ETHNIC PEACE ACCORDS AND ETHNIC CONFLICT RESOLUTION:

A SURVEY




John M. Richardson Jr. and Jianxin Wang
From:  Peace Accords and Ethnic Conflict.   Eds. K.M. de Silva and S.W.R. de A Samarasinghe.  New York:  St. Martin's Press, 1993.
January, 1992

Overview of the Following Text:

1.  Introduction

2.  Conflict Resolution Studies Relevant to Ethnic Conflicts:  A Survey

   A.  Surveys of Theory, Practice and Experience

    B.   Case Studies and Comparative Case Studies

    C.   Practical Guides to Negotiation, Mediation and Problem Solving

3.  Negotiation and Implementation

4.  Why Did the Ethnic Peace Accords Fail?

    A.  The Intractability of Ethnic Conflicts

     B.  Shortcomings in the Six Ethnic Peace Accords

5.  How Can Negotiators Do Better?

    A.  Effective Mediation and Conflict Regulation

6.  Summary of Major Conclusions

7.  References

8.  Endnotes

Introduction

The peace accords described in this text did not lead to durable settlements.  In this respect they failed.  On the other hand, however, they were pioneering attempts at settling one of the most intractable forms of political conflict.  In every case a framework for conflict resolution, agreed upon by some, was created and provided a breathing space within which further discussions could go forward.  Thus, the peace accords can usefully be viewed as experiments, from which there are lessons to be learned.  Identifying those lessons is a major purpose of Peace Accords and Ethnic Conflict and of this chapter.

The following table summarizes the outcomes of the accords.  The Addis Ababa Agreement was the most successful, contributing to nearly ten years of peace between Northern and Southern Sudanese, but now ethnic conflict rages again 1.   About three years of stability followed the independence of Cyprus, mandated by the London-Zurich Accord.  In Sri Lanka, violence subsided in the north for about six weeks after the Indo-Lanka Accord was signed, but the accord was a catalyst in a new conflict in the South 2.  The Punjab Agreement and Canada's Meech Lake Accord produced documents, but few tangible results.  One could add to this list the several agreements that have attempted to resolve Northern Ireland's 3 ethnic conflict, plus other negotiations and accords, signed and unsigned, that have failed to produce lasting peace.  Shortcomings in peace accords point to the two questions addressed in this paper, which reviews both 'scholarly' and 'practical' studies of conflict resolution:  1. Why did the peace accords fail to achieve their objectives?  2. How can those concerned with resolving ethnic conflicts do better?

Apparently, ethnic conflict has not yet captured the interest of most conflict resolution scholars.  A computer search of the major book collection in the Washington, DC area devoted to 'conflict resolution' produced 392 titles of which 121 were devoted to 'international conflict resolution' 4, but only 3 to 'ethnic conflict resolution'.  A search 5 of the DWIL periodical index produced 447 titles on 'conflict resolution', 91 on 'international conflict resolution' and seven on 'ethnic conflict resolution' 6.  No doubt the reawakening of ethnic strife in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union will evoke new interest in this area and in the practical problem of framing durable peace accords to resolve ethnic conflicts 7.

Table 2. Outcomes of Peace Accords

Conflict Resolution Studies Relevant to Ethnic Conflicts:  A Survey

The literature most relevant to resolving ethnic conflicts can usefully grouped into three broad categories, (a) surveys of conflict resolution theory, practice and experience; (b) case studies of ethnic conflict resolution and (c) practical guides for negotiators, mediators and facilitators. This section briefly reviews representative works in each category.

Surveys of Theory, Practice and Experience

Most scholars of conflict resolution assume there is commonality between conflicts occurring at the individual, family, group, organizational, national and international levels. Theories of conflict resolution propose that lessons learned from resolving conflicts at one level will be broadly applicable to others. The massive "St. Martins' series" on conflict resolution recently completed under John Burton's leader-ship (Burton, 1990a, 1990b; Burton and Dukes 1990a, 1990b) exemplifies this point of view. Burton and Dukes argue that the struggle to satisfy inherent human needs is common to all conflicts, although conflicts may take many different forms. Different forms of conflict may require different conflict resolution strategies, for example negotiation, alternative dispute resolution, mediation or second track diplomacy.

Other works in this genre include Sandole and Sandole-Saroste (eds., 1987), Azar and Burton (1987), Shellenberg, (1989), Berkovitch (1984) and Kressel and Pruitt (1989). The works of Shellenberg, Berkovitch and Kressel and Pruitt, however, illustrate a more specialized focus. Shellenberg argues that theories of conflict resolution must be based on a broad understanding of theories that address the causes and dynamics of conflict. Berkovitch focuses on the role of third parties in resolving inter-personal, labor management and international conflicts. Kressel and Pruitt report results from applying a single conflict resolution strategy - mediation - across a broad range of conflict levels from individual to international.

Studies by Deutsch (1973), Likert and Likert (1976) and Pruitt and Rubin (1986), illustrate work that draws primarily on social psychological theories and related empirical research dealing with individual, group and organizational behavior. Deutsch, writing in the tradition of George Simmel (1955) and Louis Coser (1956), views conflict positively and argues that the challenge of conflict resolution is to transform destructive conflicts into constructive ones. His work presages the emphasis on "win - win" solutions associated with contemporary "problem-solving" approaches to conflict resolution 8. The Likerts draw upon "research-based principles and theories of organization and management" to identify more effective systems of organization for constructively managing conflict. Such systems, they argue, are essential for striking a balance between individual freedom and social order in complex industrial societies. Pruitt and Rabin examine causes and consequences of alternative strategies for coping with conflict. Under what conditions, they ask, will individuals engage in the cognitively demanding task of attempting to maximize not only their own outcomes, but those of the other side?

Burton's early classic, Conflict and Communication (1969) and a more recent work by Kahn (1988) illustrate a school of thought that emphasizes the importance of communication in conflict resolution. Burton argues that resolving conflicts "must involve processes by which communication can be made to be effective, [that is]...deliberate conveying and accurate receipt and interpretation of what was intended and should be conveyed, and the full employment of information as received and stored in the allocation and reallocation of values, interests and goals" (p. 49). Burton's later work emphasizes that effective communication, while important, represents only one facet of conflict resolution. Kahn, however, presents the more simplistic view that enhanced communication alone will be sufficient to resolve most conflicts. She ignores situations - sometimes present in ethnic conflicts - where clearer, more accurate communication may actually widen, rather than narrowing differences between protagonists.

Mao Tse Tung's writings are rarely cited in surveys of the conflict resolution literature, but his On the Correct Handling of Contradictions Among the People (1957) merits attention from students of ethnic conflict. Mao notes that both "chauvinism of the majority" and "parochialism of the minority" are potentially divisive problems in multi-ethnic societies. His approach to conflict management provides for a multifold strategy emphasizing equal participation, changing attitudes (promoting communication and mutual trust) and economic development. Mao's view that "contradictions" are rooted in a syndrome of interdependent and divergent attitudes, cultural contexts and economic circumstances offers a sophisticated perspective that is sometimes lacking in proposed and implemented conflict resolution strategies (including the peace accords discussed in this book. 9 

An equally multifaceted perspective is found in the late Edward E. Azar's last book, The Management of Protracted Social Conflict (1990). Like his frequent collaborator, John Burton, Azar is properly grouped with scholars who believe that individual, group, organizational, national and international level conflicts (and conflict resolution strategies) have much in common. However Azar argues that an emergent, virulent strain, protracted social conflicts poses unusual problems of intractability for both protagonists and third parties concerned with conflict resolution. Ethnic or communal conflicts typically fall into this category. We will have more to say about protracted social conflict in a subsequent section.

Case Studies and Comparative Case Studies

Azar's work also illustrates a second, although rarely encountered genre in the literature: case studies and comparative case studies of ethnic conflict resolution. Azar's first insights about the distinctive characteristics of protracted conflict grew from in-depth study of his native country, Lebanon 10. This work lead provided a basis for further case studies, sponsored by the University of Maryland's Center for International Development and Conflict Management, and to refinement of the "problem-solving forum" strategy for resolving ethnic conflicts 11. Rothchild and Hartzell's study of the Sudan peace process (1990) 12 also focuses on the negotiation process and the potential for successful third party mediation. They identify five preconditions favoring success: (1) the emergence of identifiable bargaining parties; (2) evidence of a mutually hurting stalemate; (3) the existence of leaders determined on a practical solution; (4) external political actors supporting conflict resolution; and (5) the presence of a mediator actively on the scene.

Other case studies focus on the need to address deeply rooted cultural, economic and geopolitical issues as prerequisites for resolving ethnic conflicts. For example, de Silva's work on managing ethnic conflict in Sri Lanka (1986) 13 points to the importance of resolving constitutional questions involving language, religion, representation patterns and devolution of power. Garcia's work on the Philippines (1988, 1989) urges that attention be given to protecting human rights, agrarian reform, delivery of basic social services and the resolution of gross economic inequities. Rupesinghe's collection of papers on Uganda (1989) emphasizes the need for political institutions that are more responsive to minority concerns and more equitable, participatory agricultural development strategies.

Horowitz's massive comparative study, Ethnic Groups in Conflict (1985) maintains that while deeply rooted issues must be addressed, some ethnic differences may be inherently unresolvable. He believes that conflict reduction, rather than conflict resolution is a more practicable goal in ethnically diverse societies. Horowitz identifies five basic mechanisms of conflict reduction (p. 597): 1. creating proliferating points of power; 2. raising the saliency of intra-ethnic conflict 14 ; 3. creating incentives for inter-ethnic cooperation 15; 4. encouraging alignments based on interests other than ethnicity; and 5. reducing disparities between groups so that dissatisfaction declines. He proposes that nations live with ethnic differences, rather than attempting to move beyond them, by   "engineering" institutional structures and procedures that are based upon an understanding of how political incentives intensify or mitigate ethnic tensions. Horowitz believes that "structural techniques" that "change the political framework within which ethnic conflict occurs but do not necessarily make promises about outcomes," will be most effective (Ch. 15). He is skeptical about "distributive policies," such as proportional allocation of government positions, that attempt to directly change the ethnic balance of economic opportunities and rewards (Ch. 16) 16. 

Eric Nordlinger's Conflict Regulation in Divided Societies (1972) is an earlier comparative study emphasizing conflict management. The work argues that common characteristics of six cases -- Belgium, the Netherlands, Austria, Switzerland, Lebanon and Malaysia -- point to a general theory of conflict regulation. Nordlinger claims that these six "divided societies" were free of conflict for long periods of time because elite leaders of protagonist groups were both dominant and politically skillful. By politically skillful, he means that they successfully implemented one or more of six conflict regulating practices (pp. 20, ff): .1. a stable coalition between governing parties; 2. the principle of proportionality; 3. acceptance of a mutual veto; 4. purposive depoliticization 17 ; 5. mutual adjustment of conflicting values and interests through compromise and 6. concessions by the stronger group. When conflict regulation succeeds, "at least one of the six practices is invariably present (p. 20)." 

Horowitz's and Nordlinger's emphasis on conflict regulation (or conflict management), distinguishes their work from most studies of conflict resolution. They are more concerned with stabilizing divided societies over the long run than with ending violent conflicts after they have broken out. Their practices and principles provide useful broad goals for negotiators and mediators, however these goals might be difficult to attain or even unreachable when the positions of protagonist groups have been polarized by extended periods of protracted conflict.

Comparative case studies by Lickleider (1990) 18 and Zartman (1985) point to the problems of negotiating successful ethnic peace accords as well providing useful insights for negotiators 19. However neither deals with ethnic conflicts specifically. Lickleider's study of How Civil Wars End emphasizes the limits of so-called "general theories" and the need for third party mediators to be deeply immersed in the details of each case 20. Mediator's roles in his cases vary widely. In Zimbabwe, third party mediation was decisive. In the Sudan, it was helpful but not decisive. In Yemen, third party intervention contributed to peace by creating a common enemy, which helped to bring the warring parties together (this was hardly the third party's goal, however).

Zartman examines four conflicts in Africa 21 that offer promising opportunities for mediation, i.e. they are "Ripe for Resolution" (1985). He introduces the concept of the "ripe moment" when a mediator with something to offer both sides can sometimes intervene successfully. A "hurting stalemate" can produce a ripe moment (pp. 266-273), however it appears difficult to define ripe moments and hurting stalemates before the fact (Lickleider, 1990). 

If negotiation and mediation can contribute to the resolution of at least some protracted conflicts, what are the essential problem-solving and conflict management skills that will make a difference? A considerable literature exists, based on experiences in negotiation, mediation and collaborative problem solving, that attempts to generalize about such skills and to make them accessible to both practitioner and student. Exemplars of this literature are considered next.

Practical Guides to Negotiation, Mediation and Problem Solving

Practical guides to negotiation, mediation and problem-solving can be divided into those that describe general negotiation skills and those that describe skills specifically applicable to international and/or ethnic conflicts. A second distinction is between competitive (zero-sum) and problem-solving (positive-sum) approaches 22. Cohen's You Can Negotiate Anything (1980) and Fisher and Ury's widely publicized Getting to Yes (1981) 23 provide good examples of works dealing with general negotiation skills 24. Zartman and Berman's The Practical Negotiator (1982), Mitchell's Peacemaking and the Consultant's Role (1981) and Touval's The Peace Brokers (1982) focus on skills relevant to international and ethnic conflict resolution 25.

Cohen's guide to "negotiating anything, at any place" covers transactions from purchasing a refrigerator to reaching agreements with the Soviet Union 26. Although he gives some attention to problem solving approaches, his work is most useful as an explication of zero-sum bargaining principles. Cohen sees control over power, time and information as essential to successful negotiations. Threats, exaggeration and lying may be effective tactics. Soviet diplomats are described as good models of effective zero-sum negotiators. Their tactics have included a. taking extreme initial positions, b. limiting the authority of negotiators, c. using emotion as a negotiating tactic, d. treating adversary concessions as weaknesses, e. being stingy in their own concessions and f. ignoring deadlines.

Advocates of problem-solving approaches maintain that zero-sum strategies are of limited effectiveness except in single, one-shot negotiations over limited resources (Singer, 1990, Ch. 2). In complicated negotiations, and especially in resolving conflicts where protagonists will remain in close proximity to one another, a strategy that transforms zero-sum bargaining to mutually supportive problem-solving is far more likely to produce stable, long lasting agreements.

The Harvard Negotiation Project, headed by Roger Fisher and William Ury has been instrumental in both refining and popularizing problem-solving approaches (Fisher and Ury, 1981; Fisher and Brown, 1989). The Project's strategy of "principled negotiation" advocates looking for mutual gains wherever possible. When interests conflict, outcomes should be based on "fair standards, independent of the will of either side," (1981, p. xii). A principled negotiation, then, becomes a collaborative process of agreeing on fair standards and identifying previously unrecognized areas for mutual gain.

The authors propose four basic principles to guide negotiation processes (1981):

1. Separate the people from the problem (Ch. 2). Adversaries must be recognized as people first and negotiators must attempt to place them-selves in their opponent's shoes. The problems caused by differing perceptions, strong emotions and the need to "save face" must be taken into account.

2. Focus on interests, not positions (Ch. 3). Negotiators must recognize that "behind opposed positions lie shared and compatible interests as well as conflicting ones. ...A close examination of the underlying interests will reveal the existence of many more interests that are shared and compatible than ones that are opposed" (p. 43) 27.

3. Invent options for mutual gain (Ch. 4). Negotiators must separate the creative process of seeking (brainstorming) new options from the more analytical, confronting process of judging and choosing among them.

4. Insist on objective criteria (Ch. 5). The authors recognize that creativity in inventing options will not entirely obviate the "harsh reality of interests that conflict" (p. 84). The challenge is to transform the resolution of such conflicts from a test of will to a negotiation on the basis of criteria that are independent of the will of either side. "Legitimate, practical" criteria can be based on such recognized principles as "scientific judgement", "market value", "professional standards", "efficiency", and the like 28.


Although every negotiation is different, Fisher and Ury maintain that the elements of a principled negotiation do not change. "Principled negotiation is an all purpose strategy" that is as applicable to family disputes as to superpower arms control talks (p. xiii).

Two contending schools of thought are found in works that focus on negotiating national and international level political conflicts specifically. The first criticizes traditional diplomacy, argues that international and other forms of conflicts have much in common and advocates an increased role for technically trained professional mediators. The second school argues that much can be learned from traditional diplomacy, that international conflicts have distinctive characteristics and that mediators must play a political as well as a professional role.

The first school of thought is exemplified by C.R. Mitchell's work on third party mediation (1981). He believes that traditional approaches to negotiation have high risks and, even if successful, fail to produce viable long-term solutions (Ch. 1). Traditional negotiators assume that they are in a "win-lose" situation where compromises, involving concessions by both sides provide the best possible opportunity for a solution (Intro.). The shortcomings of traditional approaches could be remedied, the author maintains, by the participation of professionally trained "consultants" who would be impartial facilitators of the negotiation process. The facilitator's strategy would be similar to Fisher and Ury's principled negotiation. Conflicts would be mediated by altering protagonists' goals, perceptions and range of available alternatives (Introduction and Ch. 4). Mitchell's model for the consultant's role is the "workshop" format first proposed by John Burton (1969) and subsequently used by Kelman and Cohen to intervene in the conflict between Greek and Turkish Cypriots (1972) 29.

The works by Zartman and Berman (1982) and especially by Touval (1982) present almost a mirror image of Mitchell's point of view 30. They argue that much can be learned from diplomats' experiences. In their view, the distinctiveness of national and international level political conflicts and negotiations demands, at least in some degree, distinctive conflict resolution strategies.

Zartman and Berman's The Practical Negotiator (1982) is the most empirically grounded study of political conflict resolution found in the literature. It draws upon more than ten years of research under the auspices of the Academy for Educational Development's Conflict and Communication program. The resources generated by the project included interviews with numerous practitioners and the results of dialogues between scholars and practitioners in several structured settings 31. The authors propose a three stage model of the negotiation process. In the diagnostic phase, negotiations are initiated and opportunities for a solution to the conflict are identified. In the formula phase, specific formulas or rules that could provide a basis for agreement are defined. In the detail phase the specific elements of an agreement are negotiated and finalized. For each phase, "specific behaviors and tactics" that can "improve the conduct of negotiations and better the chances of success are proposed. These are summarized in practical "check-lists" which negotiators are advised to "keep on their desks." 32

While Zartman and Berman's work is broadly applicable to both direct negotiations between protagonists and to those in which third parties play a role, Saadia Touval's The Peace Brokers: Mediators in the Arab Israeli Conflict, 1948-79 (1982) addresses the role of third parties exclusively. It also emphasizes the distinctive characteristics of international/communal conflicts most strongly. The author's "Peace Brokers" are the individuals or teams that participated in nine distinct attempts to resolve the ongoing strife between Arabs and Israelis 33. The qualities Touval attributes to successful mediators are similar to those emphasized elsewhere. They should be experienced in conflict resolution and knowledgeable about the specific conflict, the context in which it is waged and the parties involved. Personal qualities should include tact, intelligence, persuasiveness, humility and patience. But in contrast to other analysts, Touval does not believe that successful mediators in international and ethnic conflicts need be or probably will be unbiased. Rather he believes that third parties will bring both recognized biases and external resources to the mediation process. In the cases he examined, mediators' effectiveness in winning concessions from protagonists was due more to the resources at their disposal than impartiality or even negotiating skills. Touval believes that third party mediation in the Middle East must realistically be viewed as another form of power politics, albeit one of the less destructive forms.

Table 2.  Negotiation and Implementation of Ethnic Peace Accords

Examination of The Peace Brokers concludes our brief literature survey. The stage is now set to answer the two questions that introduced this paper: 1. Why did the ethnic peace accords fail? 2. How can those concerned with resolving ethnic conflicts do better?


Why did the Ethnic Peace Accords Fail?

We propose two explanations for the failure of the ethnic peace accords. First is the intractability of ethnic conflicts. These conflicts, while they bear some similarity to other disputes, are probably the most complex and difficult to resolve by any conflict resolution method and under any circumstances. Our second explanation is shortcomings in negotiating and implementing the accords. Possibly excepting the Addis Ababa agreement, the negotiation process, content and followup of the peace accords fail to exhibit even the most elementary principles that conflict resolution specialists point to as prerequisites for success.


The Intractability of Ethnic Conflicts

A major theme of Donald Horowitz's path-breaking Ethnic Groups in Conflict (1985) is, as noted above, that resolving ethnic conflicts may be impossible. It may only be possible to manage them. He illustrates with the following tale:

When the Japanese hurriedly evacuated Christmas Island, south of Java, they left some small arms behind. The Malays and Chinese who inhabit the island had enough of fighting, and it is said that they arranged for the Chinese to keep the rifles and the Malays to keep the bolts. The Malays, on the other hand, were to keep the pistols but give the magazines to the Chinese. By these devices, a bloodbath was averted (p. 563).

The Christmas Islanders recognized that their predispositions toward violent ethnic conflict were dangerous, deeply rooted and not susceptible to individual good will. Fortunately, they were able to seize a propitious moment and limit the resources that would support violence. Protagonists and victims of most ethnic conflicts have been less fortunate. Ethnic differences often provoke violence. The resources to sustain violent conflict are readily available. As noted above violent ethnic conflict often assumes a particularly virulent form, labeled by the late Edward Azar as protracted social conflict.

The focus of protracted conflicts, according to Azar, "is religious, cultural or ethnic communal identity, which in turn is dependent upon the satisfaction of basic needs such as those for security, communal recognition and distributive justice (p. 2) ." Such conflicts "tend to involve an enduring antagonistic set of perceptions and interactions between communal groups and the state." Those perceptions and interactions are conditioned by the experiences, fears and belief systems of the contending ethnic groups. Each attributes the worst motivations to the other side. Hostility begets hostility, creating conditions of violent conflict that feed upon themselves (pp. 13-16). Protracted conflict weakens civil society, delegitimizes governmental institutions, destroys the economy and frustrates developmental goals.

At the onset of conflict, social and economic institutions mediating communal interrelationships may still be functional, and communal boundaries permeable. As conflict protracts, however, communal cleavages become petrified, and the prospects for cooperative interaction and nation building become poor (p. 16). ...With the continued stress of each conflict, attitudes, cognitive processes and perceptions become set and ossified. War culture and cynicism dominate. Meaningful communication between or among conflicting parties dries up, and ability to satisfy communal acceptance needs is severely diminished (p. 17).

Protracted conflict creates severe obstacles to any peace-making process. Peacemaking is resisted even though for most of those involved, the economic costs of protracted conflict clearly outweigh any conceivable long-term economic benefit (Azar, 1990, p. 7,ff; Richardson and Samarasinghe, 1992). In part, this is because leaders and members of militant groups, who must be key actors in any peace-making process, reap both psychic and material benefits from the perpetuation of conflict, while passing the costs to others. They may have little to gain from peace (Richardson and Samarasinghe, 1992). Often militant forces are far from unified; there may be multiple - even rival - key leaders with differing objectives. Sometimes militant leaders and groups comprising one faction seem as hostile to each other as to their adversaries from opposing ethnic groups 34.  For high government officials, the perpetuation of conflict can divert attention from failures in leadership and from intractable social and economic problems (Richardson and Samarasinghe, 1992). For the foot soldiers in protracted conflict, symbolic considerations often weigh more heavily than economic ones (Horowitz, 1985, Ch. 4).

Clearly ethnic conflicts are protracted. Animosities contributing to a high potential for violent conflict can be traced back over decades and even centuries 35. When violent conflicts between ethnic groups do break out, they tend to last far longer than wars between nations 36. Although available data is more anecdotal than comprehensive, the evidence seems overwhelming that genocide, military defeat exile or enforced separation of contending parties are more likely to mark the end of violent ethnic conflicts than negotiated peace accords 37.


Shortcomings in the Six Ethnic Peace Accords

Formidable challenges clearly await those who would frame ethnic peace accords as negotiator, mediator or external arbiter. For negotiators or mediators the conditions for success would seem to include - at a minimum - bringing authoritative representatives of contending groups together, establishing communication, creating trust, identifying acceptable terms for an accord, ensuring that those terms have adequate support among the adversaries and fully imple-menting the accord. Possibly, external arbiters can devote less time to building consensus to the degree that they have the capacity to impose and enforce terms of an accord. But imposing terms on militant groups is not easy, as the Indian Peace Keeping Force discovered in Sri Lanka and an imposed peace, unless supported by some commitment from contending groups, is unlikely to be sustainable.

Table 2 above summarizes the negotiation processes and implementation of each accord discussed in this book. External actors played a role in four - Cyprus, Sri Lanka, Philippines and Sudan. In two cases, Cyprus and Sri Lanka, external powers attempted to achieve peace by imposing an accord. Although both accords attempted to deal with some outstanding issues, neither set of negotiations involved all of the protagonists and fundamental points of difference were left unresolved. In Cyprus the proportional representation scheme written into the new nation's constitution never provided a basis for real cooperation. Peace ended when Greek and Turkish Cypriots were able to draw their client states into a confrontation. In Sri Lanka, the Indian Government was over-optimistic about the ability of its Army to enforce the accord that Rajiv Gandhi had dictated to the LTTE leader, Prabakharan. When the Liberation Tigers resumed hostilities, within two months after the accord was signed, the Indian Peace Keeping force was hardly more effective than the Sri Lankan army had been in maintaining order 38 . The two cases where external actors played the role of mediators produced the relatively successful Addis Ababa accord and the failed Tripoli accord. Differences between circumstances of the two negotiations and negotiation procedures help to explain the different outcomes. In the Sudan conflict, the Southern rebels negotiated from a strong, if not equal position with government representa-tives. Their key role in bringing the Nimieri regime to power was recognized. President Nimieri was personally committed to reaching some accord and empowered a skillful negotiator, in the person of Vice President Alier, who could effectively communicate with both sides. Signing of the accord was followed by implementation of its provisions, again under the direction of Vice President Alier 39.

The Tripoli accord was negotiated between a relatively strong Philippine government and much weaker rebel forces. The government seems to have been more concerned about mollifying international opinion than about resolving its differences with the Moro. Moreover the conflict was as much over the economic exploitation of "ancestral home-lands" as over ethnic differences. Key actors in the conflict were politically influential businessmen, with a stake in that economic exploitation. However these businessmen played no role in the Tripoli negotiations and had nothing to gain from implementation of the accord. Business and politics are always closely intermingled in the Philippines. In the absence of a strong presidential commitment or institutional mechanisms for implementing the accord, government officials were far more receptive to pressures from business interests than those from the Moro community.

An analogous situation seems to have prevailed in two of the three negotiations that did not involve external actors, the creation of autonomous regions in the 1987 Philippine constitution and the Punjab Accord. The two Philippine cases are so similar that additional discussion is hardly needed. The Cordillera People's Alliance (CPA) has been no more effective in asserting their rights under the Constitution than the Moro have been in implementing the Tripoli Agreement and for the same reasons (Royo, 1991). The Punjab Accord also failed to involve key actors with strong interests in the negotiations. The accord provided for major concessions, involving land and water rights, from the leaders of Hariana province. Prime Minister Gandhi first overestimated his ability to persuade recalcitrant provincial leaders and then lost interest in the process when the configuration of forces in Indian provincial politics changed. In failing to ensure the support of militant Sikh leaders, Gandhi committed an error that he was to repeat in the Indo-Lanka accord, two years later, with equally disastrous consequences.

Among the six accords, Meech-Lake is a special case because Canada is a modern nation and because there has been little violent conflict between the English and the Quebecois. However there are parallels between the problems encountered in ratifying this accord and those in the Philippine and Punjab cases. Implementation of each accord failed in part because the negotiations excluded parties with strong interests and effective veto power. Prime Minister Mulroney was so focused on resolving outstanding issues between Quebec and the federal government that he neglected the concerns of other provinces and failed to see the impact of the accord on Canada's indigenous peoples 40.

When one compares recommendations from studies of conflict resolution against what transpired in negotiating and implementing the six peace accords the shortcomings of the accords become apparent. Parties to the accords, especially "external" third parties made commitments that could not, or would not be kept. The effective veto power of key actors, who were excluded from the negotiations was either underestimated or ignored. Thus, most of the ethnic peace accords failed to establish communication, build trust, identify mutual interests or resolve fundamental issues among major protagonists. This offers grounds for hope, not pessimism. It suggests that negotiators of ethnic peace accords have something to learn from studies of conflict resolution and that the process of negotiating such accords can be improved.


How can Negotiators do Better?

Effective Mediation and Conflict Regulation

Studies of ethnic conflict by Horowitz (1985), Azar (1991) and others provide convincing evidence that violent ethnic conflicts will rarely, if ever be "resolved" by the protagonists alone except through the capitulation, destruction or extermination of one of them. But "conflict resolution" through military victory is likely to be an uncertain, costly, destructive and time consuming process (Richardson and Samarasinghe, 1992). Even though third party intervention was largely ineffective in negotiating and implementing the accords discussed in this book, we believe that a strong case can be made for effective third party intervention. But what type of third party role is most likely to bring warring parties together and mediate a successful accord. Principles of effective mediation, as described in the literature, may contribute to a successful outcome, but they will not be sufficient. To be effective in resolving ethnic conflicts, third party negotiators must be more than skillful. They must be (or represent) key political actors in their own right who bring influence, strong interests in resolving the conflict and substantial resources to the negotiation process.

Readers will recognize that this conclusion is consistent with Saadia Touval's work on the Middle East peace process (1982) and differs from the view that an effective role can be played by a dispassionate, technically competent mediator who is not politically involved. Although Touval is primarily writing about international conflicts, I believe his findings are relevant to the concerns of this paper. The more than thirty year armed struggle between Israelis and Arabs certainly qualifies as a protracted social conflict.

According to Touval, mediating powers in the Arab-Israeli conflict had strong national security interests in the outcome and were often biased toward one side or the other. However bias did not appear to limit their effectiveness. Serious negotiations were more likely when a mediating power could exert political pressure that would bring the protagonists to the negotiating table. When negotiations commenced, the ability of the mediator to provide benefits for both sides and to reduce risks that adversaries assumed by making concessions were key factors contributing to success. Successful mediators were able to create a "win-win" situation by providing positive incentives to both sides and serving as credible guarantors against backsliding or cheating 41.

The Camp David Accords illustrate many of these points 42 . After thirteen days of arduous negotiations, Egypt and Israel reached agreement on the terms of a peace treaty and on Israeli withdrawal from the Sinai peninsula. There has been peace between the two nations for more than a decade 43. The United States used not only political pressure, but the prestige of the U.S. Presidency to bring top-level representatives of two major protagonists to the negotiating table. President Carter provided not only good offices, but substantial financial incentives and military guarantees. In addition to these political, financial and military resources, the President and his aides used many of the techniques of "problem solving" negotiation that have been described above.

The story of Camp David Accords illustrates that partial resolution of ethnic conflicts may sometimes be possible without military victory; it also illustrates that the task of framing a sustainable ethnic peace accord should not be undertaken lightly, nor with any certainty about the outcome. Moreover, Camp david may be a model of limited generality. Tensions between Israel and Egypt were high, but a number of circumstances, not easily replicable, contributed to the results achieved 44. Negotiations were preceded by major political changes in both Israel and Egypt, catalyzed by President Sadat's trip to Israel and speech before the Israeli parliament. Both Egypt and Israel were already politically beholden to the United States and were major recipients of U.S. Aid. President Carter was perhaps uniquely skilled among U.S. Presidents as a peacemaker and willing to risk the reputation of his Presidency on a favorable outcome.

The circumstances of many ethnic conflicts are less favorable than those faced by the Camp David negotiators. Members of conflicting groups may be intermingled, as in Northern Ireland, Croatia, India and Sri Lanka, making clear territorial demarcations difficult. There may be multiple groups and divided authority on one or both sides, complicating the negotiation process. Leaders of militant groups may have little predisposition toward the give and take of negotiation and see few gains from a peaceful outcome. There may be more than one external power with a stake in the outcome; some external powers may see greater benefits from prolonging conflict than from conflict resolution. Moreover it would be inaccurate to label the Camp David results "conflict resolution." Rather, the accords managed to reduce friction between the two protagonists sufficiently so that further negotiation, rather than the use of force became a mutually acceptable basis for managing potentially violent conflicts and beginning to resolve outstanding disputes.

Mediation has a role to play in resolving violent ethnic conflicts and may sometimes provide a successful basis for long-term conflict management. But given the costs and intractability of such conflicts, implementing conflict reduction or conflict management strategies before violence breaks out would seem to be far more promising and cost effective. Paradoxically, we have far less detailed knowledge about conflict avoidance in ethnically diverse societies than about the minutiae of negotiation, mediation and arbitration. Nordlinger's work on conflict regulating practices identified a promising area of research that, until recently, has received little attention. Horowitz's work on mechanisms of conflict reduction and his comparative analysis of structural vs. preferential policies to reduce ethnic conflict represents a significant step forward. Work in this genre can be helpful in preventing the outbreak of violent conflict and in building a durable peace following a successful mediation effort.


Summary of Major Conclusions

Negotiating a successful ethnic peace accord, without military victory on one side, will require third party intervention.

The third party should be substantially more powerful, politically, than any protagonist, should have a strong interest in reaching an accord and be willing to commit substantial resources to implementing its provisions. The United Nations or a regional group such as ASEAN, SAARC, OAS or OAU might play the third party role if group mediation is backed by major powers 45.

Third party leaders must resist the temptation to try imposing a solution using military force. The use of neutral peace keeping forces, under conditions agreed to by all key protagonists, may be a temporary expedient.

Third party negotiators should be committed to establishing communication, building trust and identifying areas of mutual interest among the protagonists.

Use of the "workshop format" and other conflict resolution techniques can be an important part of the negotiation process, but should be viewed as complementary to the role of a politically powerful, highly committed third party.

All key actors with potential veto power over implementation of an accord should be involved in the negotiations.

Conflict management is probably a more desirable and attainable goal for ethnic peace accords than conflict resolution. Many ethnic conflicts may be manageable, but not resolvable.

Successful negotiation of an accord should be viewed as the beginning, not the end of the conflict management process.

Potential third party intervenors as well as protagonists should recognize that the most propitious and cost effective time for managing ethnic differences is before violent conflict breaks out.

Among conflict management strategies found in the literature, Donald Horowitz's proposals, emphasizing design of political structures to mitigate, diffuse and channel ethnic tensions appear to be the most promising.

As the 1990s begin, a new generation of political leaders is grappling with questions of constitutional and institutional design in ethnically diverse nations. These leaders need to understand more about the causes of ethnic conflict and how alternative institutional structures can either mitigate or exacerbate ethnic tensions. Further, the costs and benefits of attempts to resolve ethnic tensions by force need to be realistically appraised. When tension does lead to conflict, leaders of contending groups and potential third party intervenors need to know which negotiation and mediation strategies are likely to be most effective. Those of us who are scholars need to research these areas more fully. But much is already known. While seeking new knowledge, we need to communicate what we know now to political leaders in ways that are clear, powerful and relevant. And we need to apply our current knowledge more widely and effectively.