IRANIAN-RUSSIAN NUCLEAR TRADE

IRANIAN-RUSSIAN NUCLEAR TRADE


CASE NUMBER: 163


CASE MNEMONIC: IRANNUKE


CASE NAME: THE ECONOMIC AND ECOLOGICAL ASSESSMENT OF IRANIAN-RUSSIAN NUCLEAR TECHNOLOGY TRADE


I. IDENTIFICATION

1. The Issue


Iran has recently come under heightened U.S. scrutiny for its deal with Russia to complete construction on two nuclear reactors that were initially built by the Germans during the time of the Shah. The U.S. has excoriated Iran and Russia for both pursuing this nuclear alliance, and has worked to fashion a multilateral effort to deny Iran any nuclear technology and has attempted to leverage Russia from further engaging in nuclear trade with Iran. While the security aspects of the Iranian reactors have drawn immense scrutiny, less attention has been devoted to the economic and environmental components of the agreement. This case study examines both the economic and environmental aspects of the Russian-Iranian nuclear trade.


2. Description

Throughout the 1980s and 1990s, Iran has used the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and other arms control agreements as vehicles to promote increased technology transfers from the industrialized North to the developing South. As one of the leaders of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM), Iran has vigorously championed the rights of States Parties in good standing to acquire sensitive dual use technologies as regulated by various arms control agreements like the NPT, the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), and the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC). In the view of Iran and many NAM nations, the West's reluctance to impart with these sensitive technologies reflects a bias against the economic development of the Third World. These nations posit that the West has used arms control fora as the avenue with which to retard the economic growth of the South. The merits of this argument can be debated, but Iran has effectively rallied NAM support behind this position during the various arms control meetings. With regards to nuclear technology, Iran has consistently interpreted Article IV to allow for the transfer of peaceful nuclear technology to States Parties in good standing. Iranian efforts to procure nuclear energy technology from Russia and China reflects Iran's commitment to furthering an agenda regulated by Article IV.

Iran was an original signatory to the NPT in 1969, and formally forswore the acquisition, research, and production of nuclear weapons. Nevertheless, the Shah of Iran attempted to propel Iran into the nuclear age during the early 1970s. Despite Iran's enormous gas and oil reserves, which at the time financed the modernization of Iran and equipped the Shah with the most dominant qualitative military force in the Middle East, the Shah was interested in acquiring nuclear technology for Iran. Whether the Shah was legitimately interested in harnessing the positive effects of nuclear technology, or whether he wanted to pursue a clandestine nuclear weapons research and production program (in order to transform Iran into the unquestioned regional hegemon in the Middle East) is a riddle that remains unsolved. Nevertheless, by 1976 the German industrial giant Siemens began construction on two nuclear reactors near the southern Iranian coastal town of Bushehr. The first reactor, Bushehr I, was 85 percent complete, and the second reactor, Bushehr II, was partially completed prior to the Iranian Revolution in 1979, which caused the stoppage of construction on both reactors. During the Iran-Iraq War from 1980-1988, Iraqi strike aircraft managed to partially damage both reactors, and Iran was unable to persuade Siemens to complete construction on them, due to diplomatic pressure applied by the United States.

After the Iranian Revolution of 1979, the nuclear aspirations of the Shah were soon embraced by the ruling mullahs. The difference, especially for the West and concerned nations in the region, was that a state inimical to Western policies was now contemplating the resumption of a nuclear energy program. The attendant fear was that a radical Islamic state would harness its nuclear energy capabilities to produce nuclear weapons and use them as instruments to advance its hegemonic designs throughout the region. In the aftermath of the Iran-Iraq War, Iran had emerged as an international pariah, and could not count on previous Western (i.e., West German) assistance in securing nuclear technology. Therefore, Iran began to look into alternative paths for acquiring such technology, and during the 1990s it has found two willing partners: Russia and China.

By 1992, Iran had managed to operate one small research (a 5 megawatt - MW) reactor in Tehran and a small Miniature Neutron Source Reactor (MNSR), (which operated at 27 kilowatts), but had still not developed a significant nuclear energy network. In order to placate rising international concerns over its nascent nuclear energy capabilities, Iran agreed to International Atomic Energy Association (IAEA) inspections on all of its nuclear facilities. During inspections in February 1992 and November 1993, IAEA officials found no evidence of proliferant activity at Iranian nuclear facilities. Iran's Permanent Representative to the IAEA, Mohammed Sadegh Ayatollahi, underscored Iran's official commitment to acceding to the proscriptive norms of the NPT and the IAEA. He noted that it is Iran's intention to be, " ... open to any kind of inspection that the IAEA as the responsible inspector of the NPT has the duty to perform. Anytime they want to come and see something, they are welcome."

Having been labeled with a "clean bill of health" by the IAEA, Iran began to aggressively pursue nuclear technology from China and Russia. However, one of the concerns with the West, based on earlier IAEA inspections in Iraq and North Korea which similarly did not find any proliferant nuclear activity, is that a clean bill of health by the IAEA does not automatically demonstrate compliance with the norms established by the IAEA and NPT. The Iraqi and North Korean cases demonstrated the failure of the IAEA to detect clandestine nuclear weapon efforts, and this shortcoming has had a powerful resonance in the thinking of many Western nations concerned with nuclear proliferation. It now appears that Western nations, especially the United States, are leery of any nuclear technology transfers to questionable Third World nations, regardless of their degree of compliance with the NPT or accession to IAEA inspections.

By as early as 1993, China agreed to install two 300 MW (electrical output) reactors located at Esteghlal, near Bushehr on the Persian Gulf coast. The Chinese have reportedly conducted seismic surveys at the Esteghal site, and have received a down payment for the construction of the reactors. Recent reports indicate that the United States has been able to persuade China to cancel this reactor agreement, although some experts note that this amounts only to a temporary abeyance of the two countries' nuclear deal, and that China was motivated more by Iran's inability to tender payment than by any U.S. leverage against the deal.

Russia and Iran formally reached a nuclear reactor agreement in January 1995, where the Iranians would receive two VVER-1000 MW (electrical) light water reactors at the Bushehr site in return for payment of up to one billion dollars. The reactors are planned to be operational within four years, and Russia has already begun initial work on the project. The U.S. openly castigated the deal, in spite of the international legality of the transaction, citing proliferation concerns and the fact that with this technology, Iran would have the ability to produce nuclear weapons in eight to ten years. The agreement does include stipulations where the spent fuel rods (from which weapons grade plutonium can be extracted) are to be shipped back to Russia, in order to allay these fears over an indigenous Iranian nuclear weapons production capability. In November 1995, two officials from the IAEA examined Iran's existing nuclear energy projects, and confirmed the peaceful nature of these projects (the Bushehr reactors were obviously not included since they are not yet completed). One of the officials stated that Iran has made progress in the application of nuclear analysis techniques, and in the use of accelerators and the cyclotron in its nuclear medical and research reactor at Karaj.

From an energy perspective, the United States has cast aspersions on Iran's commitment to a legitimate nuclear energy program, given Iran's preponderant oil and natural gas reserves. Iran is endowed with 92.86 billion of proven crude oil reserves (circa 1994), equivalent to 9.3% of the world's total reserves. It is estimated that Iran's oil reserves have a natural life of 72 years, according to 1993 production statistics. Iran also possesses 73 billion cubic feet of natural gas, which is second only to Russia in the ownership of gas reserves. Since natural gas is much easier and cheaper to develop for energy purposes than nuclear energy, U.S. analysts doubt whether Iran needs its nuclear reactors from Russia.

However, Iranian officials have launched a determined public relations campaign which laments the weakened state of Iran's energy infrastructure and points to the problems associated with its continued reliance on gas and oil to power this infrastructure. In July 1995, the Iranian government urged people to economize on the consumption of energy, and warned to punish producers and importers of goods with high energy consumption. An Iranian energy ministry official noted that Iran's industrial consumption of oil was twice as high as in developed countries, and due to this inordinate energy consumption rate, Iran would not have any oil to export in twenty two years. In order to meet consumption demands, he added that Iran would have to increase daily production to four million barrels, up from its current total of three and six tenths million barrels per day (two and one half million barrels are currently slated for export). The official stated that the reason for the high energy consumption was the heavy state subsidization of oil, which cost $12.5 billion a year.

Furthermore, Iranian officials have bemoaned the fact that Iran only has 47 years of oil reserves left (compare this with the earlier Western projection of 72 years), so given that oil is an exhaustible resource, Iran should explore alternative energy sources such as nuclear power. Table 1 demonstrates how Iran has been increasingly reliant on the production of electricity (the majority of which is oil-fired), and the concomitant rise in domestic energy consumption.Table 1Source: Economist Intelligence Unit Country Profile, 1994-1995: Iran

According to an 1994 Economist Intelligence Unit country report on Iran, Iran has suffered from chronic shortages of electricity as a result of the Iran-Iraq War, and has also suffered from failures in power station maintenance. Peak-period demand has led to black-outs and severe industrial problems. Currently in Iran, 62% of electricity is produced at thermal power stations, 16% at gas-fueled plants, and 15% by hydroelectric plants.

Therefore, faced with growing pressures on Iran's ability to sustain industrial development with current energy policies, Iranian officials have been quick to laud the positive benefits that nuclear energy would accrue to Iran's economic and industrial development. Reza Amrollahi, director of Iran's Atomic Energy Organization (IAEO) states that Iran " . . . plans to take 20 years to get 20 percent of its energy from nuclear [processes]." Iranian IAEA official Mohammed Ayatollahi provided four reasons why Iran should develop nuclear technology. First, he questioned the stereotype that Iran was an oil-rich country, given the fact that Iran has provided data on the exhaustability of its oil reserves. Second, he emphasized the ecological consequences of sustained activity by the hydrocarbon industry, since oil is a highly pollutant fossil fuel. Third, he stressed that Iran should not put all of its energy resources in one "basket", and that nuclear energy provides Iran with an alternative energy source: " It is widely agreed that the optimum for any country should be to diversify the energy options. The main energy supplies are water, fossil fuels - oil, gas, coke - and nuclear. A combination of these is best for sustainable development." Finally, Iranian President Ali Hashemi Rafsanjani opined "[T]he benefits of nuclear technology, of course, are numerous, and we cannot forego other uses of peaceful nuclear technology."

From an economic perspective, Iran's economy is undergoing serious dislocations at the time, as the global drop in oil prices has caused a massive shock to the Iranian economy. Based on the fact that Iranian oil exports will continue to assume the lion's share of total exports (up to 90% in 1994), the fortunes of the Iranian economy will be inordinately tied to oscillations in the world oil market. In addition, heightened U.S. efforts to economically contain Iran, such as the May 1995 unilateral U.S. embargo of all Iranian imports (the vast majority of which are oil exports from Iran, worth almost three billion dollars in 1994) have hurt the Iranian economy. For example, the U.S. embargo has caused a drop in the Iranian rial during the summer of 1995. Nevertheless, in the facing of declining oil revenues, the Iranian government is attempting to complete its nuclear reactor deal with Russia, even though the cost could well exceed one billion dollars, which is a large amount considering central government expenditures totaled slightly over $39 billion in 1993. The fact that Iran is willing to spend such a large amount of money (which is increasingly becoming a scare resource) on an energy method it seemingly has little current utility indicates the seriousness Iran attaches to nuclear energy.

Given Russia's economic hardships, the Iranian oil deal will give it a well-needed infusion of hard currency. Currently, the Russian economy is continuing its evolution to a free-market, capitalist economy, and a sudden economic boon as a result of this structural overhaul has yet to come to fruition in Russia. Recent statistics bear out the dismal performance of the Russian economy: economic growth has only started to recover to positive growth in 1995, after three years of double digit negative growth; the same trend was reflected for industrial production from 1993 to 1995; unemployment has steadily increased from five percent in 1993 to roughly 12% in 1995. In order to improve the performance of the Russian economy, Russia has attempted to secure increased economic ties with Third World nations, at a time when the global economy is squeezing Russia out of the developed world's economic affairs. Russian ties with states like Iran will give it access to much needed currency and will also provide access to suitable markets for the export of other Russian goods (at a time when global competition for market penetration anywhere is fierce).

The Russian Ministry of Atomic Affairs (MINATOM) has seized upon this reality and has aggressively sought to export Russian nuclear technology to many developing nations, including Iran, Armenia, and Cuba. The Christian Science Monitor reports that MINATOM officials are so eager to export Russian nuclear technology that concerns over safety and proliferation have been subsumed by an influx of dollars and other forms of hard currencies. According to William Potter, a proliferation expert at the Monterey Institute for International Studies, the Russians are not as concerned with nuclear safety as their Western counterparts and have not cultivated a "culture of safety" that is found in Western nuclear science programs. Despite these glaring deficiencies, Russian nuclear technology is one of the few commodities that Russia can produce for export that is of roughly equal quality with Western technology. In addition, Valery Davydov, a Russian nuclear scientist working at the Russian-American Press, posits that MINATOM desperately needs the earnings it generates from its nuclear sales and that it attaches little importance to proliferation concerns. In recognition of this increased demand for Russian nuclear technology, in 1995 MINATOM is expected to generate $1.5 billion, up from $1.2 billion in 1994. .

In addition to Russia's economic motivations for pursuing nuclear technology transfers with Iran, there also is a political dimension to this policy. Increased economic and military ties with Iran may give Russia much needed leverage to sway Iran from extending its influence into Russia's "near abroad", especially the former Central Asian Republics. Russia cum the Soviet Union has long appreciated Iran's cultural ties, geographic proximity, and ethnic affiliations with the Central Asian republics. After the dissolution of the Soviet Union, the Russians have been acutely aware that the Central Asian republics are searching for their own identity after seventy years of Soviet rule, and that the Iranian model may serve as an attraction to some of the republics. While this analysis is short-sighted and does not take into account a variety of religious, political, and cultural differences between Iran and the republics, Iran has penetrated the republics in the economic and political spheres. The Russians would not look highly upon a constellation of fundamentalist Islamic nations on their southern border, and regardless of the potential for this to occur, they have adopted policies to moderate Iranian influence in the region.

While the aforementioned security and economic aspects of the Russian-Iranian nuclear deal have been discussed in great detail in many other forums, few, if any, have speculated on the possible ecological consequences of this arrangement. As mentioned previously, the Bushehr reactors that were constructed before the 1979 Iranian Revolution suffered extensive structural damage as a result of Iraqi air strikes during the Iran-Iraq War. One of the reactors was so badly damaged that the structure was until recently sealed, and its protective dome was covered by a metal sheet. In addition, the Russians have to figure out a way properly configure their 1,000 MW reactors into structures that were designed to house German 1,200 MW reactors. Therefore, based on the structural problems inherent in the reactor deal, the possibility of a radiation leakage due to deficiencies in the new structure is not out of the realm of possibility.

As noted above, many nuclear physicists are not entirely convinced of the level of safety of the Russian nuclear reactor designs, given the explosion at the Chernobyl nuclear reactor in 1984. If a radiation leakage were to occur in the Bushehr reactors due to existing structural damage or Russian design and construction flaws, the resultant ecological and economic consequences for the Persian Gulf would be catastrophic. Since Bushehr lies in southern Iran and almost contiguous to the waters of the Persian Gulf, the irradiated water would cause enormous harm to the bio-diversity of the Persian Gulf. In addition, many of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) states rely on Persian Gulf water for human consumption and agricultural purposes (due to the lack of indigenous fresh water sources, the lack of rainfall, arid climate, and high temperatures endemic to the region), as networks of desalinization plants have been erected to service water needs in most of these countries.

The prospect of a nuclear armed Iran is quite unsettling for most of Iran's neighbors, and there is the perception that the Russian reactors will be the conduit to which Iran can produce a workable nuclear device in eight to ten years. Therefore, the possibility of a pre-emptive strike or a strike during the course of hostilities by concerned Middle Eastern nations (e.g., Israel, Iraq, or the GCC states) or the United States remains high. If such an event were to occur, not only would Iran and the countries of the region have to deal with radiation leakage into the Persian Gulf, but they would also have to deal with nuclear fallout into the atmosphere as a result of any military strike. One only has to harken back to the aftermath of Chernobyl to remember the ecological devastation caused by the release of a radioactive cloud after the explosion at that reactor.

Other anticipated ecological consequences could be some type of nuclear accident involving the shipment of equipment and technology from Russia to Iran. In addition, the possibility exists of some type of calamity due to an accident in the shipment of the spent plutonium fuel rods from Iran back to Russia. Another possible ecological calamity could be the possible seismic shock to the area, and the attendant destruction this would unleash from the damaged Bushehr reactors. Iran contains many fault lines, and dormant fault lines ready may become "active" in the future near the Bushehr reactor site.

One aspect of the ecological consequences of the Iranian-Russian nuclear that has not been considered in great detail is the possibility that the United States will be successful in annulling the arrangement at some point in the future. If this was to occur, the deepened Iranian reliance on its hydrocarbon industry as the source of its energy needs could begin to have increasingly deleterious effects on the Iranian ecological landscape. The over reliance on oil and natural gas, without the development of a suitable energy alternative, could begin to overwhelm the Iranian ecological balance with devastating results.

The foregoing analysis has demonstrated that the Iranian-Russian nuclear reactor deal affects security-related, economic, and ecological considerations not only in the transacting countries, but in the countries across the region as well. Sustained attention to the issue needs to be devoted, in order to properly examine all of the aforementioned factors in the future, and at a bare minimum, to forestall an ecological disaster in the Persian Gulf.


3. Related Cases

Key Words: Nuclear Russia Iran

4. Author

Javed Ali

, Comparative and Regional Studies, Middle East

II. LEGAL CLUSTER

5. Discourse and Status: AGRee and INPROGress

The final resolution of the Iranian-Russian nuclear arrangement has not yet been determined, as continued U.S. pressure on Russia may force the Russians to abrogate the deal entirely, or at least to suspend it temporarily.

6. Forum and Scope: IRAN and BILATateral

The arrangement is solely between Russia and Iran, and the two countries are working within the framework of the NPT to ensure that its conditions do not violate any terms of the treaty.

7. Decision Breadth: TWO

Russia and Iran

8. Legal Standing: TREATY

Both parties must ensure that the nuclear deal abides by the terms of the NPT. In addition, the reactors will be subject to inspection by the IAEA.


III. GEOGRAPHIC CLUSTER

9. Geographic Locations:

Domain: Asia

Site: WAsia

Impact: Iran

10. Sub-National Factors: NO

11. Types of Habitat: DRY


IV. TRADE CLUSTER

12. Type of Measure: Export Ban

The United States is attempting to pressure Russia not honor the contract terms with Iran. While the Clinton administration has been loathe to directly punish Russia (given the delicate political balance between the two nations), the U.S. Congress has stepped up efforts to "modify" Russia's behavior. The Senate has considered legislation barring all U.S. trade with nations that aid the proliferant activity of pariah states such as Iran. In addition, threats have been made to cut off critical Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) aid to Russia, which assists Russia in destroying its existing weapons of mass destruction arsenal.

The United States has also tried to unilaterally punish Iran, and in May 1995 President Clinton announced that the United States would ban all trade with Iran, meaning that Iran would lose almost three billion dollars a year in exports to the United States. This unilateral U.S. trade sanction has negatively impacted the Iranian economy, as the Iranian currency (the rial) has been significantly devalued. The hope is that the more the United States can weaken Iran economically, Iran will be less able to provide the hard currency needed to fund the Bushehr reactor complex (as the Russians have insisted that the deal is on a strict cash basis, and that any lack of payment will trigger a stoppage of work).

13. Direct vs. Indirect Impacts: DIR

14. Relation of Trade Measure to Resource Impact: DIR

15. Trade Product Identification: NUCLEAR Technology

The deal calls for the Russians to complete construction on two 1,200 MW reactors initially constructed by the Germans in 1976. The reactors are light-water reactors, and supposedly there is are plans for Iran to receive uranium enrichment technology (such as a gas centrifuge). In addition, to allay rising proliferation concerns, the spent fuel rods from the reactors will then be transported back to Russia (since weapons grade plutonium can be manufactured from the irradiated plutonium in the fuel rods).

16. Economic Data

Iran currently operates two small research reactors, but it hopes to eventually generate 20% of the country's electrical needs from nuclear energy. Currently, Iran must produce around 65 million kilowatts of electricity for internal consumption.

17. Impact of Trade Restriction

Cost ($): High

The current U.S. trade ban on Iran will cost Iran almost three billion dollars in export revenues, and will effect about $600 million in U.S. exports to Iran.

Coverage (%): High

Since Iran has total export revenues of $39 billion, the U.S. trade ban will have a significant effect, as Iran must scramble to find new buyers for its oil.

Price Effect (%): High

The global drop in oil prices, coupled with a seven percent drop in total export revenues, will make it increasingly difficult for Iran to finance the Bushehr reactor deal, or any other ambitious nuclear technology projects. Since the summer of 1995, the Iranian rial has suffered an almost 30-40% percent drop in total value.

Competitive Effect: High

18. Industry Sector: NOTH

19. Exporters and Importers

Case Exporter: Russia

Case Importer: Iran

Leading Exporters:

The Russian Ministry of Atomic Affairs has increased earnings from the foreign sale of nuclear technology from $1.2 billion in 1994 to $1.5 billion in 1995.


V. ENVIRONMENT CLUSTERS

20. Environmental Problem Type: Radioactivity

The potential leakage of radioactive material into the Persian Gulf, or around the surrounding areas in Iran, is a source of concern. This problem is exacerbated by the fact that the Russians will be attempting to fit 1,000 MW reactors into 1,200 MW reactor hulls initially designed by the Germans. These reactors also suffered structural damage from Iraqi airstrikes during the Iran-Iraq War, and these structural deficiencies have to be corrected before the reactors are operational. There are reports that MINATOM is less concerned with proliferation and safety, and is willing to overlook these problem areas in return for hard currency cash deals. Finally, the radioactivity concern is heightened by the potential for a preemptive airstrike on the reactors by a number of states (Israel, Iraq, or even the United States).

21. Number of Species: MANY

Any release of radioactivity in the Gulf would threaten a diverse expanse of animal life.

22. Impact and Effect

Impact: HIGH

Effect: PRODUCT

23. Urgency and Lifetime: High and 100s of years

24. Substitutes: ALTERnative Energy

Iranian officials claim that nuclear energy will fulfill Iran's future energy needs, since Iran has an exhaustible reserve of natural gas and oil.


VI. OTHER FACTORS

25. Culture: NO

26. Human Rights: NO

27. Trans-Boundary Issues: YES

The potential exists for radioactive pollution due to some sort of man-made or naturally occurring disaster at the Bushehr site. The effects of such a calamity would not be limited to Iran, as leakage into the Persian Gulf has the potential to contaminate wide swathes of water in the region, which would disrupt the ecological balance in the region with devastating effects. Also, a radioactive cloud could spread environmental destruction over vast regions of the Middle East, and Central and Southwest Asia.

28. Relevant Literature

Anderson, Jim. "Iran Doesn't Need Reactor Deals to Get Nuclear Know-How", The Washington Times, May 17, 1995, p. A15.

Chubin, Shahram. "Does Iran Want Nuclear Weapons", Survival, Volume 37, No. 1, Spring 1995, pp. 86-104.

Economist Intelligence Unit Country Profile, 1994-1995: Iran

Feuilherade, Peter. "Nuclear Conundrum", The Middle East, Number 236, July/August 1994, pp. 9-10.

Ingwerson, Marshall. "Marketing Nuclear Plants for an Energy-Hungry World", The Christian Science Monitor, November 8, 1995, p. 10.

McKay, Betsy. "Small Manufacturers Spring Up in Russia", The Wall Street Journal, November 10, 1995, p. A7.

Mesbahi, Mohiaddin. "Iran's Emerging Partnership with Russia", Middle East Insight, Volume XI, No. 5, July-August 1995, pp. 84-87.

The Middle East. "A Bomb for the Ayatollahs", Number 216, October 1992, p. 23.

Nadir, George. "Interview with President Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani", Middle East Insight, Volume XI, No. 5, July-August 1995, p. 12.

Rathmell, Andrew. "Iran's Liquid Lifeline", Jane's Intelligence Review, Volume 7, No. 9, September 1995, pp. 411-414.

Sciolino, Elaine. "Iran Says It Plans 10 Nuclear Plants but No Atom Arms", The New York Times, May 4, 1995, p. A6, A7.

Sciolino, Elaine. "Iran's Nuclear Goals Lie in Half-Built Plant", The New York Times, May 19, 1995, pp. A1, A10.

Sciolino, Elaine. "China Cancels Deal for Selling Iran 2 Reactors", The New York Times, September 28, 1995, pp. A1, A10.

Skootsky, Mark. "U.S. Nuclear Policy Toward Iran", Journal of Nonproliferation Analysis, Volume 1, No. 1, June 1995, pp. 1-25.

Spector, Leonard. Tracking Nuclear Proliferation (Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1995).

Watson, Russell. "So Who Needs Allies", Newsweek, May 15 ,1995, p. 36.

Map of Iran

ENDNOTES


See the case study on Iranian nuclear facilities in Leonard Spector and Mark McDonough's authoritative work Tracking Nuclear Proliferation (Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1995), pp. 119-124.

Ibid., p. 123.

Ibid., p. 119.

"What Islamic Bomb? Post-Cold War Proliferation; Interview", New Perspectives Quarterly, Volume 12, No. 3, June 22, 1995, p. 17.

Ibid., p. 119.

See Eliane Sciolino. "China Cancels Deal for Selling Iran 2 Reactors", The New York Times, September 28, 1995, p. A1, and "China Softens Stance Against Iranian Reactors", The Washington Post, September 30, 1995, p. A9.

By May 1995 150 Russian technicians had descended on Bushehr, and the Russians claimed that it would send up to 3,000 workers to the site. See Elaine Sciolino. "Iran's Nuclear Goals Lie in Half-Built Plant", The New York Times, May 19, 1995, p. A1, A10.

Under Article IV of the NPT, States Parties in good standing (Iran is currently included in this group) will have access to nuclear technology for legitimate civilian purposes. The current problem with the U.S. policy of nuclear technology denial for Iran is that such a policy is inconsistent with the NPT, a treaty the U.S. worked so hard to indefinetly extend and quiet Third World claims of nuclear technology denial in May 1995, during the NPT Review Conference.

Russell Watson. "So Who Needs Allies", Newsweek, May 15, 1995, p. 36.

"IAEA Experts Confirm Peaceful Nature of Iranian Nuclear Efforts", Xinhua News Agency, November 7, 1995.

The Economist Intelligence Unit Country Profile, 1994-1995: Iran, p. 29.

"Iranians Urged to Economize on Energy", The Xinhua News Agency, July 3, 1995.

Watson, op. cit., p. 36; IAEA represenative Mohammed Ayatollahi stated that Iran hopes that nuclear power will eventually account for twenty to twenty five percent of Iran's total energy production needs, equivalent to about 4,000 MW. See "What Islamic Bomb? Post-Cold War Proliferation; Interview", op., cit.

The Economist Intelligence Unit, op.cit., p. 30.

Elaine Sciolino. "Iran Says It Plans 10 Nuclear Plants But No Atom Arms", The New York Times, May 14, 1995, p. A6, A7. Also, Iran's long term economic modernization plans are based on a strategy that over the next twenty years, Iran will become primarily a natural gas rather than oil exporter. Nevertheless, the fruition of this plan is far from being realized, and in the near term Iran will still rely on oil export revenues. See Andrew Rathmell. Iran's Liquid Lifeline", Jane's Intelligence Review, Volume 7, No. 9, September 1995, p 412. However, this view must be balanced with reports that natural gas has been designated as the main fuel for the country's new power stations, and over one third of Iran's natural gas output is consumed by these new power stations. See

The Economist Intelligence Unit Country Profile, op. cit.

"What Islamic Bomb? Post-Cold War Proliferation; Interview", op., cit.

George Nadir, "Interview with President Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani", Middle East Insight, Volume XI, No. 5, July-August 1995, p. 12.

The CIA World Fact Book 1995 (Washington, D.C.: Central Intelligence Agency, 1995).

U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers, 1993-1994 (Washington, D.C.:U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, 1995), p. 67.

For a detailed and current analysis of current Russian economic performance, see Betsy McKay, "Small Manufacturers Spring Up in Russia", The Wall Street Journal, November 10, 1995, p. A7.

See Marshall Ingwerson, "Marketing Nuclear Plants for an Energy-Hungry World", The Christian Science Monitor, November 8, 1995, p. 10.

See Mohiaddin Mesbahi, "Iran's Emerging Partnership with Russia", Middle East Insight, Volume XI, No. 5, July-August 1995, pp. 84-87. Ibid., p. A10.


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