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Kosovo, Non-violence and the Break-up of Yugoslavia

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1. THE DISINTEGRATION OF THE YUGOSLAV STATE AND THE KOSOVO CONFLICT

THE SECESSION of four of the six republics from the Yugoslav Federation has been accompanied, in the cases of Croatia and Bosnia, by unrestrained acts of violence, war, torture and ethnic cleansing. Organized violence has been employed to attain political and social objectives for communities which are distinguishable largely by religious affiliation rather than ethnic or linguistic criteria.¹ These disturbing incidents were preceded by two critical developments.

First, institutional mechanisms in the form of the Federal Collective Presidency inaugurated after the death of Marshal Tito, and the federal nature of the Yugoslav state, failed to reconcile the emerging political agenda of the six republics and two autonomous provinces. While the republics of Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina and later Macedonia desired a more decentralized system of confederal states, Serbia with its allies, Montenegro and the now powerless autonomous provinces, desired a more centralized state that would entrench the power of the Communist Party and the influence of Serbia.²

The second development was that growing nationalist sentiment polarized communities on the basis of religious affiliation. This made it difficult for political alliances against nationalist sentiment to develop among the different communities. According to Glenny, increased nationalist sentiment was a consequence of political leaders unleashing their greatest asset for attaining their objectives – the *narod*, the people.³ While the subsequent outbreak of war in parts of the former Yugoslavia has rightly led to strong international interest in Croatia and Bosnia, there has been a territory which is yet to witness the outbreak of war. That territory is Kosovo.⁴

Kosovo has a majority Albanian population: 1993 estimates put the Albanian population at 87.8% while Serbs make up 6.6% of Kosovo's two million residents.⁵ In 1987, a process of abrogating Kosovo's autonomous status in the Yugoslav Federation was begun by Serbia, culminating in the adoption of a new constitution by the Serbian Republic in 1989 that abolished all aspects of Kosovo's autonomy. Kosovo's judiciary, police force and provincial administration were brought under direct control of Belgrade, while Kosovo's Provincial Assembly was abolished.

These events were viewed with alarm by the other Yugoslav republics since they were a transparent attempt by Serbia to enhance its influence in Yugoslav federal institutions. Furthermore, Serbia's actions were contrary to the 1974 Yugoslav Constitution, and helped to discredit federal institutions which found themselves powerless in the face of a concerted effort by Serbia to bring 'its' autonomous provinces under Belgrade's direct control. For example, Belgrade recalled the Kosovo representative to the eight-member Federal Presidency, the ethnic Albanian Riza Sapunziju, in March 1991 for his 'anti-Serbian activities' and replaced him with Sejdo Bajramovic – an ethnic Albanian married to a Serb who identified himself as a Yugoslav and was more amenable to Serbian policies.⁶ This transparent attempt to enhance Serbia's federal position played an undoubted influence in accelerating the break-up of Yugoslavia. There has since been a sustained campaign of non-violent action waged in Kosovo by its Albanian majority, protesting the erosion of Kosovo's autonomy.

Initially, there were two parts to the Albanian campaign. The first was a campaign of strikes, protests and demonstrations.⁷ When these were repressed with the loss of life, and the wars in Croatia and Bosnia threatened to spill over into Kosovo or to provide the pretext for military force to be used by Serbian paramilitary groups, police and army, Albanian political leaders decided to change their tactics. The second part of the campaign involved non-cooperation with Serbian authorities and the institutions they now controlled. It was decided that the Albanians would simply develop or maintain parallel institutions – a policy which remains the linchpin of the non-violent campaign and efforts to resolve the conflict.⁸

2. KOSOVO'S PARALLEL INSTITUTIONS

The policy of developing parallel institutions began with Serbia's suspension of the Kosovo Provincial Assembly after the latter proclaimed on 2 July 1990, 'the constitutional declaration on Kosovo as an independent and equal unit ... to the other units in the Federation/Confederation.'⁹ The Assembly continued to convene (except for its Serb deputies, many of whom now represent Kosovo in the Serbian Parliament), and on 22 September 1991 declared the Republic of Kosovo a sovereign and independent state. In the referendum organized by the Assembly and held on 26–30 September 1991, a full 99.87% of those who voted

(turnout was 87% due to a boycott by local Serbs) affirmed their desire for Kosovo to be a sovereign and independent state.

The last time the Assembly convened was on 2 May 1992 when it announced multi-party, general and Presidential elections for 24 May. Elections to the 130-member Assembly resulted in the Democratic League of Kosova (LDK) winning 76.4% of the vote and getting 96 deputies; while the Parliamentary Party of Kosova got 4.86% and has 13 deputies. Other successful parties were the Peasants Party of Kosova (7 deputies) and the Albanian Christian Democratic Party (7 deputies). In the Presidential election, Ibrahim Rugova, the popular and charismatic leader of the LDK, won by an overwhelming majority

The executive wing of Kosovo's political system is headed by Ibrahim Rugova, who coordinates the work of the separate commissions comprising Assembly members which oversee Kosovo's parallel institutions. The Kosovo President has also appointed a Prime Minister, Bujar Bukoshi, and several ministers who currently live in exile due to intimidation by security forces. The legislative wing of Kosovo's political system, the Provincial Assembly, has been unable to convene due to threats made against its members by security forces.

It is the parallel education system which is the most 'successful' of the institutions developed by the Albanians of Kosovo.¹⁰ Aside from local Serbs, it caters for virtually all Kosovo's student population. A total of 276,000 elementary school pupils (years 1-8); 60,000 secondary school pupils (years 9-12); and 20,000 tertiary level students attend the parallel education system.¹¹ This parallel system arose in response to efforts to impose a 'Serbian' curriculum sanitized of anything deemed to foster Albanian nationalism. Music and history in the new curriculum disseminated the idea that the territory of Kosovo has always been, and continues to be, an integral part of Serbia.

The parallel health system began as a result of the dismissal of Albanian health workers from Kosovo's provincial hospitals. First, it meant that there was a large pool of unemployed doctors and nurses in Kosovo. Second, there was widespread distrust of state health institutions among Albanians due to a lack of Albanian medical staff and rumours that Serbian authorities had initiated a secret policy of enforced birth control, etc. Finally, while the official state system charges nominal fees, the reality is that the poorly paid state health workers have to be bribed with sums as high as DM500 (USD 340) to perform routine operations. For the largely unemployed Albanian population who had moreover lost their welfare cards for subsidized healthcare,¹² and where even those with jobs could only expect to earn roughly DM150 (USD 105) a month, such costs were prohibitive and generated the need for an alternative health system.

There are three branches to the Albanian health system in Kosovo. First are the private clinics which are run on a non-profit basis with salaried staff and service costs passed directly on to patients. The second branch is a series of humanitarian clinics under the auspices of the Mother Theresa Foundation. In the 6-month period beginning January 1994, some 102,400 patients were treated in the 45 clinics of this type established throughout Kosovo.¹³ All health

services, including medicines, are provided free of charge, and medical staff work on a voluntary full-time basis. All medical equipment and medicine are donated by international humanitarian organizations, such as Caritas, Mercy Corps, Medicins sans Frontiers. The third and smallest branch of the parallel health system is directly funded by the government of the Republic of Kosovo to provide health checks and services for children in Kosovo's elementary school system. Its medical personnel receive a stipend equivalent to that received by teachers of 105DM (AUD95). Though the first two branches of the parallel health system are ostensibly non-political, their continued functioning makes them integral parts of the Kosovo Albanian strategy of avoiding all dealings with 'official' state institutions.

Parallel financial, cultural and sporting systems are also maintained by Kosovo's Albanian population. Collectively, all the parallel institutions in Kosovo represent a mass campaign of non-violent action that stand as an attempt to resolve the conflict over Kosovo's final political status without resorting to organized violence.

3. SERBIAN RESPONSES TO PARALLEL INSTITUTIONS

The Serbian government's response to Kosovo's parallel institutions has been twofold. The first is a policy of marginalizing Albanians from the political, economic and cultural life of the province. The fact that Albanians develop their own institutions is irrelevant from the Serbian government's perspective that 'real' power – repressive institutional capabilities – continues to be held by Belgrade. In fact, the refusal of Albanians to cooperate with Belgrade and the development of a separate Albanian system actually assists the government's policy of having Serbs fill all positions of responsibility in state institutions. For example, when Albanian police and judges refused to recognize the authority of Belgrade, all were sacked and replaced by Serbs. The development of separate systems is also desired by local Serbs, who, for example, demanded segregation in the workplace and in education from June 1990.¹⁴

Separate institutional systems allow discriminatory policies to be formulated by the central and provincial administration, which openly promotes the settlement of Serb refugees in Kosovo through subsidized housing, interest-free loans and guaranteed employment.¹⁵ This is part of an official state programme which 'pave[s] the way for the realisation of the Program for the settlement of 100,000 Serbs and Montenegrins in Kosova.'¹⁶ Some senior Serb officials openly claim that as many as 600,000 Serb refugees will eventually be resettled in Kosovo.¹⁷ The rationale is to offset what Serbian authorities claim has been a systematic exodus of Serbians from Kosovo during the Communist era as a result of discrimination by Albanians and federal authorities. In fact, such demographic changes in Kosovo have largely been a result of Serbian emigration due to better employment opportunities elsewhere in Yugoslavia

and a higher fertility rate among Kosovo's Albanians. Meanwhile, Albanians are 'encouraged' to emigrate by the lack of employment opportunities, affordable healthcare, routine payment of bribes for administrative services, extortion by security forces and enforced conscription of youth. Consequently, up to 300,000 Albanians have emigrated or reside overseas.¹⁸

The second response by the Serbian government has been to repress the Albanian's parallel institutional system. Aside from private health clinics, the humanitarian services of the Mother Theresa Foundation and the elementary school classes permitted to operate in state buildings, all parallel institutions have been declared illegal and are subject to state repression.

Repression may involve various mechanisms. The most widespread is the arrest, detention and abuse of staff of parallel institutions, those who allow their private dwellings to be used by parallel institutions, and of those who avail themselves of services provided by parallel institutions. The Serbian Constitution requires that police obtain a judicial ruling if any prisoner is to be detained for more than 72 hours. As a general rule, however, detention does not go beyond this period unless subversion charges are actually laid.¹⁹ Statistics provided by the Council for Human Rights in Prishtina reveal that of the 2,590 Albanians arrested and taken in for questioning in the period from 1 January 1994 to 28 October 1994, only 87 were charged and sentenced, whereas the remaining 2503 were released without charges.²⁰ Those detained by Serbian security forces experience various forms of physical and psychological abuse which have been documented by domestic and international sources.²¹

Confiscation of documents and property is another repressive method used by security forces against parallel institutions. Records are removed from schools, medical equipment can be confiscated, and humanitarian supplies donated for the Mother Theresa Foundation can also be taken by the authorities.

The existence of a separate institutional system allows Serbian authorities to carry out their policies of marginalizing Albanians while promoting a demographic solution to the conflict. Nevertheless, the fact that Albanians openly flout Serb authority by having their own institutions, which foster links with international institutions and organizations, is a blow to Serbian international prestige and claims of sovereign control. For this reason, it is likely that the Serbian government will continue to repress the parallel institutions even though they indirectly assist government policies in Kosovo.

Despite the repressive mechanisms used by Serbian authorities in the course of the five years that these parallel institutions have been functioning, there is very little to suggest that Serbian policy has had any appreciable effect on the determination of the Albanian community to maintain their institutions. In fact, if the comments of one secondary school principal can be any guide, the non-violent nature of the Albanians' campaign, combined with the recognition that their struggle was 'just', served to strengthen their moral position in dealings with Serbs and was a source of renewed determination to continue the non-violent campaign.²²

4. EVALUATION OF THE NON-VIOLENT CAMPAIGN

The evolution of Kosovo's parallel institutions represents a non-violent approach to resolving the conflict in Kosovo. In terms of discipline, strategies and scale, it is the largest campaign of non-violence since Martin Luther King's civil rights movement, and arguably Gandhi's *satyagraha* campaign. In contrast to King's and Gandhi's campaigns, however, the Kosovo Albanians' non-violence is predicated on pragmatic considerations concerning the non-feasibility of organized violence, rather than a principled acceptance of non-violence as a guideline for individual and collective action.²³ Unlike other federal units of the former Yugoslavia – Croatia, Slovenia and Bosnia – Kosovo no longer controlled its own police or territorial defence force as a result of a sustained Serbian policy since 1987 of disarming all Albanians while simultaneously arming ethnic Serbs and flooding the province with military forces. Put simply, if Kosovo Albanians had still retained control of the provincial police force, it is likely that armed force would have been used to pursue their political goods.

The clear rejection by Kosovo's Albanians of a military solution on pragmatic rather than principled grounds has, nevertheless, when compared to the military campaigns in Bosnia and Croatia, constrained some important aspects of the conflict.²⁴ Despite intimidation by Serb paramilitary and security forces, overt displays of Serb nationalism, and calls for massive deportation of Albanians by radical Serb political parties, the Albanians' disciplined campaign of non-violence has meant that there have been few cases of violent confrontation.²⁵ This suggests that some important behavioural and attitudinal aspects of the conflict have not degenerated to the point where they become important obstacles to a resolution of the conflict.

From the perspective of Belgrade, the Serbian economy has been devastated by international sanctions. Industrial output for the month of April 1995, in Serbia and Montenegro, for instance, was still less than half that for the same month in 1991, the year before sanctions were imposed.²⁶ Serbs are also finding it difficult to accept ostracism by the West, and genuinely wish to see their country integrating with Western European social and economic institutions. The Serbian government therefore appears intent upon avoiding violent confrontation in Kosovo that could trigger further international sanctions, the destabilization of Macedonia, some form of intervention by Albania, and a wider Balkan war. It is extremely unlikely that there will be an ethnic explosion in Kosovo. References to Kosovo as an 'ethnic powderkeg' or 'time-bomb' are simply misleading. What is more likely to happen is that Kosovo's Albanians will continue their non-violent campaign in the hopes that international diplomatic support will prove decisive in forcing the Serbian government to meaningful negotiations.

The critical factor for the success of the non-violent campaign in Kosovo – and indeed of any non-violent campaign – is what Johan Galtung has called the 'great chain of non-violence'.²⁷ The idea is that the success of a non-violent

campaign is firmly linked to the degree that Albanians can utilize some linkage in the form of a third party between themselves and the Serbian government. Such a linkage would create a dependency relationship between Belgrade and Kosovo's parallel government. An example is the US civil rights movement in the 1960s, where the federal government was the 'link' that generated a dependency relationship between Black Americans and White segregationists. Ralph Summy, who refers to this third-party linkage between conflicting parties as 'indirect dependency', argues that the creation of a dependency relationship is the key to the ultimate success of a non-violent campaign:

Whenever non-violent action has been instrumentally successful – whether against a despotic, totalistic or democratic regime – the core element can be traced to the existence of a dependency relationship. It is a necessary, though not sufficient, component of a successful outcome. There are many examples of brutal tyrants and totalitarian systems capitulating to improvised non-violent action: in every case, a dependency relationship either existed directly between the protagonists or was established indirectly through third parties.²⁸

Contenders for such a linkage or dependency relationship in the case of Kosovo might be Kosovo's Serbian community, moderate Serb political forces in Belgrade, and/or the international community. Which of these can offer optimal chances for the success of the non-violent campaign?

Kosovo's Serbian community is divided between those who have directly benefited from Belgrade's control, in terms of senior positions in the provincial administration or the police force; and those who, along with the Albanians, have to deal with a corrupt civil administration and police force. After a period of twenty years where the proportion of Serbs in Kosovo diminished primarily due to a loss of privileged employment opportunities, the re-availability of positions in the provincial administration and security apparatus has spurred recent Serb immigration into Kosovo, along with the repatriation of Serb refugees from Bosnia and Croatia.

Serbs who are critical of the corrupt administration and police force in Kosovo have displayed a greater capacity to compromise with the Albanians with whom they have lived and worked most of their adult lives; and have been willing to participate in instances of low-level negotiations with Albanians. Despite this division among Kosovo's Serbs, there is still strong support for radical Serb nationalist parties, especially that of the Serbian Radical Party led by Vojislav Seselj, posters of whom are provocatively placed all over Kosovo. The Serbian Radical Party rejects any compromise with ethnic Albanians over Kosovo's political status and has called for the massive deportation of Albanians. The popularity of such extreme positions is due to widespread Serb perceptions of Albanians as murderers and rapists.²⁹

The rise of Slobodan Milosevic was accompanied by the removal of those Serbs in positions of influence who were 'moderate' insofar as they were more prepared to negotiate with Kosovo's Albanians. For example, Milosevic successfully forced the resignation of his chief rival in December 1987, the Presi-

dent of the Serbian Republic, Ivan Stambolic, for failing to 'prevent the total annihilation of non-Albanian nationalities in Kosovo by Albanian irredentists'.³⁰ Milosevic's efforts to highlight the grievances of Serbs in Kosovo and other parts of Yugoslavia sparked a wave of resignations and dismissals of prominent Serb figures who protested against his enthusiastic support for Serb nationalists and condemnation of the 1974 constitution.³¹

The marginalization of *moderate Serbs* was accelerated by the polarizing effects of the Croatian and Bosnian wars, and the defeat of Milan Panic in the December 1992 Presidential elections. Panic had raised the ire of Serb nationalists by his readiness to negotiate with the newly declared Croatian and Bosnian governments over the fate of their Serb minorities, and with Kosovo's Albanians over the future political status of their territory. Many of the views of the radical Serb nationalist parties concerning Kosovo's political status are shared by political parties that favour democratic reform in Serbia together with greater civil and political liberties – such as the Serbian Renewal Movement of Vuk Draskovic. Indeed Draskovic once called for the expulsion of Kosovo's Albanians.³² In a small survey of 220 Belgrade Serbs, 39% favoured expulsion or increased repression of Albanians, whereas 20% favoured some form of compromise or greater autonomy.³³ This suggests that even in the most cosmopolitan and presumably tolerant city in Yugoslavia, there is only marginal support for accommodation with the Albanians of Kosovo. The position of Serbian political parties, therefore, is unlikely to shift significantly in the direction of compromise.

The international diplomatic community has displayed an ambiguous position over the Kosovo issue. The various peace talks convened to deal with substantive political issues arising from the break-up of the former Yugoslavia have concentrated on the imperative of containing the wars in Croatia and Bosnia and negotiating an end to them. Recognition of the former republics of the Yugoslav Federation as independent states was thus initially canvassed as an important means of achieving this imperative.³⁴ With international recognition, and subsequent inflammation of the conflict, this imperative was given more urgency since the conflict was now viewed as an international one which had crossed over national borders: the type of conflict which the UN Charter was designed to handle.

Despite Kosovo's former political status as a constitutive federal unit, it was viewed as subordinate to the preceding imperative since it was not seriously considered a candidate for international statehood. The most important reason for not bestowing recognition, aside from the constitutional ambiguity over Kosovo's federal position, was that the political institution which declared itself the representative of a majority of Kosovo's citizens did not possess coercive capacities. The self-declared 'Republic of Kosovo' had no army or police force which it could deploy.

Subsequently, Kosovo has been viewed as an issue of human rights and self-determination within the framework of sovereign control by the Serbian gov-

ernment. This is exemplified by the December 1994 General Assembly resolution which expressed concern for Kosovo largely as a human rights and self-determination question, and did not challenge Serbian control and authority. The resolution condemned 'the measures and practices of discrimination and the violations of human rights of ethnic Albanians of Kosovo' and demanded that the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia 'establish genuine democratic institutions in Kosovo, including the parliament and the judiciary'. Thus, while the international diplomatic community has shown no signs of supporting the Kosovo campaign for international statehood, it has demonstrated its support for human rights and self-determination issues in Kosovo.

As far as the international nongovernmental community is concerned, Kosovo remains a human rights issue that must be dealt with before turning to its self-determination aspects.³⁵ Currently, Kosovo's Albanian community is garnering international support to place Kosovo on the international agenda as both a human rights and self-determination issue.

Of the three elements identified as the basis for a dependency relationship that could lead to the Serbian government implementing substantive negotiations with Kosovo's Albanians, the international community seems to hold the greatest promise. There is genuine international concern over the human rights situation, and a genuine desire to see the self-determination issue resolved along with other territories with large ethnic 'minorities' in the former Yugoslavia. On the other hand, those Kosovo Serbs who are prepared to negotiate with the Albanian community do not enjoy as much political influence as their more radical brethren in Kosovo. Similarly, moderate Serbs in Belgrade are politically insignificant at the moment, and are likely to remain so for some time yet.

The current Serbian political agenda is very much dominated by a three-cornered competition involving Milosevic's Socialist Party of Serbia, Seselj's Radical Party of Serbia, and Draskovic's Serbian Renewal Party. At stake are Serb policies in Bosnia and Serb-held territories in Croatia, and the democratization of the political process. None of these parties advocate negotiations over Kosovo's political status. This is unlikely to change in the short term, due to the refusal of Kosovo's Albanians to participate in the Serbian political process, thereby eliminating the possibility of coalitions between Albanians and pro-democracy Serbs.

5. TOWARDS RESOLUTION OF THE KOSOVO CONFLICT

What mechanisms might the international community use to bring about a resolution of the Kosovo conflict? Three mechanisms are critical: the first is the current sanctions regime against Serbia; the second concerns the future of international peace talks for the former Yugoslavia; and the third is continued international criticism of Serbian policies in Kosovo.

While much of the international sanctions regime has been specifically created as a result of the Serbian government's involvement in the Croatian and Bosnian wars rather than its policies in Kosovo, it is unlikely that all sanctions will be lifted if the Serbian government does not resolve the conflict in Kosovo. What will be critical here is to what extent elements of the sanctions regime remain in place, since its existence has been vital in pressuring the Serbian government to distance itself from Serb minorities in Bosnia and Croatia. Indeed, the sanctions have brought Milosevic to pursue a more moderate conciliatory position over Bosnia and Eastern Slavonia (and previously Serb-held Krajina before it was overrun), despite intense opposition by Serb nationalists. Nevertheless, Milosevic's government has not indicated any similar change in its Kosovo policy – as exemplified by its attempt to resettle thousands of Krajina Serb refugees in Kosovo. Consequently, Ibrahim Rugova and other members of Kosovo's Assembly have been lobbying to have the sanctions regime explicitly linked to the issue of Kosovo.

Second, the fate of peace talks over other territories with large ethnic minorities in the former Yugoslavia – Bosnia, Eastern Slavonia, Vojvodina – may be linked with Kosovo as part of a comprehensive peace package brokered by the international community. Political concessions granted to Kosovo's Albanians could be linked to those demanded by Bosnian Serbs, de facto statehood with confederal ties with Serbia, and extensive political autonomy for Serbs in Eastern Slavonia. The uncertainty here is that the military balance in Bosnia has changed due to NATO military intervention, and the Bosnian government is likely to take advantage of this to regain territory despite any agreement reached with Serbs premised on a significant handover of Serb-controlled areas – a handover Bosnian Serbs are unlikely to implement fully. Thus the final battle-lines have not been drawn for an internationally brokered plan that can comprehensively resolve outstanding human rights and self-determination issues in the former Yugoslavia, including Kosovo.

The third and final mechanism is continued scrutiny and reports by international bodies on political conditions in Kosovo. Critical resolutions by bodies like the UN Commission on Human Rights, supported by reports from independent human rights bodies such as Amnesty International and Helsinki Watch, will be critical in maintaining international attention on Kosovo. This is a necessary condition for any success in effectively maintaining part of the current sanctions regime against Serbia.

If non-violent action is agreed to be a desirable method of resolving conflict, the support of the international community for the campaign in Kosovo is critical. An indefinite continuation of elements of the current sanctions regime as long as Kosovo conflict remains unresolved would be the optimum means of implementing a dependency relationship between the Serbian government and Kosovo's political leaders that could culminate in meaningful political negotiations to resolve the conflict. If elements of the sanctions regime are

maintained, then the international community can play a constructive role in resolving the Kosovo conflict.

NOTES AND REFERENCES

- * Dr Michael Salla is the author of *Islamic Radicalism, Muslim Nations and the West*, and co-editor of *Why The Cold War Ended* and *Essays on Peace: Paradigms for a New World Order*. His research interests include the politics of religion, peace and conflict studies, and politics of non-violent action. He teaches in the Department of Political Science, Australian National University, Canberra, Australia.
- 1 This does not make the conflict in former Yugoslavia a religious conflict; strictly speaking it is a political conflict that utilizes religious and cultural differences among communities with a shared ethnicity. Cf. Glenny, *The Fall of Yugoslavia* (new edition, Penguin, 1993), p. 172.
 - 2 Cf. Misha Glenny, *The Fall of Yugoslavia*, pp. 32,42. For an account of the constitutional crisis which preceded the break-up, see Branka Magas, 'Recent Political History of Yugoslavia,' *Eastern Europe and the Commonwealth of Independent States 1992* (London: Europa Publications Ltd., 1993), pp. 285-290; and Richard Iglar, 'The Constitutional Crisis in Yugoslavia and the International Law of Self Determination', *Boston College International and Comparative Law Review*, vol. 15, no. 1, 1992, pp. 213-39.
 - 3 *The Fall of Yugoslavia*, p. 19.
 - 4 Spelt as "Kosova" by the territory's ethnic Albanian majority.
 - 5 The 1981 census put the Albanians at 77.4% while Serbs made up 13.2%. Hivzi Islami, *Demographic Reality in Kosova* (Prishtina: Kosovo Information Centre, 1993), p. 31.
 - 6 See *Keesing's Record of World Events 1991*, p. 38081.
 - 7 For details, see M. E. Salla, 'The Nonviolent Struggle Continues,' *International Journal of Nonviolence*, vol. 1, no. 1 (1993), pp. 82-85.
 - 8 Gene Sharp refers to this as non-violent intervention where the aim is to obstruct the functioning of the targets of a non-violent campaign. *The Politics of Nonviolent Action* (Boston, MA: Porter Sargent, 1973), pp. 357-432
 - 9 Kosovo Information Center, *Albanian Democratic Movement in Former Yugoslavia: Documents: 1990-1993* (Prishtina, 1993), p. 6. Information in the following paragraphs on the elections is from the same source.
 - 10 For a more detailed discussion of Kosovo's parallel institutions than what follows, see M. E. Salla, 'Ex-Yugoslavia's Forgotten Conflict - Nonviolence in Kosovo', *Social Alternatives*, vol. 14, no. 3 (1995), pp. 37-40.
 - 11 Statistics and information concerning the parallel education system come from an interview with Abdyl Rama, Member of the Kosovo Assembly and member of the LDK Presidency, Prishtina, 26 December 1995. Statistics provided by the Humanitarian Law Centre confirm that 360,000 students attend 830 elementary schools and 62 secondary schools. There are seven post-secondary schools or colleges which cater for 1815 students, while 5875 attended 12 university departments. *Spotlight Report No. 16: Kosovo Albanians II*. (Belgrade: Humanitarian Law Centre), 1995, p. 3.
 - 12 According to Kosovo Information Centre sources, 121,000 Albanians have been dismissed, from the 164,210 Albanians formerly employed by the state.
 - 13 Statistics supplied by Director of the Mother Theresa Foundation in an interview in Prishtina, 28 December 1995.
 - 14 See *Spotlight Report No. 16*, pp. 3-7.
 - 15 For demographic changes in Kosovo, see Islami, *Demographic Reality in Kosova* (Prishtina: Kosovo Information Centre, 1993), p. 31.

- 16 This is part of a statutory decree issued by the governments of Serbia and Montenegro in January 1995. See *Kosova Daily Report* #532 (Prishtina, Kosovo Information Centre, 17 January 1995).
- 17 See Submission to the 46th Session of the United Nations Commission on Human Rights, Council for the Defence of Human Rights and Freedoms (Prishtina, 1994), p. 5.
- 18 Colin McIntyre, 'Serb Crackdown on Kosovo Albanians Reported', Reuters, Prishtina, 14 June 1994.
- 19 For statistics on subversion charges in Kosovo and in Yugoslavia more generally, see *Spotlight: Report No. 16*, pp. 22-23.
- 20 Interview with Sami Kurteshi, Executive Director for the Council for the Defence of Human Rights and Freedoms, Prishtina, 1994, p. 5.
- 21 See Amnesty International, *Yugoslavia: Police Violence against Ethnic Albanians in Kosovo Province* (London, April 1994).
- 22 Private interview in Prishtina, 27 December 1994.
- 23 For a typology of different forms of non-violent action, see Ralph Summy, 'Typology of Non-violent Politics', *Australian Journal of Politics and History*, vol. 31, no. 2, 1985, pp. 230-42. This is not to suggest that King's and Gandhi's followers shared their leaders' principled non-violence. Many recognized, as do Kosovo's Albanians, that organized violence was simply not a feasible option.
- 24 For a definition of conflict that distinguishes between a conflict situation, attitudes and behaviour see Johan Galtung, 'Conflict as a Way of Life', *Essays in Peace Research*, vol. III (Copenhagen: Christian Ejlertsen, 1978), pp. 484-507; and Christopher Mitchell, *The Structure of International Conflict* (Hampshire: Macmillan, [1981] 1989), pp. 15-17.
- 25 Isolated instances of Albanians attacking police appear to be forms of retaliation for acts of police brutality, rather than politically motivated acts.
- 26 See Reuter, 'Yugoslav Output Down 10.1 pct', Belgrade, 17 May 1995.
- 27 'Principles of Nonviolent Action: The Great Chain of Nonviolence Hypothesis' *Nonviolence and Israel/Palestine* (Honolulu, HI: University of Hawaii Institute for Peace, 1989), pp. 13-34.
- 28 'Direct dependency' refers to a dependency that the target of a non-violent campaign has upon non-violent actionists. See Ralph Summy, 'Nonviolence and the Case of the Extremely Ruthless Opponent', pp. 169-74 in Michael Salla, Walter Tonetto and Enrique Martinez, eds, *Essays on Peace: Paradigms for Global Order* (Rockhampton, Queensland: Central Queensland University Press, 1995)
- 29 For discussion of various petitions highlighting dominant Serb perceptions, see Branko Magas, *The Destruction of Yugoslavia: Tracking the Break-up 1980-92* (London: Verso, 1993), pp. 49-52.
- 30 *Keesing's Record of World Events 1988*, p. 35796.
- 31 Some of these figures included the mayor of Belgrade, Zivana Olbina; the editor-in-chief of the Belgrade television service, Mihajlo Eric; and the director of the Politika publishing house, Ivan Stojanovic. For further details and an account of Milosevic's rise to political power, see Glenny, *The Fall of Yugoslavia*, pp. 31-61.
- 32 *Ibid.*, pp. 39, 68. Glenny goes on to point out, however, that after first appearing as a nationalist ideologue prepared to use whatever means necessary to further the 'Serbian nation', Draskovic has 'revealed a genuine commitment to dialogue for solving constitutional and political problems'.
- 33 *Spotlight Report No. 16*, p. 31
- 34 For criticism of the decision to bestow recognition on Slovenia and Croatia, and of the role of Germany and Austria, see Bogdan Denitch, *Ethnic Nationalism: The Tragic Death of Yugoslavia* (Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press, 1994), p. 52.
- 35 See Jan Oberg, 'Conflict Mitigation in the Former Yugoslavia', in Michael Salla et al., *Essays on Peace*, p. 118.