The Hero's Journey in World
Politics
Political Communities and the Hero's Journey
The hero's journey is a process of self-discovery. This
journey takes the hero from being a restless and troubled individual to
a self-actualized being empowered to transform his/her social and political
environment. The key to this transformation in the hero's journey are three
archetypal encounters 'slaying the dragon', the 'sacred marriage', and
'atonement'. The archetypal encounters happen in a cyclical pattern
due to some critical event that leads to a loss of memory of what has been
earlier gained. This makes it necessary to begin once again the hero's
journey. The four steps of the hero's journey - 'call to adventure', 'great
remembering', 'return to society', and the 'deep forgetting' - are repeated
again and again as the hero moves ever closer towards a deeper understanding
and expression of the archetypal encounters at the heart of the journey.
The challenge in understanding the relevance of the hero's journey for
world politics is to explore whether it applies to political communities
as well as for individuals.
The central character of the hero's journey is clearly
the individual who makes the decisions necessary for transforming his/her
self-consciousness as a result of archetypal encounters. The hero is a
self-conscious entity capable of making moral choices, and making these
choices a basis for his/her self-identity. For example, as children we
repeatedly were told injunctions in the form of "good boys/girls don't
..." This made it possible for us to make a moral choice each time we did
something. We therefore were able to develop a sense of self-identity based
on what we believed to be right or wrong, good or bad. In world politics,
the hero archetype corresponds to political communities that are self-conscious
and autonomous. Such communities can make the moral choices they take the
basis for establishing their self-identity. Political communities at the
international level have similar transformative potential for their 'self-consciousness'
as that for the individual hero. If the hero's journey is a process of
self-discovery, what sort of political communities can take this journey?
Candidates for a self-discovery process, or hero's journey,
at the international level can be any political community ranging in size
from a tribal group up to nation state. Such communities have the necessary
self-consciousness to make moral choices. These choices then become the
basis of their self-identity as symbolized in constitutions, flags, or
emblems used by all political communities. All of these symbols illustrate
the positive qualities of the political community and what it hopes to
achieve. Nation states have been the traditional focus in the study of
world politics, and still remain central players in the international system
due to a combination of military, political and economic resources at their
disposal. States therefore are the most important place to begin examining
the idea of a political community undergoing a hero's journey.
Some of the main characteristics of nation-states now
can be described so as to show how the hero's journey applies to them.
A well respected international relations theorist, Hedley Bull, defines
states to be "independent political communities, each of which possesses
a government and asserts sovereignty in relation to a particular portion
of the earth's surface and a particular segment of the human population."
(1) He lists four characteristics of states: first, "they are
territorially based"; second, they comprise people within that territory;
third, "some of the people of a state are designated as its official representatives,
as constituting its government"; and fourth, they each refer to themselves
as sovereign. (2)
As far as the last characteristic is concerned, there
is a difference between 'internal' and 'external sovereignty'. Bull argues
that internal sovereignty "means supremacy over all other authorities within
that territory and population" while external sovereignty means "not supremacy
but independence of outside authorities." (3)
The power of a state to organize its population and use its territorial
resources free from external influence is the best indicator of its sovereignty.
According to Bull, a "political community which merely claims a right to
sovereignty ... but cannot assert this right in practice, is not a state
properly so-called." (4) States such as
Lebanon whose institutions do not have complete control due to external
interference, i.e., Syria - have only a limited degree of sovereignty in
both the internal and external senses. In the globalization process a state's
power to counter external influence is being eroded especially in the financial
sphere. The Asian financial crisis in 1998 prompted the intervention of
the International Monetary Fund in many countries that were forced to implement
unpopular austerity measures. This brought pressure to bear on all governments
responding to the crisis but nowhere more so than in Indonesia where, in
a remarkable development in May, the long-standing leader President Suharto
was forced to resign. This is evidence that the sovereignty of the modern
state is very much being gradually eroded by global economic processes.
The modern state has a range of political institutions
responsible for developing domestic and foreign policy. The policy making
process involves a complex relationship between executive and legislative
branches of government, competing bureaucratic departments and other governmental
actors, and finally citizen groups. (5)
What remains at the center of this complex policy making process is the
concept of national interest. (6) Hans Morgenthau,
the most important international relations theorist to promote the idea
of national interest, wrote:
Without such a concept [interest defined as power, i.e.,
the national interest] a theory of politics, international or domestic,
would be altogether impossible, for without it we could not distinguish
between political and nonpolitical facts, nor could we bring at least a
measure of systematic order to the political sphere.... The concept of
interest defined as power ... infuses rational order into the subject matter
of politics, and thus makes the theoretical understanding of politics possible
(7)
The concept
of national interest gives us the key to unlocking the door to national
self-consciousness. National self-consciousness reflects a consensus by
actors involved in the policy making process that they wish to promote
the national interest of the state. The common aim to promote the
national interest is what is shared by all involved in the policy making
process. Political leaders, Morgenthau wrote, "think and act in terms of
interest defined as power, and the evidence of history bears that assumption
out." (8)
One 19th Century German author argued that "No state has every entered
a treaty for any other reason than self interest ... [and adds] A statesman
who has any other motive would deserve to be hung."
(9) A British contemporary rejoined, "where British interests
are at stake, I am in favor of advancing these interests even at the cost
of war. The only qualification I admit is that the country we desire to
annex or take under our protection should be calculated to confer a tangible
advantage upon the British Empire." (10)
A primitive organism will seek to satisfy its vital needs and therefore can be seen as a form of consciousness. Even microscopic organisms such as single cells display a level of consciousness. So too the modern state can be said to have a degree of self-consciousness insofar as it is a political community seeking to promote its national interest. According to the great Indian philosopher, Sri Aurobindo, the recognition and promotion of self-interest is the key to recognizing the self-consciousness of states:
The primal
law and purpose of the individual life is to seek its own self-development.
Consciously or half-consciously or with an obscure unconscious groping
it strives always and rightly strives at self-formulation ... In the same
way the primal law and purpose of a society, community or nation is to
seek its own self-fulfilment; it strives rightly to find itself, to become
aware within itself of the law and power of its own being and to fulfil
it as perfectly as possible, to realize all its potentialities, to live
its own self-revealing life. (11)
For Hans Morgenthau,
the recognition and promotion of national interest leads to the 'struggle
for power' becoming a fundamental principle of international relations.
(12) Others
such as Stephen Walt describe this power struggle as "an innate desire
to dominate others." (13) Power politics
is therefore nothing other than states pursuing their national interest
in a competitive international system where nothing less than national
survival is at stake.
States as Moral Actors
The political
theorist most famous for developing the notion that states have a degree
of self-consciousness that gives them a moral dimension is the early Nineteenth
Century German philosopher, Georg Hegel. (14)
He writes:
The actual
state is animated by this spirit [of the people] in all its particular
affairs, wards, institutions, etc. This spiritual content is something
definite, firm, solid, completely exempt from caprice, the particularities,
the whims of individuality, of chance.... The state does not exist for
the citizens; on the contrary, one could say that the state is the
end and they are its means. But the means-end relation is not fitting here.
For the state is not the abstract confronting the citizens; they are parts
of it, like members of an organic body, where no member is end and none
is means. (15)
Hegel is suggesting
here that individuals relate to the state in the same way that blood cells
relate to a healthy and functioning human. The state is therefore not a
lifeless abstraction, but a living conscious entity comprised of individuals
who share in the 'spirit' or morality of the state.
A similar idea
was proposed by Sri Aurobindo:
The nation
or society, like the individual, has a body, an organic life, a moral and
aesthetic temperament, a developing mind and a Soul ... [I]t is a group
Soul that, once having attained a separate distinctness, must then become
more and more self-conscious and find itself more and more fully as it
develops its corporate action and mentality and its organic self-expressive
life. (16)
The Nineteenth
Century British theorist, T.H. Green, also argued that states have a moral
dimension:
The doctrine
that the rights of government are founded on the consent of the governed
is a confused way of stating the truth, that the institutions by which
man is moralized, by which he comes to do what he sees that he must, as
distinct from what he would like, express a conception of a common good;
that through them that conception takes form and reality; and that it is
in turn through its presence in the individual that they have a constraining
power over him... (17)
Green wrote
at a time when many called for state action to deal with social problems
caused by the Industrial R. He responded to the dominant view in England
that states need to have firm limits on their ability to tax and implement
moral social policies on their citizens. Green believed that the best way
of addressing social problems was through moral policy-making at the state
level rather than individual morality through charity and philanthropy.
Writing in
Prussia at a similar time, Hegel found it much easier to argue the case
for firm state action to address social problems. In fact, Hegel's view
of the state as a self-conscious political community that recognizes its
own moral development was embraced enthusiastically by the political leaders
of the Prussian state. Prussia was the first to establish a comprehensive
social welfare system, and the first to grant universal franchise to all
its male citizens. With Prussia providing a solid example, Hegel's view
of the moral qualities of the state seemed to have no limit. He wrote:
All the
value man has, all spiritual reality, he has only through the state [my
emphasis]. For his spiritual reality is the knowing presence to
him of his own essence, of rationality, of its objective, immediate actuality
present in and for him. Only thus is he truly a consciousness, only thus
does he partake in morality, in the legal and moral life of the state....
The state is the divine Idea as it exists on earth
(18)
Hegel here
argues that individual morality should be subordinated to the morality
of the state. This makes possible the mistaken belief that state authorities
are correct in establishing a mold of the 'ideal citizen' that can be used
as a measure for individual behavior and morality. State authorities
therefore can use all their resources in forcing conformity to the notion
of the citizen that would best serve the interest of the state. This made
Hegel the intellectual godfather of the Prussian state that promoted an
aristocratic militarist culture that later imposed its model of citizenship
on the princely states that joined the unified German Empire.
The above attempt
to subordinate individual morality to state morality also was attempted
by totalitarian states in the Twentieth Century. This belief led to incredible
misery and destruction in different parts of the planet. What Vladimir
Lenin, Joseph Stalin, Adolf Hitler and Mao Tse Tung, all had in common
was the idea that individual identity should be cast from a mold created
by the state which could impose the desired moral consciousness on its
citizens. For Hitler, the mold was defined in terms of the Aryan ideal:
In this world,
human culture and civilization are inseparably bound up with the existence
of the Aryan. His dying off or his decline would again lower upon this
earth the dark veils of a time without culture. The undermining of the
existence of human culture by destroying its supporters (e.g. Aryans) appears
as the most execrable crime. (19)
A similar effort
had been attempted by Stalin where there was an effort to create a 'new
human being' unique to Soviet society. This 'new human being' was described
by one Soviet commentator as follows: "[T]he `Soviet man' (Sovetskiy
chelovek) will emerge with a `Soviet', `international', `proletarian'
supranational consciousness. National differences will disappear, national
cultures will survive only as folklore. All Soviet citizens will have ...
`the Weltanschauung of the Petrograd worker'." (20)
Suppressing different cultural and ethnic groups so as to promote one distinct
Soviet identity led to a profound instability in the Soviet Union. This
made it impossible for the Soviet state to survive the centrifugal forces
of nationalism once Mikhail Gorbachev began implementing his reformist
policies in 1985 that effectively ended the forced imposition of a collective
Soviet identity. (21) Whether the identity
mold was a Sovetskiy chelovek, the Aryan man or its equivalent in
another totalitarian system, the underlying idea of imposing a set of state
determined moral norms on all citizens, and repressing cultural and ethnic
differences, was the same.
The fundamental
flaw in Hegel's analysis of the state as the proper starting point for
developing moral codes for society has led to his views being either ignored
or strongly condemned. But this too is a mistake. Hegel exaggerated the
role of the state as a superior moral actor to individuals. However, he
was correct to point out that the state has a degree of self-consciousness
that makes it an autonomous actor that builds its self-identity on the
moral policy choices it takes. Put more simply, Hegel is correct in describing
the state as an evolving moral actor that is self-conscious of its morality
and willing to promote its moral norms both within and outside the state.
Such a view is strongly challenged by two sets of thinkers. I will examine
each of these sets of criticisms in order to determine where states have
the necessary degree of morality to undergo a hero's journey.
Realist Critics of the idea of Moral States
Realists are
commentators of world politics that argue that states are at their core
motivated by the pursuit of power and promoting their national interests.
A 'realist critic' of the idea that states are moral actors is Reinhold
Niebhur who believes that morality should be expected only of individuals
and not of states. In his most celebrated work, Moral Man and Immoral
Society,
Niebhur wrote in his introduction the following:
Individual
men may be moral in the sense that they are able to consider interests
other than their own in determining problems of conduct, and are capable,
on occasion, of preferring the advantages of others to their own. They
are endowed by nature with a measure of sympathy and consideration for
their kind, the breadth of which may be extended by an astute social pedagogy.
Their rational faculty prompts them to a sense of justice which educational
discipline may refine and purge of egoistic elements until their own interests
are involved, with a fair measure of objectivity. But all these achievements
are more difficult, if not impossible, for human societies and social groups.
In every human group there is less reason to guide and to check impulse,
less capacity for self-transcendence, less ability to comprehend the needs
of others and therefore more unrestrained egoism than the individuals,
who compose the group, reveal in their personal relationship.
(22)
Niebhur is
here suggesting, in agreement with Hegel, that states, like individuals,
have a degree of self-consciousness or 'egoism'. However, he disagrees
profoundly that a state's self-consciousness is capable of pursuing moral
norms in any way similar to individuals. Essentially, the larger the human
group, the less likely can it be expected to behave in a moral way similar
to individuals. To illustrate his belief of how states don't behave morally;
and, in fact, cynically manipulate morality, Neibhur writes:
The Italian
statesman, Count Sforza, has recently paid a witty and deserved tribute
to the British art in politics. They have, he declares, "a precious gift
bestowed by divine grace upon the British people: the simultaneous action
in those islands, when a great British interest is at stake, of statesmen
and diplomats coolly working to obtain some concrete political advantage
and on the other side, and without previous base secret understanding,
clergymen and writes eloquently busy showing the highest moral reasons
for supporting the diplomatic action which is going on in Downing Street.
Such was the case in the Belgian Congo. Belgian rule had been in force
there for years; but at a certain moment gold was discovered in the Katanga,
the Congolese province nearest to the British South African possessions;
and the bishops and other pious persons started at once a violent press
campaign to stigmatize the Belgian atrocities against the Negroes. What
is astonishing and really imperial is that those bishops and other pious
persons were inspired by the most perfect Christian good faith, and that
nobody was pulling the wires behind them. (23)
Niebhur in
the above passage implies it is hypocrisy that drove Imperial British policy.
The implication is that moral concerns merely mask the selfish national
interests of states. Other 'realist' writers on world politics such as
Hans Morgenthau and Henry Kissinger, similarly agree that states are intrinsically
driven by power interests. They thereby elevate amoral political calculations
into the realm of prudent statecraft and they criticize moral principles
as impractical and naive. (24) Agreeing
with this approach, Kenneth Waltz wrote the following in the conclusion
to his famous, Man, The State and War:
Each state
pursues its own interests, however, defined, in ways it judges best. Force
is a means of achieving the external ends of states because there exists
no consistent, reliable process of reconciling the conflicts of interest
that inevitably arise among similar units in a condition of anarchy. A
foreign policy based on this image of international relations is neither
moral nor immoral, but embodies merely a reasoned response to the world
about us [emphasis added]. (25)
What critics
of the idea of states as moral actors overlook is that morality is not
always a mask for deep national interests based on power. While many holding
the levers of the policy making process operate under shrewdly calculated
power principles, others may be more in tune with the moral impulses that
tug at the heart strings of the educated population. History is full of
debates between statesman desiring to bring the ship of state closer to
their preferred island of national interest or moral rectitude. For every
calculating Prince von Metternich there is the idealist Tsar Alexander;
for every saber rattling Otto van Bismark there is a cooperative William
Gladstone; for every pragmatic Theodore Roosevelt there is a visionary
Woodrow Wilson.
The 19th Century
movement against slavery shows how a clear humanitarian concern gradually
displaced a state practice that was earlier seen as sanctified by the God
and a permanent testimony to the fallen nature of humanity. Similarly,
the Treaty of Versailles that gave self-rule to many former colonial territories
was an imperfect compromise between the altruistic Woodrow Wilson's support
for self-determination and the European victors that were more intent on
divvying up the spoils of the German, Austro-Hungarian and Ottoman Empires.
While it would be foolish to say states do not act out of self-interest,
it would be similarly foolhardy to say that states cannot rise above their
immediate self-interest or 'national egoism'. States can and do often pursue
a policy based on moral principles. A more powerful set of arguments of
the idea that states are moral is posed by liberal thinkers.
Liberal Critics of the idea of the Moral State
The growth
in liberal thought in 17th Century England urged limits to the
power of the state over its citizens. The underlying idea was that states,
in the personage of a monarch, had grown too powerful and would tyrannize
their citizens if not curbed. In simple terms, the ability of states to
adopt amoral policies at the expense of their citizens had to be curbed.
The political theorist who went further than any other in arguing for
firm constraints on the power of states was John Locke. He urged that the
state had a duty to protect the natural rights of its citizens. At the
same time, however, there needed to be limits to the powers of the state:
But though
men when they enter into society give up the equality, liberty and executive
power they had in the state of nature into the hands of the society, to
be so far disposed of by the legislative as the good of the society shall
require; yet it being only with an intention in every one the better preserve
himself, his liberty and property (for no rational creature can be supposed
to change his condition with an intention to be worse), the power of the
society, or legislative constituted by them, can never be supposed to extend
farther than the common good, but is obliged to secure every one's property
by providing against those three defects above-mentioned that made the
state of nature so unsafe and uneasy. (26)
The 'natural
rights' that are the anchor of Locke's thinking were life, liberty and
property. He argued that these rights were the basis of an imaginary 'social
contract' between the state and its citizens. When state leaders infringed
the 'natural rights' of its citizens, revolution was not only justified
but obligatory:
This I am sure,
whoever, either ruler or subject, by force goes about to invade the rights
of either prince or people, and lays the foundation for overturning the
constitution and frame of any just government, he is guilty of the greatest
crime I think a man is capable of, being to answer for all those mischiefs
of blood, rapine, and desolation, which the breaking to pieces of governments
brings on a country. And he who does it is justly to be esteemed the common
enemy and pest of mankind, and is to be treated accordingly.
Whosever
uses force without rights as everyone does in society who does it without
law, puts himself into a state of war with those against whom he so uses
it, and in that state all former ties are canceled, all other rights cease,
and everyone has a right to defend himself and to resist the aggressor
... [emphasis added] (27)
Locke's writings
have given birth to a powerful distinction between 'civil society' and
'state'. The state's potential for violence, repression, power politics
and subordination of moral considerations, leads to the need for firm constraints
on the state. On the other hand, civil society - e.g., trade unions, professional
associations; employer associations; and religious organizations - is the
bastion of moral concerns that plays a restraining role on the potential
excesses of the state. Put simply, a consequence of Locke's writings is
the idea of co-existence between an 'immoral state' and a 'moral civil
society'. Civil society needs a strong state in order to protect it, and
the state needs a strong civil society in order to curb it.
A number of
recent writers have described the different functions of the state and
civil society, and how the two ought interact. Beverly Woodward for example
argues that the functions of civil society include: "to create a sphere
of autonomous social activity, to campaign and agitate in behalf of political
and social objectives, to provide a counterweight to governmental power,
and to oppose the illegitimate exercise of governmental power."
(28) Authors such as Philip Smith have commented on the "civilizing
process" played by civil society in its dealings with the state that would
otherwise be tempted to use repression on its own citizens or on other
states. (29) The implication is that when
a clear separation exists between the state and civil society, the conditions
are present for a strong civil society to fulfill its "civilizing process".
When state and civil society are combined it is argued that this poses
a dangerous anti-democratic development. For example, in response to the
claim that "civil society in power" is where "the good men in power have
formed the republic of virtuous men," Woodward objects as follows:
[T]he claim
"civil society is in power" obliterates the distinction between society
and government; that the identification of government and civil society
eliminates, in theory at least, the basis for opposition to governmental
power; that the virtue of individuals is equated (wrongly) with governmental
power; that this presumption of virtue makes governmental power holders
intolerant of opposition and insensitive to the needs and claims of societal
interest groups. (30)
Woodward here
argues that the exercise of power is a corrupting influence and that civil
society should therefore remain clearly separate from the state.
Woodward's,
Smith's and others' preference for a clear separation between state and
civil society supports descriptions of the state as a set of amoral political
institutions that are power driven. In this view, the state must be necessarily
restrained by elements of civil society if moral policies are to be incorporated
into the policy making process. Such a view, however, overlooks that the
separation between state and civil society is difficult to prove in practice.
Numerous relationships and influences occur between political institutions
(the state) and social institutions (civil society). This was the case
for Locke's Seventeenth Century England and even more so in the Twentieth
Century with modern democratic states.
The growth
in democracies is an undisputed feature of the Twentieth Century. Indeed,
so rapid has been the growth of democratic states that Francis Fukuyama
sees democracy in his famous "End of History" article as the final stop
on a historic journey:
What we may
be witnessing is not just the end of the Cold War, or the passing of a
particular period of postwar history, but the end of history as such: that
is, the end point of mankind's ideological evolution and the universalization
of Western liberal democracy as the final form of human government ...
The state that emerges at the end of history is liberal insofar as it recognizes
and protects through a system of law man's universal right to freedom,
and democratic insofar as it exists only with the consent of the governed.
(31)
An important
aspect of the democratic form of governance is the wide ranging web of
influences, interdependencies and connections between governmental and
non-governmental sectors of society. In fact, any clear distinction between
civil society and the state becomes difficult to sustain in modern democratic
states. Forces of globalization are making it even more difficult to maintain
the distinction and separation between civil society and state due to the
phenomenal growth in the number of transnational corporations. The US Congress,
for example, is strongly influenced by powerful lobby groups that represent
civil society. These groups influence how Congress formulates and implements
legislation by either making direct financial contributions, or by threatening
a representative's reelection prospects by lobbying against him/her. The
difficulty experienced by the Clinton administration over campaign contributions
to the 1998 Congressional elections, is one example of the power of lobby
groups in the US Congress. In practice then, rather than there being
a clear separation between state and civil society, there is an intertwined
relationship between them. This makes any distinction between an amoral
state and moral civil society, especially in the case of modern democratic
states, very difficult if not impossible to establish.
A result of
the intertwined relationship between state and civil society means that
the state cannot be seen simply as an amoral set of political institutions.
The state represents the focal point of the goals, values and beliefs of
civil society. Rather than there being a clear distinction between state
and civil society, an organic metaphor is more appropriate. In this metaphor,
the state is the head, arms and feet of the body, while civil society provides
the heart and other vital organs. A result of this organic relationship
is that the state can be expected to incorporate a moral element as a consistent
feature of its policy making. I can now return to Hegel's insight that
states are self-consciousness political entities that are evolving in the
moral dimension. One can now conclude that morality can be introduced as
an important basis in the motivation and behavior of a state. Consequently,
the self-consciousness and morality of states is important for understanding
world politics. As a result, states have the necessary degree of self-consciousness,
autonomous decision making and morality required for embarking on a hero's
journey.
States and the Hero's Journey
If states can
embark on the Hero's journey, then the various steps of the hero's journey
may be examined in the context of states rather than individuals. These
steps were earlier described in terms relevant to individuals. Now, they
must be described in terms that make sense when applied to states. To illustrate
these steps, it will be useful to refer to various events in American history.
Indeed, in subsequent chapters I will argue that America forms an exemplary
case of a state undergoing a hero's journey, and is currently in its seventh
journey.
The Call to Adventure
The first step
in the hero's journey is a rejection of the value system promoted by the
community. In psychoanalytical terms, this is a recognition of the fragmentary
nature of the human ego and the dissatisfaction that results. This leads
to the need to discover a new basis of identity. The first step for states,
then, is a rejection of the dominant value system found in the international
state system due to a dissatisfaction with the morality of these values.
Such a rejection for states would make possible the discovery or consolidation
of a new set of moral principles not at the time possible for the international
system. As explained in the first chapter, there are three phases in the
first step of the 'Call to Adventure' in the hero's journey: 'hearing the
call'; 'refusal of the call'; and 'crossing the first threshold'.
'Hearing the
call' for a state means a rejection of the dominant moral values upon which
the international system is based. It means the start of a new attempt
at establishing moral principles for guiding national policies and for
influencing the policies of other states in the international system. In
this phase, those controlling the policy making process would be 'idealist'
in orientation and very critical of the dominant way in which in the international
system operates. For example, after its independence in 1776, America took
a foreign policy approach based on a fundamental difference between the
new Republic and European states. The latter practiced power politics at
the expense of indigenous populations around the world. There was an implicit
belief that as a political community, America was morally superior to the
imperialist European states engaged in amoral power politics. America was
therefore bound to take a foreign policy approach that would be based firmly
on sound moral principles. In this regard Henry Kissinger writes: "American
leaders rejected the European idea that the morality of states should be
judged by different criteria than the morality of individuals."
(32)
The 'refusal
of the call to adventure' is the belief that there is no moral difference
between one's own state and the international system. In this phase of
the journey, policy makers take a more 'realist perspective' that all states
mask their national interests in the guise of good moral principles. In
this sense, morality should not be used as a basis for organizing national
policy. For example, after American independence there were therefore advocates
of America practicing power politics. Supporters of such a view could look
to the separation of powers in the American political system and argue
that preserving the balance of power in Europe was vital for American interests.
John Adams, America's second President, for example wrote:
There is a
Balance of Power in Europe... Nature has formed it. Practice and Habit
have confirmed it, and it must exist forever. It may be disturbed for a
time, by the accidental Removal of a Weight from one Scale to the other;
but there will be a continual Effort to restore the Equilibrium.... Congress
adopted these Principles and this System in its purity.
(33)
Others could
point out instead that there was nothing morally superior in America's
democratic system since history showed that republics could also be involved
in wars of conquest. As Alexander Hamilton wrote:
Sparta, Athens,
Rome, and Carthage were all republics; two of them Athens and Carthage,
of the commercial kind. Yet were they as often engaged in wars, offensive
and defensive, as the neighboring monarchies of the same times.... In the
government of Britain the representatives of the people compose one branch
of the national legislature. Commerce has been for ages the predominant
pursuit of that country. Few nations, nevertheless, have been more frequently
engaged in war... (34)
In sum, 'refusal
of the call to adventure' represents the belief that America is not all
that different from other nations and should not commit its vast resources
to ensuring a more moral framework for the conduct of world politics.
'Crossing of
the first threshold' represents crossing the Rubicon in which a state commits
itself to the moral principles it believes fundamental for the behavior
of states. This typically would occur by some tangible policy which cannot
be reversed. For example, soon after American independence, this was done
by America refusing to compromise its moral principles and engage in the
power politics that bedeviled the international system. America subsequently
withdrew from the international system and made this a sign that America
lived in a very different moral universe. As President Monroe declared:
"In the wars of the European powers in matters relating to themselves we
have never taken any part, nor does it comport with our policy so to do."
(35)
Great Remembering
The second
step of the Hero's journey, the 'great remembering' refers to the encounter
with the three archetypes most meaningful for the 'self-discovery' process:
the 'shadow'; the 'Mother'; and the 'Father'. In psychoanalytical terms,
these encounters lead respectively to recognition of the moral limitations
of the individual; integration of all aspects of the individual and self-empowerment;
and discovery of a new 'calling' or purpose in life. Similarly, the encounter
with these archetypes would enable a political community to achieve three
related things. The encounter with the shadow allows a community to adequately
deal with its own deficiencies. The key national motif here would be the
'war against some category of national enemy'. The encounter with the Mother
archetype leads to the community integrating all elements of its diverse
population and to renew its economic vitality. 'National unity' and 'renewal'
would be the key phrases here. Finally, the encounter with the Father archetype
leads to (re)discovery of the moral principles at the core of a community's
national identity. The key motif here is to be faithful to one's national
calling or mission.
As mentioned
earlier, encountering the shadow archetype suggests that an individual
deals with the negative or dark aspects of the self without projecting
these undesirable qualities onto others. In similar terms, states successfully
encounter the 'shadow' archetype when they deal with their negative attributes
in a way that does not allow them to project these onto other states or
political communities. A state then would be unlikely to project dichotomous
moral categories of good and evil respectively onto itself and to other
states or communities. 'Slaying the dragon', for states, is a policy making
process that avoids the creation of enemy images whereby another state
or community is dehumanized or depicted as the embodiment of evil. An example
of shadow projection for states and how 'slaying the dragon' occurred is
described by Corinne McLaughlin and Gordon Davidson:
A classic case
of shadow projection is found in the recent history of U.S.-Soviet relations.
Americans used to believe that it was the former Soviets who were aggressive,
expansive, and deceptive - never ourselves. Clearly they were the "bad
guys;" Conversely, the Soviets believed that we were the "bad guys" and
that they did nothing wrong. But, in fact, both countries are mirrors for
each other in certain ways.... This projection began lessening when President
Reagan, who had referred to the Soviet Union as the "evil empire," actually
went into "the heart of the beast" at Red Square and embraced his "shadow"
- projected onto Gorbachev - thereby helping to transform the collective
projection. (36)
'Slaying the
dragon', as occurred with Reagan's visit to Moscow and embrace of Mikhail
Gorbachev, is a process states undergo when political leaders, business
interests, or ordinary citizens, begin to humanize the other. This means
avoiding dichotomous moral values of good and evil, right and wrong, etc.,
in the way different communities understand and communicate with one another.
This means moving from a 'values based moral system', to a 'needs based
moral system' where each community's needs are recognized and respected.
This is not to suggest, however, that we can live in a world without opponents
since there is always likely to be antagonistic political forces and movements
in world politics. (37) The important thing
to do is to identify and acknowledge the truths, no matter how distorted
we feel them to be, that our political opponents are committed to in order
to humanize them. As Sam Keen has thoughtfully recommended, we must strive
to humanize our 'enemies' in order to unmask our own deficiencies and to
avoid excesses in dealing with the other side. (38)
The encounter
with the Mother archetype - the 'sacred marriage' - was described earlier
as unleashing psychological qualities that are necessary for empowering
the individual and achieving an integrated sense of identity. In similar
terms, the 'sacred marriage' for states corresponds to states being able
to integrate all its citizens and groups into one political community.
National unity is therefore an important part of this encounter. For example,
the rapid decolonization of states after the Second World War led to them
all emphasizing national unity. Nation building through the creation of
a set of political myths for the heroes of the independence struggle was
emphasized. However, these top-down approaches to national unity often
used coercion and have been failures. This suggests that there is something
more than simply emphasizing national unity that is the key to the sacred
marriage for states. A deeper form of unity than simply celebrating national
symbols is needed. Corinne McLaughlin and Gordon Davidson insightfully
write about what this deeper unity may mean for states:
Just as individuals
must struggle with the process of personality integration, bringing the
physical, emotional, and mental components of their personalities into
a coordinated, working whole, so too must a nation become an integrated
personality before it can successfully invoke its Soul.
(39)
Establishing
more integrated and 'connected' political communities is increasingly argued
to be an important paradigm shift in all disciplines. Robert Bush and Joseph
Folger, for example, argue that numerous writings reflect that we are moving
from an 'individualist worldview' based on individual autonomy and competition,
to a 'relational' worldview emphasizing mutual connectedness and cooperation:
Carol Gilligan's
work on moral theory and development stresses the equal importance of both
individuality and connectedness in human consciousness and the resulting
capacity for integrating strength of self with concern for other.... In
the work of contemporary thinkers such as [Gilligan] ... the shape of the
Relational worldview is emerging. Moreover, most of these thinkers are
quite explicit about the fact that their ideas are meant to express a new
worldview that contrasts with the Individualist outlook. Indeed, almost
all of these "relational" writers explicitly criticize the Individualist
worldview, usually in quite similar terms. The fact that elements of this
worldview are being expressed similarly, across such a range of fields,
signals the beginning of another paradigm shift, form the Individualist
to the Relational worldview. (40)
Encountering
the 'sacred marriage' means the establishment of political communities
that are more 'interconnected' and integrated. Tangible benefits of the
'sacred marriage' are that states can more effectively use the territory
and resources over which they have sovereign control. The state could therefore
reap a rich harvest, in the sense of goods and services, necessary for
the prosperity and well being of the entire political community. The productivity
of the land and the entrepreneurial efforts of the population thus become
benefits attributed to the archetypal encounter of the 'sacred marriage'.
These benefits, made possible by the state integrating its citizenry and
faithfully using the resources made available to it, lead to the empowerment
of the state.
In sum, the
'sacred marriage' signifies a transition within a state's self-consciousness
in which a greater degree of interconnectedness and integration occurs
between the population. The 'sacred marriage' is leads to a very deep sense
of national unity that allows the state to enjoy its material prosperity
or to continue its hero's journey. The Buddha could choose to immerse himself
in nirvana (immersion in the sacred marriage) or become a world teacher
(atonement). So too states can immerse themselves in the fruit of their
endeavors (materialism) or begin a hero's quest to change the international
system.
Encountering
the Father archetype suggests a transition in national self-consciousness
so that a state identifies its place in history and its 'calling' in the
global community. This can be done by turning to those expressions of a
national identity - constitutions, emblems, flags, literature and songs
- that illustrate the aspirations of those who founded the state. This
step of the hero's journey means discovering the national ideals embodied
in the clearest expressions of national identity, and trying to achieve
them. The ultimate task of any political community, according to Hegel,
was achieving its highest ideals. When this is realized, the state has
achieved what he believes to be national self-consciousness. Hegel writes
that world history is an unfolding process of the 'Spirit' realizing itself
through individuals, peoples and states, where Spirit achieves higher and
higher degrees of self-consciousness:
We have already
seen what the final purpose of this process is. The principles of the national
spirits progressing through a necessary succession of stages are only moments
of the one universal Spirit which through them elevates and completes itself
into a self-comprehending totality.... This implies that the present stage
of Spirit contains all previous stages within itself. These, to be sure,
have unfolded themselves successively and separately, but Spirit still
is what it has in itself always been. The differentiation of its stages
is but the development of what it is in itself.... The moments which Spirit
seems to have left behind, it still possesses in the depth of its present.
(41)
Hegel here
argues that states are self-conscious actors that can become aware of a
historical process in which they play a primary role. This self-awareness
gives a state a place in 'world history'. For states such as colonial India,
Hegel believes that despite India's profound literary and religious output
over millennia, "it has no history". (42)
He believes this was due to the absence of a political community in India
that achieved self-consciousness. Achieving self-consciousness and recognizing
their role in an unfolding historical process is therefore fundamental
for a state and its citizenry. The recognition of a historical process
and one's relationship to this process, for Hegel, stands as the basis
for all morality.
The deeds of
great men who are individuals of world history thus appear justified not
only in their intrinsic, unconscious significance but also from the point
of view of world history. It is irrelevant and inappropriate from that
point of view to raise moral claims against world-historical acts and agents.
They stand outside of morality. (43)
Atonement corresponds
to the discovery that global events and processes are steps in an unfolding
historical purpose. The state's awareness of its role in this historical
drama is its 'calling'. Fulfilling this 'calling' is how the state achieves
atonement with the Father archetype. History is therefore purposive, and
states can achieve a degree of self-consciousness that makes them autonomous
moral agents in an unfolding historical drama.
In the individual
hero's journey, atonement came about when the individual left behind the
selfish desires of his/her personal consciousness and adopted a calling
that would transform the community in which he/she lived. For a state,
atonement comes by leaving behind its limited national-interest. Instead,
the state sets out to achieve a set of interests defined in terms of its
'national calling' or 'national mission' as embodied in different expressions
of the political community's ideals. The result is a transformation of
the international system. In Hegelian terms, 'atonement' represents a state
recognizing itself as a "self-comprehending totality."
(44) Atonement for states, then, comes about when the 'national
interest' is firmly understood in terms of the 'global interest' (Hegel's
'totality'). This broadened self-interest then becomes part of the national
self-consciousness and the fundamental basis of the policy making process.
The Return to International Society
The third step
in the hero's journey is a return to one's community with a new identity
and value system, and desiring to establish one's values in the community.
As explained earlier, there are three phases in the third step of the Return,
'refusal of the call'; 'crossing the return threshold'; and 'master of
the two worlds'. In psychoanalytical terms, the Return corresponds to sharing
the wisdom achieved through the 'great remembering' with the wider community.
The third step for states, then, is a return to the international state
system after periods of discovering a new set of moral principles upon
which to base foreign policy. The returning state has a mission to promote
a set of moral principles that finally has become possible for the behavior
of states in the international system.
In psychoanalytical
terms, 'refusal of the return' means a reluctance to leave the elevated
state of consciousness reached in the journey of self-discovery, and to
reenter the normal waking consciousness. For states, this would correspond
to the belief that one's own value system is superior to that of other
states, and that it is almost impossible to change the international system
for the present moment. For example, after the First World War, many American's
despaired of reforming the international system after the harsh peace imposed
on Germany in the Treaty of Versailles. The US Senate refused to ratify
the Treaty and to join the League of Nations. The refusal to join the League
of Nations corresponded to Campbell's 'Refusal of the Return' in which
America signaled that despite its formidable resources and clear interest
in maintaining peace and order in the European continent, it would not
participate in an international system corrupted by principles of power
politics. America would not compromise its belief that the international
system had to be based on sound moral principles before America would fully
commit itself to the cause of international peace and order.
Crossing the
return threshold means for individuals that one is willing to give up remaining
immersed in an elevated state of consciousness (the sacred marriage), and
return to ordinary waking consciousness in order to realize one's calling
(atonement). For states, this means making a irreversible commitment
to reforming the international system. For example after the Second World
War, America took up the mantle of undisputed leadership among the Western
democracies. This was due to the material devastation of continental Europe;
economic exhaustion of the imperial powers, Britain and France, and the
ensuing task of decolonization; and the threat cast by the Soviet Union.
America was ready to take up its national calling and demonstrate its atonement
with the Father archetype. In doing so, America would cross the threshold
of no return and commit itself to fulfilling the Wilsonian vision of a
universal peace based on liberty, democratic political institutions, and
a global association of nations - the United Nations.
'Master of
the Two Worlds' means an individual has integrated the elevated state of
consciousness and normal waking consciousness in a way that empowers and
gives purpose to the Self. For states, this achieves a harmony between
the moral principles at the base of national identity, and the political,
economic and military resources that a state possesses. In short, being
master of the two worlds means fusing power and morality in a 'grand synthesis'.
For example, in acting to protect the rights of ethnic minorities through
a mix of diplomatic and economic resources at the end of this century,
America has become Master of the Two Worlds. America has channeled its
vast resources to a set of political principles that represent a higher
moral truth - liberty.
The Deep Forgetting
The fourth
step of the hero's journey is to forget the sense of identity gained as
a result of the archetypal encounters of 'slaying the dragon', the 'sacred
marriage', and 'atonement'. Just as individuals undergo three types of
a 'great forgetting' so too do states undergo a national parallel of 'fear',
'pursuit of power' and 'materialism'.
The national
parallel for 'fear' is the state become preoccupied with the security threat,
diplomatic consequences, and/or economic costs of pursuing a moral foreign
policy. Any benefits from pursuing a moral foreign policy are overshadowed
by the dangers of such a policy in the minds of key policy makers and leading
political figures in the broader public. The state consequently abandons
the grand synthesis achieved earlier in the return to international society.
The national
parallel for 'pursuit of power' is imperialism in which states feel free
to ignore more legitimate forms of international authority such as the
various organs of the United Nations. The transition from 'mastery of the
two worlds' to 'imperialism' is a real and slippery one. Confident that
they have fused the spheres of morality and politics, states in time come
to act as though the views of policy elites is all that matters. This may
seriously compromise international public opinion and the moral principles
that lie at the heart of America's identity. For example, America has come
under strong international criticism for acting in an imperialistic manner
by ignoring the will of the international community. On issues such as
creating an international criminal court, banning anti-personnel land-mines
and ratifying human rights treaties, American policy makers have been out
of step with the moral principles and views of the broader international
public opinion.
The parallel
for 'materialism' for states is excessive preoccupation with increases
in a state's gross national product is emphasized with little regard given
to distributing this in an equitable manner. For example, at the international
level, industrialized states don't do enough to change the iniquitous nature
of the international trade system. Europe and America insist on a high
wall of tariffs, subsidies and regulations for imported agricultural products,
but insist that such walls against manufactured and service products must
be eliminated. This unfortunately disadvantages developing countries that
rely on agricultural exports to pay for manufactured products and services
from developed countries.
In conclusion,
states are political communities that have the necessary degree of self-consciousness
and moral development necessary for embarking on a hero's journey. The
four steps of the hero's journey for individuals parallel the policies
states can take at the international level. All four steps are psycho-social
events and processes similar to the psychological processes undergone by
individuals. Just as an individual achieves self-transformation by undergoing
the hero's journey, so too states can undergo a transformative process
by experiencing archetypal encounters. To illustrate the hero's journey
for states, I now turn to an examination of the United States of America.
ENDNOTES
1. Bull, The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in World Politics (London: MacMillan, 1977) 8.
2. Alan James, Sovereign Statehood: The Basis of International Society (London: Allen & Unwin, 1986) 13-14.
4. The Anarchical Society, 8-9
5. For discussion of the foreign policy making process in the US see James A. Nathan & James K. Oliver, Foreign Policy Making and the American Political System, 2nd ed. (Boston: Little, Brown and Col., 1987) 1-20
6. Henry Kissinger discusses the development of the forerunner to this concept, the French notion of raison d'etat in Diplomacy 58-59.
7. Politics
Among Nations, 5th ed., rev (New York: Knopf, 1978) 5.
Politics
Among Nations, 5.
9. Quoted from Reinhold Niebhur, Moral
Man & Immoral Society (Charles Scribner's Sons, 1960) 84.
10. Quoted from Niebhur, Moral
Man & Immoral Society, 84.
11. The Human Cycle, The Ideal
of Human Unity, War and Self-Determination (Pondicherry, India: Sri
Aurobindo Trust, 1977) 29.
13. Foreign Policy (Spring
1998): 31
14. Indeed, Hegel goes further than
anybody else in elevating the position of the state. Cf., Dougherty and
Pfaltzgraff, Contending Theories of International Relations, 64.
15. Hegel, Reason in History: A
General Introduction to the Philosophy of History (new York: The Bobbs-Merrill
Company, [1837]1953) 52.
16. The Human Cycle, The Ideal
of Human Unity, War and Self-Determination (Pondicherry, India: Sri
Aurobindo Trust, 1977) 29.
17. T.H. Green, "Society as Positive
Freedom," The Development of the Democratic Idea (New York: Washington
Square Press, 1968) 412.
19. Quoted in Mosse, G.L., ed. Nazi
culture; Intellectual, cultural and social life in the Third Reich (New
York: Schocken Books, 1966) 6.
20. Bennigsen and Broxup, The Islamic
Threat to the Soviet State, 26.
21. See McLaughlin & Davidson,
Spiritual Politics, 282-83.
22. Niebhur, Moral Man & Immoral
Society, xi-xii.
23. Moral Man & Immoral Society,
108-199
25. Kenneth Waltz, Man, The State
and the State of War (New York: Columbia University Press, 1959) 238.
26. Locke, "Second Treatise of Civil
Government," ch IX, sec 131, quoted in The Development of the Democratic
Idea, 162.
27. Locke, "Second Treatise of Civil
Government," ch XIX, sec 230,232, quoted in The Development of the Democratic
Idea, 181.
28. "Civil Society in Transition,"
Rethinking Peace, eds. Robert Elias & Jennifer Turpin (Boulder,
CO.: Lynne Rienner, 1994) 226.
29. Smith, "Civil Society and Violence,"
The Web of Violence, eds. Jennifer Turpin & Lester Kurtz
(Chicago: University of Illinois, 1997) 110-12.
30. "Civil Society in Transition,"
Rethinking Peace, 228.
31. "The End of History?" The New
Shape of World Politics: Contending paradigms in International Relations
(New York: Foreign Affairs, 1997) 2,4. Originally published in
The
National Interest (Summer 1989)
33. Quoted in Schlesinger, The
Cycles of American History, 52.
34. Quoted in Kissinger, Diplomacy,
33.
37. For discussion of antagonistic
political forces, see McLaughlin and Davidson, Spiritual Politics, 256-63.
38. Faces of the Enemy: Reflections
of the Hostile Imagination (San Francisco: Harper & Row, 1991).
40. Bush and Folger, The Promise
of Mediation: Responding to Conflict Through Empowerment and Recognition
(San Francisco: Jossey Bass Publishers, 1994) 256.