TED Case Studies


Mochovce Nuclear Plant


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          CASE NUMBER:        176  
          CASE MNEMONIC:      MOCHO
          CASE NAME:          Mochovce Nuclear Plant

A.   IDENTIFICATION

1.   The Issue

     The completion and refurbishment of the nuclear reactor at
Mochovce in Slovakia is a case study of a Western response to the
problem which did not meet expectations.  A serious debate sprang
up in Slovakia, Austria, and the European Union around conditions
attached to a loan from the European Bank for Reconstruction and
Development (EBRD) to complete the plant.  Environmental groups,
especially in Austria, maintained that the completion of Mochovce
as a reactor represented a serious threat to the local
environment, in the form of gradual degradation or perhaps a
catastrophe such as occurred at Chernobyl.  The Slovaks
maintained that the offer's conditions, which included certain
safety regulations, were unacceptable, and thus turned the offer
down in lieu of a Czech/Russian offer to finance completion of
the project.  There was considerable debate about whether
completion by the EBRD would have met Western safety regulations,
and the new Czech/Russian contract seems even less likely to
respect safety standards.

2.   Description

     Construction on the Mochovce Nuclear Power Plant began in
1983 and consists of four VVER 440/V-213 Soviet-design
pressurized water reactors.  The plant, located 100km east of
Bratislava and approximately 150 km from Vienna, is located in a
rural yet relatively populated area of Slovakia.

     The original financing plan, approved in 1978 by the former
Czechoslovakian government, involved 50 percent funding from the
state budget, 30 percent by the state energy utility and 20
percent of costs from loans.  In 1991, all construction work at
Mochovce was stopped due to a shortage of funds.  Anticipated
expenditures for 1992 totaled 4.4 billion CS crowns (28.9 CS
crowns/$1US in 1992).  At that time less than 2 billion CS crowns
were available for project completion.  Mochovce had cost
approximately US$665 million when construction was halted.  

     Since the separation of the Czech and Slovak Republics in
1993, Mochovce  has been under the responsibility of Slovensky
Energeticky Podnik (SEP), the Slovak energy authority. In 1994,
SEP entered into a joint venture arrangement with Electricity de
France (EdF) for the upgrading and completion of Mochovce.  EdF
holds 51 percent of the joint venture shares with SEP holding the
remaining 49 percent.  Bayenwerk, a German utility, has been
given the option to purchase of a percentage of SEPs shares. 

     The new joint venture company (EMO) approached the European
Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) and the nuclear
association of the European Union, EURATOM, for funds  to upgrade
and complete units 1 and 2 of the facility.  Units 1 and 2 are 90
and 70 percent complete, respectively, while units 3 and 4 are
approximately 50 percent complete.  Of the estimated US$830
million needed to complete Mochovce, the EBRD, EURATOM, via the
European Investment Bank, and EdF and Bayenwerk would contribute
the financing in equal proportions.  Global 2000 reports that
according to EBRD documents, western involvement in the project
will be paid for by a 10-15 year contract of cheap exports of
electricity to western utilities.  The EBRD refutes this claim
stating that electricity exports will only occur during a short
overlap between the completion of Mochovce and the closure of
another Slovak nuclear facility at Bohunice.  In this case,
electricity exports will represent at most 2.3 percent of
electricity produced over the life of Mochovce.

     Units 1 and 2 at Mochovce are scheduled for completion in
the year 2000.  EMO will own these two units which would be
leased back to SEP.  The EBRD refused to finance completion of
the units 3 and 4 because this added capacity exceeds Slovakia■s
energy needs.  Construction has been stopped entirely on these
units.

     Two factors motivate the Slovak government to complete
Mochovce: the opportunity for energy self-sufficiency and the
potential to boost foreign exchange reserves from electricity
exports. Currently, the Slovak electricity system consists of:
(1) Slovenske Electricky Podnik, the main generator and operator
of the high voltage transmission network, and (2) limited
capacity regional distribution utilities which provide retail
electricity and heat services to customers.  In 1990, SEP met
nearly 90 percent of Slovkia■s energy needs.  The following
table highlights SEP's capacity and production for 1993:

                          Table 176-1
          Electricity Production Capacity for SEP and
               Slovak Energy Consumption in 1993

               Capacity (1993)          Needs (1993)
               Total (MW) Percent       Total (MW) Percent

Nuclear        1760      30.1           11022     52.5

Conventional:  1990      34.0           5698      27.2
   Coal        721       13.4           3149      15.0
   Lignite     54        99.4           1690       8.1
   Gas/oil     660       11.3           859        4.1
   Hydro       2096      35.9           3318      15.8
Net Imports    9434.5

Source:  Putnam, Hayes & Bartlett, December 1994. 
     
     Mochovce would replace 1760 MW of Bohunice■s capacity,
bringing total energy resources to 6,918 MW.  Once Mochovce is
operational, the two Soviet-design VVER 440/230  (V-1) reactors
at Bohunice are slated for closure.  Bohunice, located 50 km
northeast of Bratislava, is considered among the most dangerous
nuclear facilities in Central Europe.  The International Atomic
Energy Association found more than 80 violations during a safety
inspection in the early 1990s and Czechoslovak officials agreed
that the V-1 reactors could never be upgraded to internationally
accepted safety levels.

     Historically, electricity demand has exceeded supply in
Slovakia.  Two factors generally contribute to this situation. 
First, even with large rate increases in 1991, industrial and
residential prices remain at 59% and 21%, respectively, of
average Western European levels.  This has provided a great
incentive for inefficient energy consumption.  Global 2000
reports that energy consumption in Slovakia is more than eight
times higher than in Austria and 11 times higher than in
Switzerland.  Second, technology used in Slovak industry is
outdated and energy inefficient.  Nearly 70 percent of energy
demand comes from industrial customers (including transport). 
Putnam, Hayes and Bartlett, a British consulting firm, reports
this to be much higher than most western economies and even
greater than most other eastern European nations.  They estimate
that technological change could reduce industrial electricity
consumption by nearly 50 percent.  However, because price
increases for energy are politically unpopular and widespread
technological change cannot be achieved in the shortrun, it is
likely that electricity demand will continue to outstrip supply
for the immediate future.  

     As part of its analysis of the Mochovce financing decision,
the EBRD contracted Putnam, Hayes and Bartlett to undertake a
least cost study of options available to Slovakia.  Taking into
account real discount rates for Slovakia, alternative energy
sources, energy import prospects, future energy demand and the
cost of Mochovce compared to alternatives, Putnam, Hayes and
Bartlett recommends the completion of Mochovce.  Mochovce is
found to be 21 percent cheaper compared to the next best base
load alternative (high efficiency combined cycle gas turbines)
and 5 percent cheaper than all energy production options for
Slovakia.

     Rounding out the EBRD■s analysis is a safety report and
environmental impact assessment.  The safety report concludes
that Mochovce can be completed according to western and
International Atomic Energy Association safety standards without
major difficulty.  The environmental impact assessment states
that (1) concerning radiological protection, Mochovce was deemed
a well-planned and quality controlled approach to radiological
protection, consistent with international standards; (2) the site
emergency plan was consistent with international principles; (3)
Mochovce is largely insulated from seismic activity; (4) certain
environmental impacts associated with construction have already
been realized.  This includes the evacuation of former Mochovce
village residents and relocation (with compensation), and (5)
routine radioactive emissions are within internationally accepted
limits.

     Since 1993, there has been considerable backlash against the
completion of Mochovce from EBRD member governments (led
primarily by the Austrian Government and including Denmark,
Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway and Portugal), non-governmental
environmental organizations and citizens' groups in over 30
countries.  Collectively, these groups have put forth the
following arguments for stopping the completion and western
financing of Mochovce.

     Mochovce is not the least cost option for Slovakia. Energy
savings programs and available alternative energy projects could
meet Slovakia■s energy needs at a lower cost. Opposition groups
claim that Slovakia■s energy needs were overstated and that gas
prices used in the least cost study were double those estimated
earlier by the World Bank and the European Investment Bank. 
Thus, gas alternatives were cast unfavorably compared to nuclear
energy.  Nuclear availability will promote increasing demand
for electricity instead of promoting energy efficiency.

     Statements made by SEP and Slovak government officials raise
concerns that Bohunice will not be closed once Mochovce is
operational.  Siemens of Germany has been awarded a $150 million
contract to backfit the Bohunice reactors with safety equipment
to achieve better safety standards.  The overall project is
anticipated to costs nearly $190 million.y  It is contradictory
for the Slovak government to invest nearly $200 million in a
project which will be closed within 2 years.  On September 18,
1993, the Director of SEP was quoted in Pravda as saying
"[R]egarding the supply of electricity it is from our point of
view a good advantage if V-1 of Bohunice will not shut down as
soon as Mochovce 1 and 2 will start to operate...We will do
everything - measures to upgrade the safety systems- to operate
V-1 until the third unit of Mochovce will be in operation."

     More than 60 international scientists have concluded that
the Mochovce design and equipment is not based on design based
accident and earthquake safety considerations.  In addition, they
claim that Mochovce is too far along in construction to be
retrofitted and comply with international safety standards.  
If Mochovce is completed, opponents fear that western companies
will try to rehabilitate other Soviet designed reactors in the
East. 
     
     The EBRD proposal held several restrictions: the project had
to be the least expensive option for plant completion with the
least environmental consequences.  The project was to be a
synergy of  Soviet nuclear technology with western safety
standards.  Further, when the refurbishment of Mochovce was
completed, the even more outdated and dangerous nuclear power
station at Jaslovske Bohunice, in west Slovakia, would be closed. 
The European Bank for Reconstruction and Development's (EBRD) bid
to refurbish the nuclear rector at Mochovce Slovakia was to be a
pilot example of how Western intervention could be economically
viable and environmentally sound.  However, certain factors
contrived to derail this particular attempt at assistance.

     The reactors at Mochovce are VVER 440s, of Soviet design. 
Numerous safety issues relating to this particular design have
been identified  and numerous plant systems are of questionable
reliability:  reactor pressure vessel integrity is substandard,
shut-down systems and accident localisation systems are
unreliable, backup systems lack redundancy and protection; in the
event of a severe breakdown, safety systems are likely to fail. 
A key problem with the VVER 440 design concerns the emergency
core-cooling system, which is described as "dangerously
undersized."

     The reactors at the plant at Mochovce pose significant
safety risks according to a Department of Energy report. 
Tattered economies, political disarray, and weak oversight plague
the east European nuclear power industry.  The plants themselves
suffer from a variety of problems:  grossly deficient designs, no
functioning emergency systems to cool the core, poor fire
protection, lack of fail-safes, and primitive instrumentation and
control.  Personnel problems magnify and multiply the safety
hazards.  Work forces are generally poorly trained, safety
procedures are inadequate, and regulation is spotty.  Workers are
underpaid and suffer from poor morale.  In some cases, the plants
were previously manned by skilled Russian technicians who left
the plants with the collapse of the Soviet Union.  Even well-
designed plants are accident prone when such personnel problems
exist.

     Over the course of the public debate surrounding the
proposed EBRD plan and the VVER 440 reactors, environmentalists
have attempted to highlight numerous environmental risks.  The
head of the Bratislava branch of Greenpeace pointed out numerous
problems with the EBRD proposal.  First, the safety improvement
of the second block would occur before the improvement of the
first, instead of the two being refurbished simultaneously.  The
result, it was argued, would be reduced safety for a certain
period.  Further, even if the plant was successfully completed,
basic questions around the cost of the management of spent
reactor fuel were unclear.  Terms to repay victims in case of an
accident were also undefined, she pointed out.

      Dr. Wolfgang Kromp of Vienna University argued that it was
impossible to reach Western safety standards within the proposed
budget and time scheme.  Furthermore, questions about fire and
earthquake risks, containment, emergency operating procedures,
and reactor vessel failure all remained unanswered.  Radko
Pavlovec of Global 2000, an Austrian environmental group, stated
that even the EBRD studies supporting the plan were substandard
in quality.

     Other problems with the EBRD proposal have been identified. 
The plan does not include the costs of storage for spent fuel in
its cost assessments.  Little attention was paid to the
environmental risks of the water emissions of the plant, or of
the possible impact of the plant on uses of local waterways which
may be impacted by the presence of the plant.  Standards
regarding the materials which will be used to refurbish the plant
are undefined in plant plans.  Important questions, such as the
possibility of seismic activity in this region, which has
suffered severe earthquakes in the past, have not been addressed
in plant planning.

     Environmentalists have argued that Western technology could
not overcome the inherent dangers of the reactor, and have posed
the question of why the West was funding construction of power
plants of a type entirely unwanted in the West.  It is evident,
no matter how altruistic the proposed financing plans may seem,
that such reactor deals mean increases in profits by the flagging
nuclear power industry of western Europe and the United States. 

     The Austrian government offered to fund a $50 million
conversion of Mochovce to alternate power sources.  The only
response to the Austrian offer was a promise by Slovak
Environment Minister Zlocha that his ministry would do everything
in its power to assure that no more nuclear power stations would
be built in Slovakia following the completion of Mochovce.  
The Slovak Economy Minister Jan Ducky said that the Slovaks would
be willing to finish Mochovce driven by an alternate fuel source
if it could happen within the stipulated time at the same cost
with the same power output.  This was simply not possible, he
stated.

     The EBRD, Electricité de France, and Slovenske Electrarne,
the Slovak power company, attempted to address these
environmental and safety concerns.  It was explained that the
improvements and functioning of the plant would fall within the
norms followed by Electricité de France. Costs to decommission
the plant at Bohunice would be covered by a state fund into which
the power contractors would place a tenth of the profits from
securities investments over the next thirty years of operation of
the plant.  Plant operators guaranteed $55 million to cover
possible damages resulting from an accident at the plant.  Any
further damages would be covered by the Slovak state.  The
Chairman of Slovakia's Nuclear Regulatory Authority affirmed the
government's commitment to minimum safety standards, and pointed
to Slovakia's membership numerous multilateral conventions on
nuclear safety.   Representatives of Electricité de France,
France's electricity company and a major contractor in the
financing plan, claimed that the plan would fully address all
safety issues, and that inaction was in fact the worst possible
outcome, because if the EBRD loan failed to pass, the Bohunice
reactor would not be closed.

     Supporters, on the other hand, argued that it would be
"unrealistic" to encourage the Slovaks to walk away from a 90%
complete project and a cost-effective proposal to complete it. 
Alain Pilloux, senior banker in charge of the Mochovce project,
charged that the environmentalists were opposed to the project
because it represented a nuclear project, not because it would
result in a degradation of safety. 

     In March of 1995, Slovakia began to back away from the pre-
conditions of the loan, asking for time to re-consider.  Premier
Vladimer Meciar argued that the stipulated increase in energy
prices would bankrupt a significant portion of small to medium-
sized businesses, and add to Slovakia's problems of unemployment.
Further, the requirement to close the Bohunice plant by 1999
whether or not Mochovce was on line threatened to provoke an
energy crisis. It was revealed that the Slovaks had received an
offer from Skoda Praha, a Czech company, to finish the
construction of Mochovce for a third less than the Electricité de
France offer.  

     In late March, Slovak Prime Minister Vladimir Meciar met
with Russian Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrden in Bratislava,
and completed negotiations for a $150 million Russian financial
commitment to the plant.  The implication was that the plant
would not meet desired safety standards.  For political reasons,
however, some Slovaks opposed the deal.  Former Prime Minister
Jozef Moravcik suggested that the resolution of the Mochovce
issue would set a precedent in Slovakia's future, determining
whether Slovakia would eventually lean more toward Russia or
would enjoy integration into Western organizations.

     In Brussels, the Slovaks attempted to explain their
position.  A delegation of Slovak nuclear experts stated that
only a lack of funds stood in the way of Mochovce's completion,
and that environmental standards would be respected regardless of
who finished the project.  Josef Zlatnanksy, vice chairman of
the Nuclear Regulatory Authority of the Slovak Republic stated
that the requirements of the EBRD loan were unacceptable.  The
Bohunice shut-down requirement would put 25% of Slovak energy
supply at risk if there were any delay in bringing Mochovce on-
line.  He argued that the required increases in domestic energy
prices were for the Slovak Government to choose, suggesting that
the requirement was an infringement on Slovakia's sovereignty. 
Zlatnanksy reassured the European Parliament that safety would be
respected within international standards, in design,
commissioning, and operation, and pointed out that the choice did
not have to be a straight either or choice between the EU or the
Czech project.  There was no reason why a final arrangement could
not contain elements of both.  

     In September, following acrominious public debate and
increasing pressure on the EBRD to retract the loan, Slovakia
finally officially rejected the EBRD offer, and stated that it
would pursue funding through the Czech and Russian proposals. 
France's Framatom, EDF, and Germany■s Siemens AG would still
contribute analytical assistance, but the Czech Skoda and Russian
export groups Atomenergoexport and Zrubezhatomenergostroi would
deliver nuclear technology.  As part of the Czech proposal, the
Czechs expressed an interest in the loan being paid back in the
form of electricity supply.  In response to the rejection, EBRD
manager for the Czech and Slovak Republics, Jiri Huebner, pointed
out that the new Slovak financing plan fulfilled none of the
requirements of the EBRD loan.  He suggested that Slovakia's
rejection of the plan threatened to undermine Slovak efforts
toward membership in the European Union.  

     Some Western countries lamented the way the EBRD loan had
foundered.  German deputy Kurt-Dieter Grill (CDU) stated that it
was an error to attach requirements of buying Western safety
technology onto German loans to complete the station.  This only
served to encourage the Slovaks to complete Mochovce without any
Western input or technology.  Grill stated that he felt the
outcome of the whole affair should be a lesson not to give
precedence to "ostentatious moral demands" over "specific
improvement of safety."  Bavarian Premier Edmund Stoiber stated
failure to use western technology in the completion of the
project would set a bad precedent, reducing chances of
successfully improving safety conditions in other former eastern
bloc countries.

3.   Related Cases

     JAPANSEA case
     JAPANPL case
     ARTIC case
     TEMELIN case

     Keyword Clusters    

     (1): Trade Product       =    UTILITY
     (2): Bio-geography       =    TEMPERATE
     (3): Environmental Problem    =    BIODIVERSITY LOSS

4.   Draft Author: Jason Meyers and Leslie Barcus

B.   LEGAL Clusters

5.   Discourse and Status:  DISagreement and COMPlete 

6.   Forum and Scope:  SLOVAKIA and UNILateral 

7.   Decision Breadth:  

     The decision to reject the EBRD loan was a unilateral Slovak
action.  The decision to pursue alternative funding involves
other actors:  at a minimu, French, German, Czech, and Russian
firms have been heavily impacted by the decision.  

8.   Legal Standing:  Slovak LAW

     The issue over where to seek funding for the completion of
the Mochovce plant involves an agreement on the part of a state-
owned body, Slovensky Energeticky Podnick, and thus involves
Slovak legal questions.  As a state-run organization, it may be
said that SEP's behavior is representative of Slovak government
policy, even though it is manifested in the form of a business
contract.

C.   GEOGRAPHIC Clusters

9.   Geographic Locations

     a.   Geographic Domain   :    Europe 
     b.   Geographic Site     :    East Central Europe 
     c.   Geographic Impact   :    Europe 

10.  Sub-National Factors:  NO

     Most of the legal requirements for the construction of
Mochovce are written at the national level.  Such laws cover
operation licenses, supervision of nuclear installations, the
approval of safety and operational programs and inspection
practices.  In the case of Mochovce, the regional water
management authority of the Hron Basin must give authorization to
use water at the plant.  Liquid effluent discharges must also be
authorized by a regional environmental office.  The quantity of
water used and the amount and quantity of effluent discharged is
set in advance of operation.  Approval must be additionally
sought for facilities that may influence water conditions.  A
local environmental office must authorize the plant operations
since it is an air pollution source. Finally, a waste management
plan must be approved by the local environmental office.

11.  Type of Habitat:  TEMP

D.   TRADE Clusters

12.  Type of Measure:  Regulatory Standard [REGSTD]

     Once Mochovce begins operation it is expected that repayment
of loans will be achieved through cheap electricity exported to
the Czech Republic and other recipients.  In theory, the cut-rate
price of Slovak electricity will result in considerable profits
for financial backers of the project.  

13.  Direct vs. Indirect Impacts:  DIRect

     Completion of Mochovce as a nuclear plant as opposed to a
coal-fired plant implies that Slovakia will be able to produce
surplus electricity for international trade.  Thus the decision
to go ahead with a nuclear power plant has a direct affect on
Slovakian trade in electricity.

14.  Relation of Measure to Environmental Impact

     a.  Directly Related     : YES  ELECTRICITY
     b.  Indirectly Related   : NO
     c.  Not Related          : NO
     d.  Process Related      : YES HABITat Loss

15.  Trade Product Identification:  ELECTRICITY

16.  Economic Data

     Until economic recovery begins to sweep eastern Europe, it
is likely that electricity demand will continue to slump in
Slovakia.  For example, from 1989 to 1990, energy demand dropped
6.2%.  Improved efficiency is proposed as the best solution to
deal with energy shortages in Slovakia.  Privatisation has
resulted in increasing energy prices, causing an overall trend in
eastern Europe toward reduced energy consumption, suggesting that
investment in surplus power production is not a sound basis for
sustainable economic growth in Slovakia.

17.  Impact of Measure on Trade Competitiveness:  LOW

     Consensus seems to exist that the impact of cheap Slovak
electricity on world energy markets will be marginal.  For nearby
countries, such as the Czech Republic, the impact could be
somewhat higher.  The estimate of the degree of change in
competitiveness caused by cheap exports of electricity to western
utilities is considered low.  SEP would be selling to regulated
utilities in other countries.  It is most likely that the
exported electricity would be used within the receiving country
and not be re-exported.  Thus, it is not anticipated that global
prices will change as a result of Mochovce electricity exports. 

18.  Industry Sector:  UTILITY

19.  Exporter and Importer:  SLOVAKIA and EUROPE

     Evidence suggests that export of power is a key assumption
driving foreign investment in the Mochovce project.  In October
of 1994 a Slovak official stated that as much as half of the
power from Mochovce will be exporter, and there are reports that
efforts are underway to connect Slovakia to the western European
electricity grid, raising the likelihood that Slovak electricity
will be exported to points west.  

E.   ENVIRONMENT Clusters

20.  Environmental Problem Type:  RADIOactive

     Several potential environmental risks exist surrounding the
Mochovce nuclear power plant.  Even if the plant functions
without major incident, risks exist.  Oleg Bodrov, a scientist at
the Science Research Technological Institute at Sosnovyy Bor
stated that the ecological system of Koporskaya Bay in the Gulf
of Finland has suffered around $2 million a year in damage to the
fish population due to the Leningrad Nuclear Power Plant's
operations.  Further reactor activity in that region will likely
ecological damage to the Gulf and likely contribute to the
upward-spiralling trend of negative health effects:  a threefold
increase in birth defects and a tenfold increase in cancer
mortalities.  

     Minor incidents, in light of the lack of proper containment
procedures could threaten local areas and water supplies.  Apart
from accidents actually in the plant, minor incidents could
include the spillage of nuclear materials (fuel or waste) either
from deficient storage areas or by vehicles transporting
substances to and from the plant area. 

     A major incident, such as an explosion or meltdown,  could
resemble Chernobyl in its magnitude.  The immense ecological
damage caused by the initial incident would only be part of the
problem, as the Chernobyl case shows the problems of attempting
containment and cleanup of the actual reactor area.  Thousands of
tons of polymers and cement were dropped on the Chernobyl cite to
contain the escape of radioactive materials.  This ■sarcophagus■
at Chernobyl has already begun to decay and has been unsuccessful
in containing radioactive leakage.

21.  Name, Type, and Diversity of Species:  MANY

     The Chernobyl incident provides the best example of human,
and animal impacts that could result rom a serious nuclear
incident.  According to some figures, as many as 125,000 people
have now died from Chernobyl-related illnesses.  Livestock loss
has been costly throughout Europe, and long-term environmental
effects are spread over a vast area, concern multiple habitats,
and have compounded conventional pollution problems.  The full
impact has still not been fully assessed.   

22.  Impact and Effect:  MEDIUM-HIGH, and PRODUCT 

23.  Urgency and Lifetime:  HIGH and 100s of YEARS 

24.  Substitutes:  LIKE products, energy CONServation

     Alternative fuel sources have been proposed as a solution,
but may present environmental problems of their own.  Though coal
or other energy sources are arguably safer than nuclear power,
they still can cause considerable environmental damage.  The best
substitute is likely some form of energy optimisation which would
minimize the requirement for new energy sources.  Such a solution
would include encouraging investment in the production of high-
efficiency technology, and could result in an increase in energy
efficiency of 50%.

VI.  OTHER Factors

25.  Culture:  NO

     Only if one considers the Slovak position to be dictated
more from political posturing (irritation with sovereignty-
infringing stipulations) than from economics could one argue that
cultural factors are at work here.  

26.  Trans-Border:  YES

     As demonstrated by the Chernobyl case, any serious accident
would have ramifications far beyond the borders of Slovakia.  

27.  Rights:  NO

     Though certain ethnic differences exist in Slovakia, as in
many east European countries, none of these impact directly the
politics surrounding the Mochovce plant completion.

28.  Relevant Literature

AEA Technology.  "Safety Upgrade and Completion of Units 1 and 2
of the Mochovce Nuclear Power Plan: Environmental Impact
Assessment," November, 1994. 

CTK National News Wire.  "We'll Finish Mochovce By Ourselves If
Need Be, Meciar," March 2, 1995.  As provided by Lexis/Nexis.

"Chernobyl, Temelin:  Lessons Lost to Political Expediency." 
Greenpeace April 1994, v3n2, p. 3.

"Chernobyl's Lingering Legacy," US News and World Report April
25, 1994, pp. 20-21.

"Commission Calls for Reinforcement of Nuclear Security."  Safety
and Health December 1994, v140n6, pp. 18-20.

Eastern European Energy Report.  "Mochovce Financing Fallout
Hits SE Board,"  The Financial Times Limited.  May 22, 1995.  As
provided by Lexis/Nexis. 

"Electricity:  East Meets West?"  OECD Observer April 1994, n
187, pp. 30-31.

Environmental Non-Governmental Organizations.  "Important
Questions and Answers About the Slovak Nuclear Power Plant
Mochovce," A briefing paper prepared for the Board of Directors
of the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development.    
November 1994. 

Europe Information Service.  "Nuclear Safety:  Commission
Prepares to Take a View on Mochovce N-Plant," May, 23, 1995.  As
provided by Lexis/Nexis. 

European Bank for Reconstruction and Development.  "Slovak
Republic Mochovce Nuclear Safety Improvement Project: Key
Questions and Answers," 1995.

"The Fallout from Chernobyl."  World Health v48 n2.  March-April
1995.  pp. 30-31.

Global 2000 and Greenpeace.  "Mochovce-Documentation for Opinion
Leaders," June, 1994. 

Heti Vilaggazdasag.  "Slovakia:  Completion of Nuclear Power
Station Provokes International Protest," February 18, 1995.  As
provided by Lexis/Nexis.

MacKenzie, Debora.  "How Safe is Safe?"  New Scientist August 27,
1994, v143n1940, pp. 12-13.

MacKenzie, Debora. "Rich Nations Squabble over Future of
Chernobyl."  New Scientist Jun 10, 1995, v146 n1981, pp. 6-7.

Public Participation Procedure: NPP Mochovce.  "Comments of the
Austrian Government, Executive Summary,"  February 1995. 

Scheer, S. Jacob; Schwarzbach, David.  "Turning Points."  Amicus
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New York Times, July 23, 1995, Sunday, Late Edition - Final. 
Section 1; Page 10; Column 1; Foreign Desk. 

     



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