© 1999 Annita Lysikatou

November 28, 1999

China seems to have been long stationary, and had probably long ago acquired that full complement of riches which is consistent with the nature of its laws and institutions. But this complement may be much inferior to what, with other laws and institutions, the nature of its soil, climate, and situation might admit of. A country which neglects or despises foreign commerce, and which admits the vessels of foreign nations into one or of its ports only, cannot transact the same quantity of business which it might do with different laws and institutions.

Adam Smith, The Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations

Book I, Chapter IX

 

Introduction

In today's post-Cold War world, U.S. foreign policy faces a plethora of uncertainties in the economic, social and political spheres. With the geopolitical order currently reduced to one major superpower, the new order is still quite amorphous. For such reasons, politicians, economists, military strategists and others in Washington have sought to answer the question, "Is there any particular country that has the potential to rise to the level of a regional, or even global, hegemon in the 21^st century?" Evidence suggests so, and the country that has placed itself on the path of fulfilling that prophecy is the People's Republic of China. A 1994 World Bank study showed in 1980, the PRC accounted for only 3.6% of the world's gross domestic product and 0.8 % of its exports of manufactured goods. It estimates that, by 2010, the PRC could account for 15.5% of the world's GDP and 6.4% of its exports of manufactured goods (O’Quinn, 1997).

Clearly, China is poised to assert much more influence on world affairs in the coming century. For this reason, foreign policy towards China has been debated under the realm of two distinct policies, engagement and containment. Engagement seeks to encourage China’s involvement in multilateral agreements and its membership in international organizations as a means of promote Beijing’s respect and adherence to international norms. Containment, on the other hand, adopts a more defensive approach. Its advocates point to the security risks inherent in accepting China into the international community. The policy proposes counterbalancing China in a method similar to that used with Russia during the Cold War.

The challenge for the United States is to examine these two policies and determine which will be most effective in promoting U.S. interests vis-à-vis an emerging China. In searching for answers, this paper will utilize arguments from a variety of scholars, most notably the famed economist Adam Smith, in an effort to focus on the strategy of engagement with the People's Republic of China. It is my thesis that engagement would be highly regarded by Smith as the preferred method with which to integrate China into the world economy and encourage China's continued growth. Furthermore, in terms of security, engagement would likely promote political objectives with China that are complementary to those of its trading partners and neighbors, most notably the United States.

In order to provide a comprehensive analysis this paper will be divided into two sections. The first section will focus on economic issues such as China’s desire to accede into the World Trade Organization (WTO). Sino-American cooperation can assist in creating an agreement that would be mutually beneficial to both parties. Potential roadblocks are discussed as well as the arguments of dissenters such as Patrick Buchanan. Three main arguments demonstrating why Buchanan came to the incorrect conclusion that Adam Smith would support a protectionist stand on China are presented. The conclusion of this section ends with a review of Smith insight’s on the value of free trade over protectionism as well as why he would likely be a strong proponent of WTO accession of China under the circumstances mentioned above.

The second section begins with an overview of the post-Cold War security environment. It discusses how disagreements between Washington and Beijing in the past have created tensions that hamper efforts to promote constructive dialogue. However, areas of successful Sino-American interaction are illustrated. Special attention is given to how economic engagement through the WTO accession discussed previously would help promote U.S. political objectives vis-a-vis China. Furthermore, the argument that economic interdependence will promote democratic reform in China is presented.

Consumption is the sole end and purpose of all production; and the interest of the producer ought to be attended to only so far as it may be necessary for promoting that of the consumer. The maxim is so perfectly self evident that it would be absurd to attempt to prove it. But in the mercantile system the interest of the consumer is almost constantly sacrificed to that of the producer; and it seems to consider production, and not consumption, as the ultimate end and object of all industry and commerce.

Adam Smith, The Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations

Book IV, Chapter VIII

A) Overview of Sino-American trade relations: the impact of WTO accession

Global interdependence has created the reduction of barriers to trade as well as the establishment of multilateral trading organizations such as the WTO. The WTO’s agreements, negotiated and signed by a large majority of the world’s trading nations, have become the legal code for international commerce. China was one of the 23 original signatories of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) in 1948 (Pregelj, 1996). However, its ideological differences with countries such as the United States have made trade negotiations between the two a difficult task. Therefore, in its efforts to accede to the WTO China is carefully monitoring its interactions with the United States. In order to understand the situation, it is best to provide a brief overview of the trade relationship between the PRC and the United States since the inception of most-favored nation (MFN) status.

Since 1942, the United States has applied MFN treatment in trade to generally all of its trading partners. This policy was modified with the enactment of section 5 of the Trade Agreements Extension Act of 1951 (P.L. 82-50), which required the president to suspend MFN status of the Soviet Union and all countries of the then Sino-Soviet bloc. (Pregelj, 1996). As a result, President Truman suspended China's MFN status as of September 1, 1951. Tibet’s MFN status was suspended the following year as a result of Chinese invasion of that country. MFN status could thereafter be restored to any of the suspended countries only by specific law until the Trade Act of 1974.

In Title IV of the Act, a special waiver authority providing temporary MFN status was granted by Congress for "nonmarket economy" (NME) countries, providing that they met the following guidelines: (1) the conclusion of a bilateral trade agreement containing a reciprocal grant of the MFN status and additional provisions required by law, and approved by the enactment of a joint resolution from both houses; and (2) compliance with the freedom-of-emigration requirements ("Jackson-Vanik amendment") of the Trade Act of 1974 (Pregelj, 1997). The requirements in part two can be fulfilled either by a Presidential determination that the NME country in question places no obstacles to free emigration of its citizens, or by a presidential waiver of full compliance, under specified conditions.

China has been a recipient of MFN (hereafter referred to as normal trade relations, or NTR) since the end of the Carter administration. On October 23, 1979, President Carter transmitted a trade agreement with China to Congress. The Jackson-Vanik extension was awarded by Congress on January 24, 1980. Continuation of NTR status is contingent upon a number of factors. The first is a triennial renewal of the trade agreement. This determines if a satisfactory balance of concessions has been maintained during the agreement. In addition, it attempts to predict whether or not the United States' real or actual reductions in tariffs resulting from multilateral negotiations have been reciprocated. Second, it imposes an annual renewal of the waiver authority by the President in June of each year. A presidential waiver to continue NTR status is subject to one significant hurdle—Congress may veto the action by a joint resolution of disapproval. Therefore, it becomes increasingly evident that legislative politics can undermine the actions of free-trade proponents. This could be especially true if Congress decides to tie trade agreements with China to the achievement of political or morally acceptable goals, such as the improvement of human rights. For example, after the events at Tiananmen Square the United States imposed economic and other sanctions on China—which were considered too "soft" by social conservatives and initiated an attempt to revoke the country’s NTR status. This precedent of congressional intervention in trade dealings in an effort to thwart trade liberalization with China has occurred repeatedly since. For example, in 1997 a House bill was introduced to reverse NTR renewal with China. It was later defeated by a vote of 173 to 259 (Pregelj, 1998).

Therefore, precautions taken by groups on both sides stem from the impact that changes in trade policy inherent with a WTO accession would have on Sino-American trade. The Institute for International Economics table on the following page highlights the two countries’ trade of goods and services, as well as the United States' increasing trade deficit with China. Indeed, it is this deficit that has served as a cornerstone of protectionist efforts that would serve to deny China NTR status and/or invoke Article 13, the non-application clause, if China accedes to the WTO.

Table 1: Adjusted Estimates of US-China Goods and Services Trade, 1992-98 (US$ billions)

* Estimate based on historic growth Source: < http://www.iie.com/NEWSLETR/news99-6.htm>

In order for an engagement policy to be pursued, economic measures that promote trade liberalization rather than the protectionism mentioned previously must be enacted. After all, engagement as a foreign policy seeks to promote cooperation through multilateral trade agreements. These agreements are the basis for future coordination in all other areas, whether they be security, the environment, etc. This is clearly seen in the following excerpt taken from Clinton's A National Security Strategy for A New Century

"An overarching U.S. interest is China's emergence as a stable, open, secure and peaceful state. The prospects for peace and prosperity in Asia depend heavily on China's role as a responsible member of the international community. China's integration into the international system of rules and norms will influence its own political and economic development, as well as its relations with the rest of the world" (Clinton, 1997)

B) Opposition Viewpoints: Why are Buchanan's assumptions incorrect?

The international rules and norms mentioned above relate to China’s inclusion in international organizations as well as bilateral/multilateral trade agreements. There are two main reasons for opposition to this policy. One, defenders of a protectionist policy believe that China has not adequately opened her markets to U.S. products. Second, others believe that liberalization with China should be conditioned on political, moral, and/or security issues. This has promoted an idea of Chinese containment.

What both groups fail to take into consideration is that the progression of American interests can only take place only through engaging China first economically by accepting her wholeheartedly into the WTO. Accession is part of China’s broader strategy to lock in a tenuous transition from communism to a market economy.

The United States has much to gain by following a policy of engagement. If included in the WTO with full NTR benefits, barriers to entry for U.S. goods will be significantly reduced. Estimates of U.S.- China trade with China accepted as a full-fledged member of the WTO have been compiled by a variety of organizations. The Institute of International Economics (IIE) has determined the affect of China’s WTO accession on U.S. exports, considering the provisional Chinese commitments summarized by the office of the United States Trade Representative, using a partial equilibrium model. The IIE forecasts a $21.3 billion increase in Chinese imports, of which $18.2 are merchandise and $3.1 are service-related. The projected increase of U.S. exports to China total $3.1 billion, of which $2.3 billion are merchandise and $.8 billion are services (Rosen, 1999). This economic interdependence will inexorably link both countries, making cooperation on security and environment issues an indeed critical issue.

However, there are those who insist that trade with a belligerent state such as China is not the solution. As well as criticizing engagement, these remnants of American exceptionalism attempt to link our preconceived judgements on what constitutes socially acceptable behavior to the behavior of other states. One such outspoken proponent of containment policy and the tightening of trade sanctions with China is Patrick Buchanan. Buchanan points to a belligerent state in which the United States should not place its trust or its investment. In an article on the website of The American Cause, he argues that revoking MFN and imposing tariffs equal to those imposed upon us by China is the appropriate manner by which to conduct relations with the PRC. Furthermore, Buchanan points to Adam Smith in his defense, claiming that:

"House Republicans who enjoy sporting Adam Smith ties should read a little more Adam Smith. In at least four cases, the father of free trade wrote, it must be "advantageous to lay some burden upon foreign (imports)," i.e., impose tariffs. Among Smith's reasons were "the defense of the country," "for the encouragement of domestic industry," for "revenge" and "retaliation" on nations that impose tariffs on one's own exports -- and to break open foreign markets". (Buchanan, 1998)

There is nothing more disheartening than the bastardization of an author’s premise in an effort to secure one’s own objectives. Unfortunately, Adam Smith is not alive today to refute the manner in which his classic text has been manipulated. However, it is important to note that Buchanan’s theory rests on the assumption that China is a threat to U.S. security interests. There are three main reasons why he came to the incorrect conclusion that Adam Smith would support a protectionist stand on China.

First and foremost, "uncertainty hawks" have attempted to fill the vacuum of the post-Cold War world by creating a picture of a belligerent PRC which can only be dealt with through forceful actions. They, like Buchanan, point to the Chinese acquisition of advanced military technology and PLA affiliation in industry. What they fail to understand is that by promoting the idea that China will be the next Russia, we will relegate ourselves to the same Cold-War mentality seen during the previous administrations. When one disregards the theatrics of uncertainty hawks and concentrates on the hard numbers of military spending the argument becomes significantly weaker.

In The Coming Conflict with America, containment advocates Bernstein and Munro estimate China's actual military expenditures at approximately $87 billion per year (Bernstein and Munro, 1997:25). Although the number is much greater than that officially declared by China, it is still only one-third that of the United States. Moreover, the military imbalance that currently exists between China and the United States is real, measured not only by more U.S. planes, tanks, and missiles but also by the more accurate barometer of military spending as a percentage of gross domestic product (GDP). Regardless of continued Chinese economic growth, this American military edge is likely to persist.

China-U.S – A comparison of key military equipment

Source: Federation of American Scientists http://www.fas.org/spp/starwars/congress/1997/h970616h.htm

Secondly, Buchanan has misconstrued Smith and failed to point out passages in The Wealth of Nations that clearly negate the rationale of his argument. A particular point to note is Buchanan's assertion that, according to Smith, it must be advantageous to impose tariffs "in defence of the country". Presumably, the United States should shield itself from Chinese imports and deny NTR status because of China's 'threat' to U.S. security interests.

There seem, however, to be two cases in which it will generally be advantageous to lay some burden upon foreign for the encouragement of domestic industry. The first is, when some particular sort of industry is necessary for the defence of the country. The defence of Great Britain, for example, depends very much upon the number of its sailors and shipping. The Act of Navigation, therefore, very properly endeavours to give the sailors and shipping of Great Britain the monopoly of the trade of their own country in some cases by absolute prohibitions and in others by heavy burdens upon the shipping of foreign countries. (Smith, 1776: 463)

Buchanan's quotation of Smith was highly inaccurate. As seen above, Smith determined that the imposition of tariffs would be necessary in cases in which the industry involved played an integral part of national defense. Therefore, Smith might possibly support tariffs in industries utilizing advanced technology. However, it is highly dubious that he would promote their extension into any other areas. By selecting key words from a lone chapter in The Wealth of Nations, Book IV, Chapter 2, Buchanan insinuates that Adam Smith would support restrictions on trade with China by exaggerating the country's military strength as if to place it on par with the Soviet Union at the height of the Cold-War.

Third, Buchanan's proposal that Adam Smith advocated ''revenge' and 'retaliation' on countries that have not sufficiently opened their borders to foreign goods also requires rebuttal. During the days of Smith trade retaliation was a common occurrence, especially between countries such as England and France. In arguing for a protectionist stance ('revenge' or 'retaliatory'), Smith elaborates by clarifying that he believes a country's short-term losses due to trade retaliation would be offset by their later revocation in favor of a freer trade policy.

"There may be a good policy in retaliations of this kind, when there is a probability that they will procure the repeal of the high duties or prohibitions complained of…When there is no probability that any such repeal can be procured, it seems a bad method of compensating the injury done to certain classes of our people, to do another injury ourselves, not only to those classes, but to almost all the other classes of them" (Smith, 1776: 468).

As is evident from the above passage, Smith would be highly critical of such retaliations if they did not produce the desired effect. Therefore, we are left to decide what he would have done in the face of our current day dilemma. It is my assertion that, given the developing nature of the Chinese economy, Smith would have not recommended a protectionist policy towards China. First and foremost, because he most certainly realized the disastrous effects tariff-free trade would have had the developing country. He states that "the undertaker of a great manufacture, who, by the home markets being suddenly laid open to the competition of foreigners, should be obliged to surrender his trade, would no doubt suffer very considerably" (Smith, 1776: 471). He did not advocate immediate reduction of tariffs in cases that would cause severe economic disturbance. Secondly, because he would have realized the extraordinary gains for the American consumer by increased trade with China. Chinese imports demonstrate the absolute advantage of buying labor-intensive products from a country that can produce them at a lower cost than any other.

In weaving through the complicated process that is inherent in any trade negotiation, it is imperative that the United States not lose sight of its goals. Trade policy must not be dictated by those who wish to preserve the rights of American producers at the expense to the rest of our population. By the same token, policymakers must realize that protecting domestic interests will alienate China and promote a dangerous trade war, which could later lead to more serious forms of confrontation. In analyzing the English colonization of the New World, Smith stated that

"A great empire has been established for the sole purpose of raising up a nation of customers who should be obliged to buy from the shops of our different producers all the goods with which these could supply them. For the sake of that little enhancement of price which this monopoly might afford our producers, the home consumers have been burdened with the whole expense of maintaining and defending that empire" (Smith, 1776: Book IV, Chapter 8)

Indeed, Smith categorically criticizes the English mercantilist system for its promotion of domestic industry at the expense of more efficient producers. One could well make the comparison between the actions of the English during the latter 18^th century and those of the Americans trade negotiators today. According to James Dorn of the Cato Center for Trade Policy Studies, after being subjected to American pressure China agreed to maintain its NME status for five years after it accedes to the WTO. But the U.S., in its quest to get a super deal- to protect jobs in the heavily unionized steel industry and other import competing industries– is demanding that China accept the NME label for a total of 10 years after joining the WTO (Dorn, 1999). In conclusion, it seems as though for all the posturing that the United States is making vis-a-vis the PRC's protectionist policies, our country is engaging in quite a bit of its own.

Commerce and manufactures gradually introduced order and good government, and with them, the liberty and security of individuals, among the inhabitants of the country, who had before lived almost in a continual state of war with their neighbors, and of servile dependency upon their superiors.

Adam Smith, The Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations

A) Overview of events to date

In the previous section of this paper, I proposed to counter the arguments of proponents of protectionism and containment theory. I discussed the reasons upon which I have concluded that China does not pose a clear military threat to the United States, whether it be next year or even ten years from now. Moreover, it was explained that without a concrete foundation in economic cooperation engagement ceases to exist. One cannot hope to engage China with words alone—rather, actions that strengthen Sino-American dialogue can only be enacted with trade liberalization. There have been occasional setbacks in U.S.-Chinese relations since the end of the Cold War but positive progress has generally been the norm.

Upon his ascendancy as President of the United States, Clinton took a markedly different approach on the policy of engagement with China from that of his predecessor. What Clinton attempted to do (and what some policymakers in Congress are currently advocating) was to link trade to political and moral issues. Issues of contention included clandestine Chinese support for Pakistan's secret missile and nuclear weapons program, human rights policies, and a satisfactory solution to issues involving Taiwan. However, on May 26, 1994, Clinton decided to "de-link" human rights from the issue of NTR status. Instead, he extended a series of sanctions imposed on China after events at Tiananmen Square. These included banning the import of munitions from China and creating more programs in an effort to promote human rights. It is generally noted that Clinton took this approach in response to pressure from Congress. The political ramifications of being "soft" on China were too serious to be ignored.

The issue of Taiwan continues to generate conflict among U.S. and Chinese officials. The Administration's September 7, 1994, Taiwan Policy Review made modest upgrades in U.S. contacts with Taiwan, reinitiating hostilities with China. Moreover, Congress soon considered legislative initiatives providing more support for Taiwan and a tougher policy toward Beijing in several sensitive policy areas. However, none of the aforementioned practices were to match the deterioration in Sino-American relations which took place when the Administration allowed Taiwan's president, Lee Teng-hui, to make a private visit to the United States. Indeed, Chinese officials viewed it as a direct violation of the 1979 Joint Communiqué on Establishing Diplomatic Relations with the People's Republic of China (Pregelj, 1996). As a result, the PRC tried to suspend contacts with the United States and to discredit President Lee's policies in Taiwan. Furthermore, the May 1999 bombing of the Chinese embassy in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia has raised a multitude of questions concerning whether or not the United States is attempting to contain Chinese regional hegemony. Regardless of whether the incident was intentional or not, it has left an indelible imprint of sensitivities and mistrust in U.S.-China relations that continue today.

B) Areas of successful Sino-American interaction: How engagement promotes U.S. political objectives

Engagement has created a number of opportunities in which China and the United States, through constructive dialogue and cooperation, have promoted tangible steps towards improving Sino-American relations. Through key objectives such as a successful WTO negotiation, the United States can succeed in securing a China that is peaceful, stable, and open. In addition, by integrating China into the international systems of rules and norms, such as seen in the WTO, the United States can guarantee itself a powerful ally in the Asia-Pacific region. Engagement with China has already produced a number of positive outcomes. For example, Beijing assisted the United States in obtaining North Korean compliance with the U.S.-DPRK Agreed Framework as well as expressing interest in cooperating with the United States towards a nuclear weapons free zone in Southeast Asia. Therefore, continued high-level meetings between officials in China and the United States, such as that between Secretary of State Albright and Chinese Foreign Minister Jiaxuan on September 23, 1999, are attempting to normalize relations by focusing on areas in which the two countries can cooperate on confidence-building measures in order to promote further progress in the future.

Fostering economic interdependence as a method of promoting peace, such as seen above, is not a new concept. The idea that trade promotes peace has been widely discussed over the past two centuries by a number of authors. In particular, Adam Smith raised some interesting points in The Wealth of Nations in regard to trade policy as a means by which to promote foreign policy objectives.

Smith extoled the virtues of commerce and manufactures in the promotion of good government as well as liberty and security among individuals. In addition, he stated that "This, though it has been the least observed, is by far the most important of all their effects. Mr. Hume is the only writer who, so far as I know, has hitherto taken notice of it" (Smith, 1776: 412).

By Hume, Smith was referring to David Hume, the Scottish philosopher. Hume was one of the only writers during that time who focused a great deal on the relationship between free trade and the promotion of democratic principles of government. In Essays, Moral, Political and Literary he described the state of disorder found in 'rude, unpolished nations'. Hume's main argument was that the development of commerce had the effect of drawing "authority and consideration to that middling ranks of men, who are the best and firmest basis of public liberty" (Campbell and Skinner, 1981: 412). In addition, editors R.H. Campbell and A.S. Skinner of The Wealth of Nations point to a close student of Hume's, Sir James Steuart, who also drew attention to the link between commerce and liberty. He commented that:

"When once a state begins to subsist by the consequences of industry, there is less danger to be apprehended from the power of the sovereign. The mechanism of his administration becomes more complex and…he finds himself so bound up by the laws of his political economy, that every transgression of them runs him into new difficulties" (Campbell and Skinner, 1981: 412).

Clearly, history has shown us on more than one occasion that countries that are interdependent economically are less likely to go to war with one another. Indeed, many countries have linked themselves together not only to achieve economies of scale but also because of the security inherent in promoting a common defense against outsiders. The European Union is perhaps the best example of an economic union that has served to promote the political interests of the parties involved.

It therefore seems logical that Smith would have advocated an open trade policy with China. A reduction in tariffs to U.S.-China trade would accomplish a three-fold objective. First and foremost it would benefit the American consumer, who would now be able to purchase Chinese goods at a lower cost than previously. Second, it would promote the division of labor worldwide to those best suited to perform each task. Therefore, China would specialize itself in labor-intensive goods while the United States focused its efforts on more capital-intensive projects. Third, it is recognized that the promotion of economic interdependence (through U.S. acceptance of China into the WTO as a full member) is the only method by which the United States can successfully promote its political interests abroad. If certain policymakers are effective in their pursuit to link trade negotiations to moral or and/or political goals, the possibilities for future Sino-American cooperation become slim. The United States cannot expect to impose democracy as a precondition to a bilateral/multilateral trade agreement. Rather, authors such as Smith, Hume, and Steuart demonstrate to us that such changes must be allowed to occur within the natural progress of the country's development. It will not and can’t occur overnight.

Moreover, by not pursuing a policy of engagement with China we would be placing ourselves into a lose-lose situation. One, the United States would forfeit the opportunity to expand the sale of goods into the largest potential single market in the world- allowing Europe and Asia to satisfy the needs of the growing Chinese economy. Second, by denying NTR status to China we are risking the chance of alienating China. In turn, the resulting containment that is sure to ensue could have drastic consequences for the United States. Professor Joseph Nye Jr., dean of Harvard University's John F. Kennedy School of Government, sharply criticized a containment of China. In his article, "The Case Against Containment: Treat China Like an Enemy and That's What It Will Be", he states:

"If we treat China as an enemy now, we are guaranteeing ourselves an enemy, particularly given the fact that nationalism is rapidly replacing communism as the dominant ideology among the Chinese people. No one knows for certain what China's future will be, but it makes no sense to throw away the more benign possibilities at this point. Containment is likely to be irreversible, while engagement can be reversed if China changes for the worse" (Nye, 1998)

We should not allow political maneuvers to overshadow what is most prudent for the United States. In judging China, policymakers should keep in mind that the history of our own country has been wrought with atrocities, which have marked our development from an agrarian based economy into one based on industry and technology. Before allowing American exceptionalism to rule our decisionmaking, we must take into consideration the feasibility of our objectives. U.S.-Chinese relations are a work in progress, and can only be improved through the conscientious application of economic policies that serve to tie the two countries together while respecting their particular differences.

 Bibliography

Bernstein, Richard and Ross H. Munro. 1997. "The Coming Conflict with America" Foreign Affairs Volume 76 Issue 2, pages 18-32.

Buchanan, Patrick. 1998. How Adam Smith Would Handle China. 28 October 1999. McLean, Virginia: The American Cause. < http://www.theamericancause.org/pjb-98-0724.html>

Clinton, William J., 1997. A National Security Strategy for a New Century. Washington: National Security Council

Dorn, James. 1997. China: Risky…or Worthy WTO Bid?. 2 November 1999. Washington: Center for Trade Policy Studies. <http://www.freetrade.org/pubs/articles/jd-7-26-99.html>

Hamilton, Lee H., 1997. United States-China Relations: The Case for Engagement. 26 October 1999. Congressional Record. Washington: Congressional Research Service.

<http://www.fas.org/spp/starwars/congress/1997/h970616h.htm>

Nye, Joseph S., 1998. "The Case Against Containment: Treat China Like An Enemy and That's What It Will Be". 14 October 1999. Project of MSNBC and New York University Center for War, Peace and the News Media. The Challenge of China. New York: New York University Press. < http://www.nyu.edu/globalbeat/asia/china/06221998nye.html>

O'Quinn, Robert P. 1997. Beyond the MFN Debate: A Comprehensive Trade Strategy Toward China. 28 October 1999. Washington: The Heritage Foundation. <http://www.heritage.org/library/categories/forpol/asc148.html#1>

Pregelj, Vladimir N. 1996. 92094:Most- Favored- Nation Status of the People's Republic of China. 6 November 1999. CRS Issue Brief. Washington: Congressional Research Service. <http://www.fas.org/man/crs/92-094.htm>

Rosen, Daniel H. 1999. China and the World Trade Organization: An Economic Balance Sheet. 1 November 1999. Washington: Institute for International Economics. <http://www.iie.com/NEWSLETR/news99-6.htm>

Shinn, James, ed. 1996. Weaving the Net: Conditional Engagement with China. New York: The Council of Foreign Relations.

Smith, Adam. 1776. "An Inquiry Into the Causes of the Wealth of Nations". In R.H. Campbell and A.S. Skinner, eds. 1981. An Inquiry Into the Causes of the Wealth of Nations. Indianapolis, Indiana: The Liberty Fund.