Nuclear Weapons Sumggling and the Environemnt

Russian Nuclear Smuggling

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CASE NUMBER:        271
CASE MNUMONIC:      NUKESMUG
CASE NAME:          Russian Nuclear Smuggling

A. IDENTIFICATION

1. The Issue

     Since the end of the Cold War, a new nuclear weapons black
market has sprung up in Moscow, Germany, and many other European
countries.  The growing black market, known to national security
experts as the 'loose nukes' problem, has grown at such an alarming
rates that it seems that just about any one can buy uranium,
plutonium, and other weapons grade material on the street.  U.S.
allies, recognized nuclear states,1 and non-nuclear
powers alike worry about the possible consequences of loose nukes:
terrorist organizations like the Russian Mafia and the antifada
becoming nuclear powers or the likelihood that some of this
dangerous material being transferred to rogue states like Iran,
Iraq, or North Korea.  Even if the uranium and plutonium are not
used to build nuclear technology, these materials are radioactive
and therefore intrinsically dangerous to any one who comes in
contact with them, particularly the smugglers themselves.  
2. Description

     A multi-million black market in nuclear materials has grown at
a frightening rate in the past several years.  Before the end of
the Cold War, only five states were recognized as nuclear powers. 
The fall of the Cold War has resulted in a the creation of three
more nuclear states which are ill-prepared to protect weapons-grade
material from potential smugglers.  Despite the thawing of the Cold
War, preventing the illicit proliferation of nuclear materials has
perhaps become one of the most important national security policy
issue.  "This [the smuggling of nuclear material] is the primary
security challenge, I think not only the United States, but the
world faces for the next, at least five to 10 years, perhaps
longer," said former Armed Services Committee Chairman Senator Sam
Nunn (D-GE).2
     
     According to a Western European intelligence report, the
principal suspects in many of the smuggling cases are "renegade
military officers and civilian nuclear technicians from Russia,
Ukraine, and Romania. . ."3  The nuclear weapons black
market has grown so large that the number of cases of actual or
attempted nuclear smuggling from former communist countries in 1994
increased to 124 -- more than double the amount reported in 1993.
4  Though International Atomic Energy Agency Director
General Hans Blix said that no information indicates that foreign
countries were actively hunting for weapons-usable materials stolen
from Russian stockpiles,5 'loose nukes' remains a hot
global security issue.  It's become such a high profile issue that
it was depicted in the recent movie True Lies.  In the
movie, two CIA officers (played by actors Tom Arnold and Arnold
Scwartzenegger) pursue the fictitious terrorist group Crimson Jihad
which explodes a warhead in the Florida Keys after becoming a
nuclear power.6

     Reporter Chris Wallace demonstrated the extent of the 'loose
nukes' problem during a recent edition of Primetime Live in which
he interviewed a black market nuclear arms dealer named
Tatiana:
     
CHRIS WALLACE: [interviewing] So, if I come to Moscow and I have
enough money, what can I buy?
TATIANA: Everything.
CHRIS WALLACE: Everything?  Uranium?
TATIANA: No problem.
CHRIS WALLACE: Plutonium?
TATIANA: Yes.
CHRIS WALLACE: Nuclear triggers?
TATIANA: No trouble.  Without any problem.
CHRIS WALLACE: It's really that easy?
TATIANA: It's really that easy.
CHRIS WALLACE: You're saying that I can buy the
materials.
TATIANA: In order to do good bombs. Yes.7 CIA analysts say that though Russian President Boris Yeltsin supports nuclear nonproliferation, he does not have the power to implement any agreements aimed at halting the spread of mass destruction. According to a CIA special estimate, "[p]rogress toward fully satisfying U.S. concerns on Russian proliferation will require that Yeltsin resolve ongoing rivalries among government ministries and policies."8 Concerns that CIA outlined in their special estimate included: In June 1994, Russia agreed to shut down three plutonium- producing reactors by 2000, but the director of the Ministry of Atomic Energy (MINATOM) is delaying implementation "indefinitely to gain time to build two new reactors with U.S. assistance. The new reactors cannot be built until well after 2000. Yeltsin recently formed a new intelligence commission to monitor nuclear smuggling, but no single person has the authority to compel bureaucrats to cooperation with its mandates Yeltsin is grappling with more pressing domestic economic and political problems to be able to focus on nonproliferation commitments. Defense Ministry officials and other agencies are engaged in deliberate foot dragging on nonproliferation issues.9 During a September 26-27, 1994 Clinton-Yeltsin summit on disarmament, which ended cheerfully according to Agence France Presse, both Clinton pledged to help provide funding to build a storage facility for fissile material as part of new measures to combat nuclear smuggling.10 Several smuggling or attempted smuggling incidents in Germany, Russia, and other European countries and unsubstantiated reports that some of the nuclear materials were headed for North Korea, Iraq, and Basque terrorists have resulted in requests for the IAEA to expand its role. At the German government's request, the IAEA General Conference passed a resolution to involve the agency in the prevention of nuclear smuggling.11 According to the director general of the IAEA, the IAEA's role in stemming nuclear smuggling will probably be modest. "We are not a police organization," Blix said. "We have taken the position that the most important task is to control the trafficking of thesematerials at the source," he added.12 Despite intelligence reports that smuggling incidents have increased dramatically in former communist nations, counter- proliferation officers are confounded by the sophistication of the smugglers. In February, 1995 a Polish dealer in used cars, meat, and sausage was given a 30-month sentence in Germany for offering 2.2 pounds uranium to a German who reported the incident to the police.13 In another case, a Colombian hid 12.6 grams of potentially fissionable plutonium-239 in oxide form in a shielded cylinder in his suitcase on a flight from Moscow to Munich. Police posing as customers in a $250 million deal arrested him and his suspected Spanish accomplices.14 IAEA Director General Blix nevertheless said several months after the Colombian and the Spaniards were arrested, "thus far, the evidence shows that the individuals trying to smuggle nuclear material . . . are more likely to get irradiated than get money." 15 German intelligence services are optimistic about the consequences of the nuclear smuggling incidents, according to Der Spiegel news magazine. "It [nuclear smuggling] is going through a quantum leap with consequences that will be extremely difficult to control," the magazine reported.16 The report blamed corrupt Russian officers for many of the cases and said that Turkey had emerged as the preferred transit route to Western Europe. 17 This charge is not outrageous as one smuggling incident in 1993 involved renegade Russian officers who stole 8.9 pounds of 30 percent-enriched uranium-235 from former Soviet weapons stocks. 18 According to an unnamed European official, Russians are balking at offers of outside help because of national pride. 19 Even worse, an expert at the French Atomic Energy Commission said that the Russians often do not even check their inventories of radioactive materials. "It is not clear that even the Russians know how much material they actually have,"20 the expert said. And despite four sting operations in Germany and the Czech Republic [no time period for sting operations provided], nuclear proliferation experts fear that large quantities of weapons-grade material is still missing and may already have been sold for illicit use.21 "It's likely that there has already been a diversion of material," said Anthony Fainberg, a senior analyst at the U.S. Office of Technology Assessment. This is a very serious problem; it is not going to go away, and it is not going to get better," 22 Fainberg said. In an interview with The Atlanta Journal and Constitution, Fainberg noted that based on the difficulty U.S. authorities face in halting the flow of illegal drugs, he estimated that only 5 to 10 percent of what is slipping through the borders of the former Soviet republics is being intercepted.23 During a visit to one Kazakhstan plant in 1994, he saw an area that stored about 600 of enriched uranium. According to Fainberg, the only signs of security were a double lay of barbed wire and a few young Army recruits with hunting knives.24 That security is lax at many nuclear materials storage sites in former Soviet republics becomes more alarming when we consider that European Community member-states have begun relaxing their borders. "Before people start insisting that all the borders are removed, they should ensure that there is a European police system capable of dealing with a borderless Europe...Otherwise we will be giving the gangsters a free ride,"25 a British official explained. Despite the increased smuggling incidents, the Chicago-base Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists set back the Doomsday Clock to 17 minutes before midnight in early 1995. In the mid-1980's the clock had been set to 3 minutes before mid-night, indicating the increased peril of nuclear weapons during the tensions of the Cold War.26 Recent events have made the Clinton Administration anxious to implement the provisions of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation, which was recently extended. "The most important beneficiaries of the Non-Proliferation Treaty are the non-nuclear states," said former Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara. "If their neighbor is prevented from obtaining a nuclear weapon, they are more secure and they are not forced themselves to move toward obtaining nuclear weapons.27 To help former Soviet republics enforce nonproliferation, American consultants are helping them upgrade their nuclear arsenals to use high technology security cards and other technology. 28 Projects like this and other ones that help research centers track nuclear material are spreading across Russia and other former Soviet republics. The timeliness of the security projects couldn't be better. Yeltsin has agreed not to renew an arms contract with Iran when a 1988 contract runs out, but in March 1995 The New York Times reported that Iran was smuggling nuclear technology through an international network that included Russia.29 Moscow officials denied the report. "At the given moment, our nuclear supplies are hermetically sealed,30" said Tatyana Samolis, a spokesperson for the Russian Foreign Intelligence Service. Despite assurances from Moscow that it has accounted for its inventory of fissile material and that nothing is missing, European security officials rejected claims. "Their claims that they know where all their materials are...are technically worthless,"31 said one german nuclear materials accounting official. It's clear that health and environmental implications of 'loose nukes' and surplus weapons fuel has become "a clear and present danger to national...security,"32 as noted by the National Academy of Sciences. At hearings chaired by Senator Richard Lugar (R-IN) in the summer of 1995 the senator called Russian 'loose nukes' the number one security risk facing the United States. "Will this new threat be given the priority it deserves only on the morning after the first act of nuclear terrorism? What will we wish we had done then?,"33 the senator asked. Jessica Mathews of the Council on Foreign Relations advises that three lessons regarding this issue ought to be remembered: 1) dealing with Russian plutonium is a security threat that we continue to ignore at our peril; 2) Congressional cuts in the programs to improve Russian nuclear security are unwise in the extreme; 3) knowing how hard it is to get rid of separated plutonium, we should be doing everything possible to stop countries from making more.34 In an effort to move advance nuclear arms reductions and thus nuclear proliferation, Secretary of Defense William J. Perry met with his Ukrainian and Russian counterparts in Ukraine to confer on the topic and to destroy a strategic missile silo built in the Soviet area.35 Under trilateral agreements, Ukraine's remaining nuclear warheads are to be shipped to Russia for disassembly and storage by June 1996. Other efforts to protect Russia, the United States and their allies from the dangers of nuclear weapons include pushes to ratify Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty-II (START-II) and continuing support for the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty of 1972. In the original START I (1991) agreement between Russia and the United States (1991) both countries pledged to reduce the number nuclear warheads they owned by one-third of the amount they had when the treaty was signed. The START-II treaty, signed in 1993, provides for both countries to limit their nuclear warheads to 3,000-3,500 each by the year 2003.36 "Only by the consistent prevention of the spread of nuclear weapons of mass destruction will it be possible to prevent the uncontrolled expansion of nuclear capabilities,"37 two advocates of disarmament wrote in The Daily Yomiuri. "Continuing, substantial disarmament...on the part of nuclear powers...and the agreement on the part of the nonnuclear states not to...develop their own nuclear weapon...potential...would also have a beneficial effect from the environmental standpoint,"38 they continued. The U.S. Senate ratified START-II in an overwhelming 87-4 vote on January 26 after months of being stalled by Senate Foreign Relations Committee Chairman Sen. Jesse Helms (R-NC),39 but the treaty has been held up in the Duma, lower house of Russia's parliament. Although Yeltsin urged the Duma to ratify START-II by April, the treaty is being held up because the Duma is dominated by anti-Western Communists and nationalists who fear losing power relative to the United States, because the United States has been unable to come up with the money it promised Russia to replace the electric power and heat generated by the Russian plutonium-producing reactors, and because the upcoming Russian presidential election in June has politicized the negotiations. 40 The ABM Treaty between President Richard Nixon and Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev sought to limit the Cold War arms race by banning the deployment of multiple land-based defenses against strategic missiles. The ABM Treaty is still important today, because nuclear warheads can be put in these ballistic missiles and because dissemination of ballistic missiles with nuclear warheads increases the opportunities that independent arms dealers and terrorists would have to steal these materials. Though Senator Helms has introduced a bill that would require the U.S. to withdraw from the ABM Treaty because he says that the Clinton administration is ignoring the "real threats" in China, North Korea, Iran, and possibly Russia, most congressmen and congressional staffers doubt the senator's legislation will draw much support.41 Both treaties are important as symbolical and practical means to prevent nuclear proliferation. 3. Related Cases Trade Product : METAL Bio-geography : TEMPERATE Environmental Problem: HABIT Loss While much of the uranium and plutonium smuggled has been to Germany, a TEMPerate area, these radioactive elements could potentially end up anywhere on the globe. IRANNUKES CASE, TEMELIN CASE, CHERNOB CASE, ARCTIC CASE, MOCHO CASE, JAPANSEA CASE, JAPANPL CASE, and MURUROA CASE 4. Draft Author: Jay Krasnow B. LEGAL CLUSTER 5. Discourse and Status: AGRee and INPROGress Whether or not the discourse is AGRee or DISagree depends on what aspect of this issue the actors are discussing. Are 'loose nukes' dangerous? The answer given would be yes unless it was given by the heads of rogue stages or some nuclear weapons smugglers. Can the Russian government account for and protect its nuclear arsenal materials? Many Russian statesmen would say yes, but the CIA says no it can't.42 In general, the leaders of Western and former Soviet republics agree that 'loose nukes' is a problem, it is dangerous, and it won't go away. 6. Forum and Scope Forum: Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) Scope: MULTILATeral As the signatories of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty have agreed, the only five states that have the right to own nuclear warheads are the United States, Great Britain, France, China, and Russia. The fall of the Soviet Union created three new nuclear states (Belarus, Ukraine, and Kazakhstan) which recognize that they do not have the right to keep these weapons. Nevertheless these three states still have nuclear warheads for the time being. When the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty was first ratified, the member- states did not consider that individuals or terrorists could become the greatest danger to nonproliferation.43 The scope of the issue is multilateral because any number of states, nongovernmental organizations, intergovernmental organizations are concerned about it. Nuclear proliferation is not just the nuclear powers' problem. Because of the inherent danger and instability of nuclear materials nuclear proliferation affects many parties. The radioactive materials involve many health and environmental risks. In addition to hazards already mentioned, experts say that excessive amounts of radiation causes thyroid cancer. These doctors draw their evidence from studies of the Chernobyl explosion. Excessive amounts of radioactive iodine, for example, is easily absorbed by the thyroid gland and therefore can be especially dangerous to infants.44 7. Decision Breadth Number of Parties involved: 172 The principal parties in this case are the former Soviet states that have nuclear warheads including Russia, the five recognized nuclear powers, aspiring nuclear powers, Eastern and Central European countries where the nuclear weapons material has been (or may be) smuggled, the consumers of nuclear material, and the smugglers themselves. As the most powerful state in a unipolar world system, the United States has become an actor by its own right. It must be noted that there is clearly some overlap in these seven groups. It should also be pointed out that since we often don't know who is buying the material, we have to guess whether the consumer is an aspiring nuclear state, a terrorist group, or some one else. Since we do not always know where the nuclear materials is going and cannot account for missing nuclear materials, every state, group, and individual is a potential party. 8. Legal Standing: Treaty As the most of the principal parties (except the smugglers and the consumers) have signed the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, they have affirmed that nuclear weapons are dangerous and therefore proliferation should be severely limited. The increased demand for nuclear materials by the consumers, whoever they may be, seriously jeopardizes the integrity of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty. THE NPT Treaty recognizes the "devastation that would be visited upon all mankind by nuclear war...[and] the nuclear proliferation of nuclear weapons..."45 The 1969 treaty obligates the signatories to abstain from transferring nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devises to non-nuclear states46 and obligates them to accept all safeguards (such as verification) as agreed to in the treaty. C. GEOGRAPHIC FILTERS 9. Geography Geographic Domain: Europe Geographic Site: East Europe Geographic Impact: Russia While 'loose nukes' is a global problem, it's almost impossible to say for sure what the geographic sites or geographic impacts are without knowing more about who the consumers are and that their agendas are. Anthony Fainberg, a senior analyst at the U.S. Office of Technology Assessment pointed out the seriousness of this problem in February 1996. "If we don't do something about the situation soon, it will get worse,"48 Fainberg said. 10. Sub-National Factors: NO 11. Type of Habitat: GLOBAL The habit of the areas affected by 'loose nukes' varies depending on where the smugglers and consumers take them. National security officers in Europe, Russia, and the United States seldom know the destination of the nuclear materials and therefore it is impossible to say what type of habitat will be affected in this case. D. TRADE FILTERS 12. Type of Measure: EXportBAN (EXBAN) The type of trade measure can be seen from several perspectives. On the one hand, The Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty mandates that only five states have the right to own nuclear warheads. Other states are not allowed to have any nuclear warheads. This can been viewed as a QUOTA. On the other hand German and Japanese policymakers don't want warheads in their country either. The open statements that leaders of these countries and other countries like it can be seen as an informal IMportBAN. The Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty also gives the five nuclear powers informal LICENsing to own these warheads. And finally, while the Treaty recognizes that five states have the right to own nuclear warheads, the signatories have generally agreed that less warheads are better than more nuclear warheads. The treaty itself mandates that the goal is to move towards zero nuclear warheads. This can be seen as another type of QUOTA. Accordingly, the smugglers of nuclear materials and the likely consumers do not have the right to own weapons-grade material. The provisions of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty orders an IMportBAN and EXportBAN against these parties. 13. Direct vs. Indirect Impacts: DIRect The impact of the trade measure is direct because it bans the production and ownership of nuclear warheads and nuclear weapons- grade material in states other than the five recognized nuclear powers. 14. Relation of Measure to Impact: Directly Related to Product: YES - NUCLEAR Indirectly Related to Product: NO Not Related to Product: NO Related to Process: YES - [POLL] The Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty limits ownership and severely restricts the trade of weapons-grade nuclear material because of its intrinsic dangers. 15. Trade Production Identification: METAL The product identification refers to plutonium and uranium. 16. Economic Data: See below The uranium and plutonium black market is a multi-million industry for the smugglers and the consumers. The Colombian who was arrested in August (see category one) for trying to sell plutonium in Germany was offered $250 million for it by an undercover police agent.49 For the states involved, the case is more of a high politics and national security issue than an economic issue. In Russia and the 'new nuclear power' states there is a great need to account for their nuclear materials. US agencies are prepared to spend millions of dollars to ensure that the nuclear states in Eastern Europe can protect their nuclear materials.50 17. Degree of Competitive Output: HIGH Most parties involved see this as a national security issue rather than an economic. The countries with money are willing to spend as much as necessary to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons material. Most of the countries that signed the treaty and are prepared to observe it, want nuclear weapons as far away from them as possible. Most of the countries that have nuclear weapons are beginning to dismantle them anyway because they don't feel as much a need to have a them. For the smugglers and consumers the nuclear proliferation is a multi-million dollar industry. The general global consensus that nuclear proliferation should be stopped does not concern them. The black market dealers, then, will continue to try smuggle and sell weapons material to their consumers. For the most part, economic output is lost only when the smugglers and their consumers are caught. 18. Industry Sector: METAL The industry identification refers to plutonium and uranium. 19. Exporters and Importers: Russia and Many We know very little about who's buying and selling nuclear materials and for how much. Most of the material originates in the former Soviet states, but the governments of these states do not appear to be involved the smuggling operations. E. ENVIRONMENTAL FILTERS 20. Environmental Problem Type: HABIT The number of possible environmental problems that could result from uranium and plutonium trading is countless. But in general, it threatens our general habitat. 21. Species Information: See below Name: Many Type: Many Diversity: 754,958 hectares of natural forests 51 The species affected depends on where the material is brought and who uses it, and for what purpose. Most people are more concerned though, about the impact it would have on people more than those who don't have voices such as wildlife and those who have not yet been born. 22. Impact and Effect: HIGH and STRuCTure 23. Urgency and Lifetime: HIGH and 1000s of years The urgency of the issue is extremely high because many of the smugglers are not familiar with the danger to themselves and others involved in the business. The urgency is high because the number of cases increase in year. While humans and wildlife are equally in endangered by the impacts of a possible accident or merely coming in contact with the material, no species is yet in danger of extinction. 24. Substitute: BIODEGRADABLE? There is no substitute for these weapons-grade material and there is no good reason for the smugglers to have them. It is assumed that the consumers will use separated plutonium or uranium to manufacture nuclear warheads. The idea of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty is to prevent this from happening. Since the thawing of the Cold War in the late 1980's, many countries that have nuclear warheads want to get rid of them. The possibility that nuclear weapons grade material is not promising, but must be mentioned. F. OTHER FACTORS 25. Culture: NO 26. Human Rights: YES At the very basic level human rights is a key issue in this case. While scientists have not been able to tell us the exact effects that it has on people, U.S. experiments from the 1940's clearly showed that radiation is dangerous to humans.52 "[I]t's most important to stress that we don't really know what radiation does. People are still unsure,"53 said Holly Barker, Senior Advisor to the Ambassador of the Marshall Islands to the United States. According to Barker, people exposed to radiation on the Marshall Islands have been born without knees, with only three toes, or without limbs.54 27. Transborder Issues: YES Since the nuclear materials have been transported from country to country, there are many transborder issues in this case. 28. Relevant Literature Atlas, Terry, "A Threat of Nuclear Terrorists Lingers After End of the Cold War," The Houston Chronicle 24 Feb. 1995: A23. Belluck, Pam, "Kiev to Queens: Plot Fit For Fiction -- U.S. Customs Agent Tells What It's Like to Run A Sting," The New York Times 26 June 1995: B1. Broad, William J. "Quietly U.S. Converts Uranium into Fuel for Civilian Reactors," The New York Times 19 June 1995: A10. "Clinton Favors Keeping All 3 Nuclear Labs: Continued Research Eliminates Need for Weapons Tests, He Says," The Washington Post 26 Sept. 1995: A17. Coughlin, Con, "FOCUS IMMIGRATION: Trojan Horse at the Heart of Europe Customs Officials Are Already Fighting a Losing Battle. Fleck, Fiona, "German Spy Chief Denies Plutonium Coup Was Set Up," Reuters World Service, 21 Apr. 1995: no page provided. Gallagher, James P., "Nuclear Sites in Russia Get New Security," Chicago Tribune 16 Mar. 1995: 22. Genscher, Hans-Dietrich and Shimbun, Yomiuri, "INSIGHTS INTO THE WORLD; Nuclear-Free Environment Indispensable for Stability and Security in the World, The Daily Yomiuri 18 Dec. 1995: 6. "German Agents Record Big Rise in Nuclear Smuggling," Reuters World Service, 18 Feb. 1995: no page provided. Gertz, Bill, "Yeltsin Can't Curtail Arms Spread; Bureaucracy Too Powerful CIA Believes," The Washington Times 27 Sept. 1994: A3. Hecker, Charles, "Russians Say No Nuclear Smuggling to Iran," The The Moscow Times 16 Mar. 1995: no page provided. Hibbs, Mark, "Europeans Term 'Worthless' Minatom Claim That No HEU or PU is Missing," Nuclear Fuel 27 Mar. 1995: 12. ---., "Schmidbauer, Agencies To Be Probed on Bonn Plutonium Sting Operations," 24 Apr. 1995: 2. Lee, Gary, "Clinton Apologizes for U.S. Radiation Tests, Praises Panel Report," The Washington Post 4 Oct. 1995 : A8. Lyon, Mark Hibbs, "IAEA Role in Containing Smuggling will be Limited Blix Says," Nucleonics Week 6 Oct. 1994: 1. Landry, Carole, "Yeltsin, Clinton Crown Summit with Trade, Disarmament Gains," Agence France Presse, 28 Sept 1994: no page provided. Lippman, Thomas W. "First Shipment of Uranium Arrives From Russia: Delivery Comes Amid Argument Over Terms of Deal That Threatens to Cancel Agreement," The Washington Post 24 June 1995: A21. ---., "U.S. Vows Faster Payment To Russia in Uranium Deal: Action Aimed at Persevering Disarmament Agreement," The Washington Post 6 July 1995: A17. "'Loose Nukes' -- Update on Nuclear Weapons Sales" on ABC's Primetime Live, 19 Aug. 1994, 10:00 PM ET; guests: Franz Mittelstaedt, Nuclear Black Market Dealer; Senator Sam Nunn, (D), Georgia, Armed Services Committee Chairman; Dmitri Muratov, Reporter, "Nova Gazetta"; Gennady, Nuclear Black Market Dealer; Tatiana, Black Market Nuclear Arms Dealer; Victor Mikhala, Russian Nuclear Energy Minister. Mathews, Jessica, "Beware the 'Loose Nukes,'" The Washington Post 13 Oct. 1995: A13. "Moscow accuses Germany over Plutonium Smuggling," East European Energy Report 26 Apr. 1995: no page provided. Randal, Jonathan C., " Planned German Reactor Fuels Controversy," The Washington Post 20 July 1995: A24. Toner, Mike, "AAAS in Atlanta Nuclear Smuggling on the Rise, Experts Say," The Atlanta Journal and Constitution 19 Feb. 1995: A7. Walsh, Mary Williams "Plutonium Smugglers Convicted in Germany," Los Angeles Times 18 July 1995: A4. Whitney, Craig, "Smuggling of Radioactive Material Said to Double in a Year," The New York Times 18 Feb 1995: 2. ---., "Report Tracks a Big Jump in East's Nuclear Smuggling," International Herald Tribune 18 Feb. 1995: no page provided.
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ENDNOTES
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1. The recognized nuclear states are the United States. Great Britain, France, China, and Russia. The fall of the Soviet Union crated several new nuclear states: Ukraine, Belorus, and Kazakhstan. Countries considered secret nuclear powers are India, Pakistan, Israel, and probably North Korea. See John Macartney, Readings Packet 433, for Govt. 53.526.01, US Intelligence Community, The American University Bookstore, Washington, DC, Fall Semester, 1995, p. 24. 2. Former Senate Armed Services Committee Chairman Senator Sam Nunn on "'Loose Nukes' Update on Nuclear Weapons Sales," on ABC's Primetime Live, 19 Aug. 1994. 10:00 PM. 3. Craig Whitney, Smuggling of Radioactive MAterial Said to Double in a Year, The New York Times 18 Feb. 1995: 2. 4. Ibid. 56 cases were reported in 1993 and 53 cases were reported in 1992 5. Mark Hibbs, "IAEA Role in Containing Smuggling Will Be Limited, Blix Says," Nuclear Week 6 Oct. 1994: 1. Blix's statement contradicted statesments made by German officials in August 1994. 6. The idea that two CIA officers try to arrest or otherwise incapacitate the terrorists is a misrepresentation of the Agency's charter. The CIA has never had policing authority. 7. Primetime Live. 8. Bill Gertx. "Yeltsin Can't Curtail Arms Spread; Bureaucracy Too Powerful CIA Believes," The Washington Times 27 Sept. 1994: A3. 9. Ibid. 10. Carole Landry, "Yeltsin, Clinton Crown Summit With Trade, Disarmament," Agence France Press 28 Sept. 1994: no page provided. 11. "IAEA Role in Containing Smuggling . . ." 12. Ibid. 13. "Smuggling of Radioactive Material Said . . ." 14. Ibid. 15. "IAEA Role in Containing Smuggling . . ." 16. "German Agents Record Big Rise in Nuclear Smuggling," Reuters World Service 18 Feb. 1994: no page provided. 17. Ibid. 18. Craig Whitney, "Report Tracks a Big Jump in East's Nuclear Smuggling," International Herald Tribune 18 Feb. 1995: no page provided. 19. Ibid. 20. Ibid. 21. Mike Toner, "AAAS in Atlanta: Nuclear Smuggling on the Rise, Experts Say," The Atlanta Journal and Contsitution 19 Feb. 1995: A7. 22. Ibid. 23. Ibid. 24. Ibid. 25. Con Coughlin, "Focus Immigration: Trojan Horse at the Heart of Europe Customs Officials Are Already Fighting a Losing Battly. Con Coughlin Fears It Can Only Get Worse," Sunday Telegraph, 19 Feb. 1995: 15. 26. Terry Atlas, "A Threat of Nuclear Terrorists Lingers After End of Cold War," The Houston Chronicle, 24 Feb. 1994: A23. 27. Ibid. 28. James P. Gallagher, "Nuclear Sites in Russia Get New Security," Chicago Tribune, 16 Mar. 1995: 22. 29. Charles Hecker, "Russians Say No Nuclear Smuggling to Iran," The Moscow Times, 16 Mar. 1995: no page provided. 30. Ibid. 31. Mark Hibbs, "Europeans Term 'Worthless' Minatom Chaim That No HEU or PU IS Missing," Nuclear Fuel, 27 Mar. 1995: 12. 32. Jessica Mathews, "Beware the 'Loose Nukes," The Washington Post 13 Oct. 1995: A13. 33. Ibid. 34. Ibid. 35. "Perry Confers in Ukraine," The Washington Post 5 Jan 1995: A27. 36. Hans Dietriech Genscher and Yomiuri Shimbun, "Nuclear Free Environment Indispensible for Stability and Security in the World," The Daily Yomiuri 18 Dec. 1995: 2. 37. Ibid. 38. Ibid., 39. Michael Dobbs, "Senate Overwhelmingly Ratifies 1993 Arms Treaty With Russia," The Washington Post, 27 Jan 1996: A1. Senator Helms had stalled ratification of the treaty for five months because the Clinton administration rejected his plan to shut down USIA, USAID, and the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. 40. Thomas W. Lippman, "Russia Balks at Arms Accord: Failure to Improve Clinton-Yeltsin Agreements Frustrates U.S. Officials," The Washington Post 21 Feb. 1996: A24. 41. Thomas W. Lippman and Bradley Graham, "Helms Offers Bill to Force U.S. Out of ABM Treaty: Aides Give Measure Little Chance of Approval," The Washington Post 8 Feb. 1996: A20. 42. "Yeltsin Can't Curtail Arms Spread . . ." 43. Greenpeace fax, "Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons," 1 July 1968, faxed to author by Tome Clements, Nuclear Disarmament Campaigner, Greenpeace, 1436 U Street, NW, Washington, DC. 44. "Chernobyl, Cancer, and Creeping Paranoia," The Economist 9 Mar. 1996: 81-2. 45. "Treaty on the Nonproliferation . . ." 46. Ibid., Article I. 47. Ibid., Article III, section 1. 48. "AAA In Atlanta . . ." 49. "Smuggling of Radioactive Material . . ." 50. "Nuclear Sites in Russia . . ." 51. "Table 19.1, Forest Resources," World Resources 1994-95 A report by the World Resources Institute in Collaboration with the United Nations Environment Programme and the United Nations Development Programme (New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994), 307. Figure represents hectares of natural forests in the former Soviet Uniion in 1990. The amount of plant species in Russia was not yet available in the 1994 edition of World Resources 52. David Brown, "Study Details the Culture That Drove Experiments: Scientists Worried About Safety, Not Consent," The Wasington Post 4 Oct. 1995: A8. 53. Ms. Holly Barker, Senior Advisor to Ambassador, Emassy of the Marshall Islands, "Paradise Lost?," Forum on French Nuclear Testing, The American University, School of International Service, 19 Oct. 1995, moderated by Professor Paul Waupner, Ph.D. 54. Ibid.

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