It does not address the commitment to deepen the notion of “community” within the region, as described in the Québec Statement, yet it adopts the concept of “regional partnership” as a vehicle to promote prosperity and security in the three countries. At the same time, it establishes guidelines to advance discussions about how to improve ongoing mechanisms for efficient economic and trade relations. It also increases security cooperation through intelligence and information sharing.

Finally, some sectors of the public share the interest of the governments in designing and adapting new ways of collaboration. Forums have taken place and have generated recommendations that deal with the regional future. For example, a group of independent experts sponsored by the Council on Foreign Relations with the Canadian Council of Chief Executives and the Consejo Mexicano de Asuntos Internacionales prepared a report.<sup>36</sup> They suggest the establishment of an economic and security community in North America by 2010. This community would emerge from something like a customs union and a project to create a security perimeter around all three countries.

## ***V. An Evaluation of The Security and Prosperity Partnership of North America (SPP)***

On March 23, 2005, in Waco, Texas, U.S. President George Bush, Mexican President Vicente Fox, and Canadian Prime Minister Paul Martin announced the *Security and Prosperity Partnership of North America* (SPP). Its initiatives and recommendations refer to two large issues: prosperity and security. In general terms, the prosperity agenda seeks to promote growth, competitiveness, and quality of life. To accomplish these goals, the three governments are focusing on nine specific areas: manufactured goods and sectoral and regional competitiveness; movement of goods; e-commerce and information and communication technologies (ICT); financial services; transportation; energy; environment; agriculture; and food and health.

The aim of the security agenda is to protect North America against external threats, prevent and respond to regional dangers, and further streamline the security movement of low-risk traffic across the shared borders. Accordingly, the governments are concentrating on traveler and cargo security, biodiversity, aviation and maritime security, law enforcement and intelligence cooperation, prevention and responses to threats, border facilitation, and science and technology cooperation.


The SPP established trilateral working groups and set milestones for these groups. A June 2005 report, security and prosperity agendas (trade and economic development) include more than 300 initiatives and seem to continue increasing.<sup>37</sup> The SPP is like a

large container into which any program or cooperative effort of security and prosperity can be added. In addition, the diversity and number of actors create a very complex scheme in which bilateral and trilateral relations intermix.

A content analysis of SPP reveals that there are numerous cooperative actions in security and trade that already have taken place. Contrary to the perception of some, these initiatives do not imply the creation of a supranational institution or a new legislative framework that will lead to a concession of sovereignty. The initiatives and programs established in Waco do not represent a substantial change to the current *modus operandi*. The SPP is mainly a collection and listing of initiatives and cooperative actions that governments have been conducting according to each government's legal framework.

Each country's bureaucracy faces an important challenge in trying to control and scrutinize every single initiative and program. To date, the Privy Council and the Foreign Policy Advisor, the White House and National Security Council, and the Presidencia de la República Mexicana and Políticas Públicas are the agencies coordinating the SPP. (Chart 1).

Chart 1



Source: <http://www.aspan.presidencia.gob.mx>

Although the SPP is based on the linkage between security and prosperity initiatives, the work groups in charge of these two big themes have conducted their activities independently of each other. Thus, communication and information exchange have not taken place as smoothly as expected. A lack of coordination duplicates efforts in areas such as food and agriculture, health and transportation, combating counterfeiting and piracy, cyber-security, financial crimes such as money laundering and terrorism financing, energy, the protection of critical infrastructure, and facilitating the travel of business people (pre-clearance, biometrics, secure travel documents, screening and visa issues).

## ***VI. The SPP's Contribution to the Integration of North America***

The Waco statement and the first report to the leaders reiterate the intention to improve the coordination among the working groups and the building of a constructive relationship in North America. The governments have avoided using terms such as “community” or “integration.” In governmental rhetoric, the expressions are “agenda, process, framework, forum, and mechanisms for tri-national dialogue.” The writers of this report by the three governments highlight that the increase of economic integration and security cooperation will create a unique and strong North American relationship while preserving the political and cultural identities.

The leaders have recognized that the role of geographic circumstances, the increasing interdependence among the three countries, and the new security context have forced them to build a secure and prosperous region. Nevertheless, to achieve these goals, they have decided to use the same bilateral tools they already have with little interest in transforming the *status quo*. Given the limits of the partnership created in Waco, one question stands out: What is the meaning of the SPP for North American integration? It provides guidelines for the governments to cooperate and advance on the road to integration and the building of a North American community.

Among the main contributions are:

- Reestablishment of the agenda for meetings of the trilateral leaders. The Presidents of the United States and Mexico, and the Prime Minister of Canada have not held a specific meeting since 2001 to share their vision of the region. On March 31, 2006, the Presidents of Mexico and United States will meet in Cancún with the new Canadian Prime Minister, Stephen Harper;
- Political willingness to work on a shared vision of the region based on a trilateral agenda that involves the higher levels of governments and includes development and security issues;
- Recognition of the need to advance and improve the trade linkages as well as the economic opportunities created by NAFTA;
- Emphasis on regional competitiveness in a global market. The governments recognize the comparative advantages and the meaning of regional trade;
- Tighter linkage between security and prosperity. Security and prosperity in each country, Canada, United States and Mexico, are mutually dependent and complementary;
- Focus on security, which is important due to the absence of a trilateral forum, political dialogue, or institutional mechanisms to allow a more systematic handling of issues; and

- Establishment of a trilateral dialogue as one of the most important contributions. The bilateral experience shows that having a forum with a specific schedule improves dialogue, facilitates understanding, and increases cooperation among countries.

## ***VII. Conclusions***

There have been some hesitant approaches to creating a roadmap for the integration of North America. Much remains to be done to forge a common vision for the region. Canada, Mexico, and the U.S. face the reality of increasing economic and social interdependence. These countries are reconsidering the significance of geopolitics in a globalized world. The neighbor is no longer an enemy; on the contrary, proximity is an advantage in building alliances. Association, interdependence, and integration are not threats to sovereignty but rather tools to strengthen the State. The leaders of North America understand this new meaning and have agreed to increase cooperation in their current legislative activities. This represents, at least, minimal progress, compared with the task of creating a shared vision.

The agreement on the creation of a tri-national forum and the inclusion of the security issue is an important element on the road to the construction of new mechanisms that recognize interdependence. This precedent might lead to greater integration in North America. The *SPP* is a trilateral forum that makes room for improving regional understanding.

This framework allows authorities and other stakeholders to establish a direct dialogue with their counterparts, allowing conversations on seldom-discussed issues such as military cooperation. In this sense, security might be a trigger and activate regional awareness and create a sense of community based on issues other than trade. Talks about military cooperation will probably unfold at a different pace between Canada, Mexico, and the U.S.

The governments and their leaders should not allow each country's election cycles in 2006 to prevent greater trilateralization. The priority is that newly elected officials should preserve and perhaps even strengthen the political meaning of the Waco Declaration. The *SPP* initiatives will continue, with or without this partnership, and electoral changes will have little impact on the current cooperation dynamic.

The U.S. and Mexican Presidents and the Canadian Prime Minister, as administrators, will meet whenever it is necessary in order to evaluate the status of the region and will review the common issues about which they need to make joint decisions. Such decision-making requires that all three show one important trait – political leadership.

It's good news that the three leaders of North America have decided to meet on March 31<sup>st</sup> in Cancún, México.

In the search for regional integration, Canada, Mexico and the United States need to continue the dialogue and cooperation that highlight the political will to begin a serious debate over the implications of creating a North American community. There is no room for misperceptions and misinterpretations. We have to realize that a large, significant initiative like this one cannot appear to belong exclusively to the government and the elites. This initiative has to be all-embracing.

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<sup>1</sup> Fiona Butler, "Regionalism and Integration", *The Globalization of World Politics: An Introduction to International Relations*, Edited by John Baylis and Steve Smith, (New York: Oxford University Press 1997), P. 410.

<sup>2</sup> Ibid, P. 200.

<sup>3</sup> Buzan, Barry, *People, States & Fear, an agenda for international Security studies in the post-cold war era*, (Boulder, Colorado:Lynne Rienner Publishers: 1991) P. 176.

<sup>4</sup> Robert A. Pastor, *Toward a North American community: Lessons from the Old World for the New*, (Washington DC: Institute for International Economics, august 2001): P.17

<sup>5</sup> Due to NAFTA, the concept of "North America" is now more than a geographic expression. It is identified with economic integration in a region that represents the largest area of free trade in the world in gross product and territory, with a GDP of U.S.\$11.5 billion, 19% of all global exports, and 25% of global imports. Office of the United States Trade Representative Consulted in [www.embassyofmexico.org](http://www.embassyofmexico.org)

<sup>6</sup> Gustavo Vega Cánovas, "La administración y resolución de diferencias comerciales y de inversión en la región de América del Norte durante la primera década del TLCAN", *Revista Mexicana de Política Exterior* 73, (México, DF: Instituto Matías Romero de Estudios Diplomáticos, February, 2005) P. 51.

<sup>7</sup> Alfonso De Maria y Campos and Alberto Fierro, "Hacia una Comunidad Norteamericana: Una Relación Estratégica de México con Canadá", *Revista Mexicana de Política Exterior* 66, (México: Instituto Matías Romero, March-June 2002): P. 103.

<sup>8</sup> Carlos Salinas de Gortari, *Tercer Informe de Gobierno*, México, Presidencia de la República, Dirección General de Comunicación Social, México, 1992. <http://db.uwaterloo.ca/~alopez-o/polind.html>

<sup>9</sup> James Wesley Scott, "On the Political Economy of Cross-Border Regionalism: Regional Development and Cooperation on the US-Mexican Border", *Globalization, Regionalization and Cross-Border Regions*, edited by Markus Perkmann and Ngai-Ling Sum, International Political Economy Series, (New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2002): P. 196.

<sup>10</sup> James Reston, "Mexican wants full review of ties in Carter talks", (New York: The New York Times, February 8<sup>th</sup>, 1979), P. A12. Cfr. Weintraub, Sidney, *Free Trade between Mexico and the United States?*, (Washington, DC.: The Brookings Institution, 1984): P. 3.

<sup>11</sup> Robert A. Pastor and Jorge G. Castañeda, *Limits to Friendship: the United States and Mexico*. (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1988) P. 106.

<sup>12</sup> Daniel Griswold, "Reagan Embraced Free Trade and Immigration", (Washington, DC: The Cato Institute, 2004). <http://www.cato.org/>

<sup>13</sup> Sidney Weintraub, *Free Trade between Mexico and the United States?*, (Washington, DC.: The Brookings Institution, 1984): P. 1.

<sup>14</sup> Robert A. Pastor, *Integration with Mexico Options for US Policy*, (Twentieth Century Fund, New York, 1993) P. 5.

<sup>15</sup> Federico Salas, "Hacia la construcción de una asociación entre los países de América del Norte", *Revista Mexicana de Política Exterior* No. 61, (México, October 2000) P. 60.

<sup>16</sup>Plan Nacional de Desarrollo 2001-2006, Gobierno de los Estados Unidos Mexicanos, Presidencia de la República (México: Poder Ejecutivo Federal, 2001) Consulted in [http://bibliotecadigital.conevyt.org.mx/colecciones/conevyt/plan\\_desarrollo.pdf](http://bibliotecadigital.conevyt.org.mx/colecciones/conevyt/plan_desarrollo.pdf)

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- <sup>17</sup> Jorge Castañeda, "Los ejes de la política exterior de México" (México: *Nexos*, 2001)
- <sup>18</sup> "Towards a Partnership for Prosperity: the Guanajuato proposal," Rancho San Cristóbal, Guanajuato, February 16th, 2001. Consulted in <http://www.migracioninternacional.com/docum/indice.html?mundo=comfeb01.html>
- <sup>19</sup> North American Leaders Statement, Québec, April, 2001.
- <sup>20</sup> Jorge Castañeda, Op. Cit. p. 12.
- <sup>21</sup> As Peter Andreas and Athanasios Hristoulas pointed out, the security issue in North American has been promoted by the Mexican government, and Canada has shown the greatest reticence. *The Rebordering of North America, Integration and Exclusion in a New Security Context*. edited by Peter Andreas and Thomas J. Biersteker, (New York: Routledge, 2003) P.15.
- <sup>22</sup> "The US-Canada Smart Border Declaration", December 12, 2001. <http://www.immigrationlinks.com/news/news1240.htm>
- <sup>23</sup> United States-Mexico Border Partnership Agreement, and its 22-point Action Plan, March, 22, 2002. Dirección General para América del Norte Archives, Secretaría de Relaciones Exteriores, México.
- <sup>24</sup> Monterrey Nuevo León, March 18-22, 2002, Consulted in <http://www.un.org/spanish/conferences/ffd/ACONF1983.pdf>
- <sup>25</sup> Arturo Sarukhán, *Balance y perspectivas de la política exterior de México*, (México: Instituto Matías Romero de Estudios Diplomáticos, radio transcript, September 17, 2002). Consulted in <http://www.sre.gob.mx/imred/difyext/transcripciones/radio02/asarukhan.htm>
- <sup>26</sup> Alfonso Zárate, *Lectura Política número 210, "Six state elections, 12 local congresses, 776 ayuntamientos and the complete renovation of the Asamblea Legislativa and 16 jefaturas delegacionales in Mexico city"*. (México: Grupo Consultor Interdisciplinario, 2 de julio de 2003) P. 6.
- <sup>27</sup> E-mail interview with Ambassador Jorge Montaña. November 16th, 2005.
- <sup>28</sup> Stephen Clarkson, "The view from the attic", *The Rebordering of North America, Integration and Exclusion in a New Security Context*, Op. cit. P. 77.
- <sup>29</sup> "Somos socios de los norteamericanos, pero de ninguna manera somos sus 'achichincles' Carlos Fuentes interviewed at the Museo Nacional de Artes Populares, México. Consulted in [www.reforma.com.mx](http://www.reforma.com.mx) Diario Reforma, Tatiana Adalid, "Exigen no ser achichinche", September 26, 2001.
- <sup>30</sup> Jeffrey Davidow, *El oso y el puercoespín*, (México: Editorial Grijalbo, 2003) P. 35.
- <sup>31</sup> Mónica Serrano "Bordering on the impossible", *The Rebordering of North America, Integration and Exclusion in a New Security Context*, Op cit. p. 48.
- <sup>32</sup> Enrique Rojo, "Relaciones bilaterales en materia de seguridad entre México y Estados Unidos de América: Cambios, retos y oportunidades al inicio del siglo XXI", Masters degree (Washington, DC.: Colegio Interamericano de Defensa and Universidad del Salvador, Argentina, June 2005) P. 87.
- <sup>33</sup> Council on Foreign Relations, Canadian Council of Chief Executives and el Consejo Mexicano de Asuntos Internacionales, "Building a North American Community" *Independent Task Force Report No. 53*, (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, May 2005). P. 160.
- <sup>34</sup> This is relative. Others do not share this perception, Miguel Pickard says: "The elites of the three NAFTA countries have been aggressively moving forward to build a new political and economic entity. A "trinational merger" is underway that leaps beyond the single market that NAFTA envisioned and, in many ways, would constitute a single state, called simply, "North America." *Trinational Elites Map North American Future in "NAFTA plus"*, The Americas Program from the International Relations Center IRC, (Silver City, NM, august 18th, 2005) Consulted in [www.americaspolicy.org](http://www.americaspolicy.org)
- <sup>35</sup> Security and Prosperity joint Leaders Statement, Waco, Texas, March 23, 2005. Consulted in <http://www.presidencia.gob.mx/buscador/index.php?contenido=17342&pagina=1&palabras=aspan>
- <sup>36</sup> Council on Foreign Relations, "Building a North American Community", Op. Cit. P. 132-160.

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<sup>37</sup> Report to the Leaders Elaborated by the Ministers and Secretaries of the Economic, Security and Foreign Policy areas of Canada, United States and Mexico. June, 2005. Consulted at [http://www.usembassycanada.gov/content/can\\_usa/spp\\_ottawa\\_report.pdf](http://www.usembassycanada.gov/content/can_usa/spp_ottawa_report.pdf)