ALGERIA
The internal security situation in Algeria has improved since 1994, but the incidence of domestic terrorism, which is among the world's worst, remained high. At least 60,000 Algerians-Islamic militants, civilians and security personnel have been killed since the insurgency of 1992
Government security forces made substantial progress against the Islamic
Salvation Army (AIS)-the reported military wing of the Islamic Salvation
Front-that primarily attacks government related targets. The government
was less successful against the Armed Islamic Group (GIA), the most
radical of the insurgent groups, which continued terrorist operations
against a broad spectrum of Algerian civilian targets in 1996, including
women, children and journalists.
The GIA continued to target foreigners in 1996 and killed at least nine, a sharp decline from the 31 foreigners the group killed in 1995. The total number of foreigners killed by the GIA since 1992 exceeds 110. Most were "soft" targets, including a former Bulgarian attachŽ, who was found beheaded in a forest in mid-November. Although no claims were made for his murder, Algiers blamed the GIA for his death. In August the GIA claimed responsibility for the murder of the French Bishop of Oran, who was killed by a bomb placed outside his residence.
Earlier in 1996 the GIA kidnapped and later beheaded seven French monks from their monastery near Medea. The GIA issued a communique claiming that the monks had been killed because Paris had refused to negotiate with the insurgent group. Algerian extremists are suspected in an explosion in a Paris subway on 3 December that killed four and wounded more than 80. The bomb used in that attack was similar to those used by the GIA in its bombing campaign in France in 1995.
The Algerian Government prosecuted numerous cases of persons charged with committing terrorists acts or supporting terrorist groups in 1996. In July, for example, four men accused of committing murder on behalf of terrorist groups were sentenced to death. Algiers also continued its limited clemency program. Members of militant groups who had surrendered to the authorities for committing murders received 20 -year prison sentences instead of the death penalty; those found guilty of membership in terrorist groups received shorter-than-normal prison sentences. President Liamine Zeroual told the Algerian press that as a result of this program, nearly 2,000 Algerians had surrendered to authorities by September.
Algeria won independence from France in 1962 and became a revolutionary Arab-Islamic socialist republic led by the National Liberation Front (FLN), the only legal political party. The FLN suppressed Islamic activism, setting the stage for the fundamentalist backlash.
In 1989, a new constitution, establishing a multi-party democracy, was approved by referendum. The Islamic Salvation Front (FIS) emerged as the largest and most influential opposition movement, appealing strongly to the urban poor and unemployed. In April 1990, FIS supporters demonstrated in Algiers, demanding the dissolution of the National People’s Assembly (NPA) and the introduction of Sharia, the Islamic religion’s code of law.
General elections were held in December 1991. The FIS won 188 seats in the Assembly, while the FLN won only 15. President Chadli Benjedid declared the elections void and a military junta assumed control. The FIS was banned, initiating Algeria’s second bloody civil war in 40 years as bitter fighting broke out between Islamic fundamentalists and military authorities. Over 60,000 people have died in the conflict. The two battling forces include the secular government, inherited from France following Algeria’s independence and the Islamic fundamentalists, who seek to replace the secular constitution with Islamic law.
The social problems that encourage Islamic fundamentalism are found in abundance in Algeria--massive unemployment (25 percent unemployment rate, 30 percent of which is youth aged 16-24), shortage of goods, a housing and amenities crisis, and large scale corruption that aborts social and economic development. The Algerian government rules with only limited popular legitimacy, using repression and patronage to maintain control.
According to the U.S. Department of State and Amnesty International, two
terrorist groups have dominated the conflit in Algeria that has killed
over 60,000 people and caused more than two billion dollars in damage to
Algeria’s cinfrastructure since December 1991. Between 250 and 300
people alone died during the Islamic holy month of Ramadan in Algeria.
Among the victims were a 13 month old baby, a 12 year old boy and five
girls. There is no end to
the fighting in sight. The two Islamic leaders of the FIS (Abbas Madani)
and the GIA (Abdel Kadir Hashani), the factions that started the civil war
have been released from prison. Algeria’s immediate future, however,
is likely to remain between the two extremes of military victory and
Islamist takeover.
All Islamist terrorist groups are structured loosely and have fluctuating membership. Leadership is diffuse and the hierarchical structure is secretive and ill-defined. Most decisionmaking is informal and based on consensus within a consultative group of governing members. Algerian groups rely primarily on internal sources for funding. Extortion and theft are the principal means for obtaining money and arms. Weapons are also stolen during skirmishes with government officials and procured through European based trafficking.
Armed Islamic Group (GIA)
History:
The Armed Islamic Group (GIA) is an Algerian Muslim Fundamentalism organization that was founded in December 1992. The group was formed after Algeria’s secular government voided the Islamic Salvation Front’s (FIS) victory in the first round of the December 1991 legislative elections. The FIS, the largest Islamic party in Algeria, had won 84 percent of the vote. The formation of the GIA in December 1992 was the direct result of a fatwa or call issued by Sheikh Abdel-Haq el-Ayadia encouraging Muslims to strike out against Algerian infidels in the government. He urged faithful Muslims to eliminate the infidels as homage both to Islam and to the Muslim cause.
Aim:
The GIA seek to overthrown the secular government in Algeria and to replace it with an Islamic state. Furthermore, the GIA has declared war against all infidels, not limiting its targets to government officials. For example, one leader in the GIA, Mahfoud Assouli (Abu al-Munthir, age 32), publicly broadcast his opposition to, and aim to kill, all Algerians who do not pray, use alcohol and drugs, and lead homosexual lifestyles. Any Algerian behavior that is against the teachings of the Koran, including the immodesty or debauchery of women, is considered to be punishable by death.
Targets:
The GIA’s assassination targets have been intellectuals, journalists, government officials, military officials, diplomats and foreigners in Algeria, excluding Americans and Germans (because the United States and Germany granted asylum to Islamic leaders and take a different stance on the Algerian crisis than France). The GIA, known as the most ruthless of the Algerian Islamic fundamentalist terrorist groups, spares neither babies, nor the elderly. The GIA has condemned all foreigners to death if they choose to reside in Algeria. One GIA leader named foreigners as “the main coronary artery” of a plan to “colonize” Algeria with non-Muslims. The GIA believes that killing non-Muslims will send a message to non-Muslims and will weaken the ruling infidels.
Methods:
The GIA uses assassinations and bombings, including car bombs,
and
favors kidnapping victims and slitting their throats. The GIA hijacked an
Air France flight to Algiers in December 1994 and are suspected of
conducting a series of bombings in France in 1995.
Leadership:
The jurisdiction of the GIA is divided into three regions or military zones in the East, West, and Middle of the state, each of which is lead by a Vice-Emir. The top echelons of the GIA consist of several emirs. There has been internal conflict over the leadership of the military arm of the GIA, El-Djama’a, which has weakened the unity and effectiveness of the organization. The following people are known to be emirs if the GIA: El Mansouri El-Miliani, Abdullah Qalek, Abdel-Haq Ayadia, Djafar El-Afghani, and Djamel El-Zitouni.
Support Networks:
The source of the GIA’s funding is unknown, but it is likely that an external force, such as Algerian expatriates in Western Europe, supplies their arms and ammunition. Experts suspect that they are supported by Iran and Sudan.
Composition of Fighters:
There are reports of 20,000 to 25,000 fighters in the El-Djama’a, the military wing of the GIA. The fighters are a mixture of veteran Afghani war fighters (200-300) and supporters of Mostafa Bou’ali, a militant Islamic group. The majority are recruited from Algeria’s scores of jobless, young men, with little formal education or religious training. The decision to join seems motivated by social alienation rather than religious conviction. Some GIA cells resemble extortion rings, devoid of religious or political ideals. They are concentrated in the Algeries region of Algeria, in the Atlas Mountains, West and East of Algeria along the Moroccan and Tunisian borders as well as along the Sahara.
Islamic Salvation Front (FIS)
History:
The Islamic Salvation Front (FIS), the second largest terrorist group in Algeria, was founded in 1989 by Kamereddine Kherbani, a former fighter pilot in the Algerian air force. Following the outlawing of the FIS by the Algerian government during the 1991 legislative elections, he fled with party leaders to Pakistan, where Islamic guerrillas were still fighting against Soviet occupation, then moved to Europe.
A November 14, 1993 statement of the FIS national provisional executive branch accused the ruling junta of declaring war on Islam and its people. In the statement, FIS leaders rejected dialogue or reconciliation with Algeria’s ruling party. The FIS charges the secular government with negotiating with former colonial powers to strip the resources of the country and attacking the ideological, historical, social, and cultural integrity of its people.
On September 28, 1997, however, the FIS called for a truce. They offered to hold a “national conference of reconciliation” with the government and various political movements to discuss amnesty, to lift Algeria’s state of emergency, to release prisoners, and to aid victims of the conflict. The offer challenged the government to recognize the party and to begin negotiations. The FIS proposal was similar to one issued in Rome in 1995, which the government rejected. Authorities expect the government to consider accepting negotiations because, recently, it has held a stronger position vis-à-vis the FIS, which is no longer control of the guerrilla movements.
Leaders:
Sheikh Abbas Madani is the leader of the banned FIS. He was released from Algerian prison in mid-1997. The spiritual leader Madani, however, reportedly has little influence over the armed factions of the FIS.
Membership:
The FIS is a loose network of autonomous local units. Followers are reportedly young, urban, poor, fanatical, and driven by the belief that they have little to lose in fighting the government.
Support:
The FIS received some financial backing from Saudi Arabia until the Algerian party began vocally supporting Iran. Iran and Sudan contribute minimally.
Aims:
Like the GIA, the FIS seeks to remove the secular government from power and install an Islamic Fundamentalist state in its place. Unlike the GIA, however, the FIS argues that they are not responsible for the indiscriminate killing of civilians and bombings undertaken by the GIA. They are only interested in fighting the Algerian security forces. The military wing of the FIS, the Islamic Salvation Army, recently declared a cease-fire saying that it would expose the GIA as the true perpetrators of the civilian massacres.
Tactics:
The FIS publicly denounces terrorism, but refuses to renounce the use of violence, claiming a legitimate right to armed resistance perpetrated against government tarets rather than against innocent civilians.