ICE Case Studies

Case Number: 14

Case Mnemonic: LITANI

Case Name: Litani River and Israel-Lebanon

Case Author: Angela Joy Moss



CASE BACKGROUND
ENVIRONMENT ASPECT
CONFLICT ASPECT
ENVIRONMENT OVERLAP CONFLICT ASPECT
RELATED INFORMATION

I. CASE BACKGROUND

1. Abstract

In the Middle East, the supply of water is much less than its demand, thereby resulting in conflict over it. This is true for Israel and Lebanon, where there have been struggles, although not always armed, for the waters of the Litani River. At this point, Israel occupies southern Lebanon. Part of the Litani is located in this region. There are conflicting reports and conclusions over whether or not Israel is using the Litani. There is also a verbal struggle over which country needs the Litani more, could make best use of it, and who, therefore, should develop their use of the Litani. Although there is not an armed struggle over it now, it has been involved in armed struggles in the past (in the 1967 war, and in 1982) and it is conceivable that in the future the struggles over it may become armed.
 
 

2. Description

The themes of this section are the environment and the Litani River, conflict over this, and the solution.

A. Environment

Some "8% of the world's freshwater supplies are used for [sanitation]. We need adequate supplies of water [also] to feed ourselves. Agriculture accounts for some 63 percent of the world's use of freshwater."(1) No where is the need for water more evident than where water is scarce, as in the Middle East. In fact, there has been an armed conflict over water, in particular, the Litani River, between Lebanon and Israel.

The entire basin of the Litani River is located within the borders of Lebanon. The river rises in the central part of the northern Biqa'a Valley, a short distance west of Baalbek and flows between the Lebanon mountain to the west and the anti-Lebanon mountains to the east, running south and southwestardly at its own pace. The river enters a gorge at Qarun, flows through it about 30 kilometers and, near Nabatiya and the Beaufort Castle, abruptly turns right (to the west), to break through the mountain range to the right, and continues to flow through the hilly terrain of the al-Amal region. North of Tyre, it empties into the Mediterranean.

 The Litani River flows not far from Israel. The nearest part of the Litani to Israel is where the river turns by Nabatiya, four kilometers from Israel's border. The river's proximity to Israel may make it even more tempting for Israel to exploit. The Litani River is 170 kilometers long, with a basin of 2,290 square kilometers. A narrow ridge about 5 kilometers wide separates the Litani from the Hasbani River, a tributary of the Jordan River.

 The Litani discharges approximately 580 million cubic meters (MCM) per year. (This is based on 25 years of measurements, from 1941-1971.) Its flow varies from year to year. The minimum was in 1970 at 184 MCM and the maximum in 1954 at 1020 MCM.(2) The estimated average annual flow of the Litani is 920 MCM.(3) The Litani is smaller than the Jordan in terms of its total flow.(4) The Litani has high quality water. In particular, its salinity level is 20 parts per million (compared with 250-350 parts per million for the Sea of Galilee).(5)

 Lebanon finds that the harnessing of the Litani is essential to its industrial and agricultural development.(6) Therefore, the Litani was partially dammed at Qarun. The Litani also passes through tunnels and pentstocks of hydroplants to the coast, where it is used for irrigation for areas south of Beirut.(7)
 
 

B. Conflict over the environment

This section discusses the history and background of the case and addresses Israel's relationship to the Litani, Lebanon's relationship to the Litani and reasons for conflict. I will then touch on international law, going on to describe Israel's reasons to want the Litani and Lebanon's reasons to want the Litani. I continue with describing logistics for securing the Litani and both Lebanon's plan and Israel's plan. Next, I portray the problem of proof of Israel diverting the Litani and the possibility and denial of this happening.

1. History/background

There has always been conflict over scarce natural resources, for instance, water. Adequate access to necessary water may be termed resource security and possible to war over. Both Lebanon and Israel see adequate supplies of water as essential to their security--and increasingly see it so. In fact, they find that there is not enough water to satisfy their wants and needs. Therefore, there exists the possibility of aggression in order to obtain water from the Litani River. In fact, "history reveals that water has frequently provided a justification for going to war: It has been an object of military conquest, a source of economic or political strength and both a tool and a target of conflict."(8)

 If the demand or need for water in the riparian region is much greater than the supply, conflict over the relatively scarce water to meet those needs is more likely. This conflict may be military.
 
 

In the Israeli-Palestinian context, water is a central ingredient, perhaps only second to land, of the wider conflict between the two sides...the water conflict is not just about water; it reaches to the recesses of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, to questions of land and annexation. Those are abnormal in a water conflict, and render the Israeli-Palestinian water conflict more complex and acute than others in the region.(9)
Israel seemingly is tempted to reach beyond its border to get access to the needed water. "Almost half of the water currently used in Israel is captured, diverted or preempted from its neighbors."(10) This is understandable, given water can be described as "Israel's vulnerable and fragile source of life."(11)

 Israel is a riparian state, in part meaning that it must share a large portion of its surface water resources with neighboring countries. Control of water may be seen as integral to Israel's sovereignty, the need for which Israel might war over.(12) Historically, Israel has been interested in the Litani, and conflict with Lebanon over the Litani is more likely given this. Essentially, control of the Litani has long been a dream of Israel in hopes of establishing a greater Zion from Sinai to ancient Babylon.(13)

 Israel has considered diverting the Litani southward, first proposed in 1905 because it seemed "the waters of the Jordan basin would be insufficient for the future needs of Palestine."(14) The Litani, because of its water, was suggested to become part of the "national Jewish entity" in 1919 but this was rejected by the League of Nations, and the Litani became part of Lebanon.(15)

 There were also prestatehood Jewish interests in the Litani. David Ben-Gurion, Israel's first prime minister, suggested the inclusion of the Litani in the Jewish state. The 1941 international commission to whom this was suggested recommended seven-eighths of the Litani be "leased to Israel."(16) Ben-Gurion and Moshe Dayan advocated Israeli occupation of southern Lebanon and the Litani.(17)

 In 1945, Professor Lowdermilk proposed a comprehensive water plan for the region which would have included changing the course of the Litani toward the Jordan and used its water for irrigation along the Jordan Valley and in central Eretz Israel (Palestine) where the electricity produced could be transferred to Lebanon. This was never implemented because the Arabs did not want to cooperate with Israel.(18) In 1947, Ben Gurion thought the Litani should be Israel's northern border. Also, water was a source of conflict in the 1967 Arab-Israeli war.(19) In fact, in the war in 1967, water resources were "perhaps the prominent factor in Israeli strategic calculations."(20)

 After the 1967 war, Moshe Dayan, defense minister, asserted Israel acheived "provisionally satisfying frontiers, with the exception of those with Lebanon."(21)

 Israel hoped that it would have use of the Litani by the mid 1980s, when it projected that it would have fully used up the waters captured in the 1967 war. Israel hoped to meet this goal by securing the Litani in 1978. Israel had even included the Litani in calculations of their water resources.(22)

 In fact, Israel's need for water makes it conceivable that it may already be using the Litani. It is not recent that Israel has been suspected of planning to divert the waters of the Litani for its own use. Near 1994, this developed into a large number of direct accusations that Israel was using the Litani.(23)
 
 

a. Israel and the Litani

Captured water is the most important part of Israel's total water supply. The four most important sources of Israel's water at the time of this writing were: "ground water; the Jordan watershed; lesser surface waters; and recycled water and water from desalinization plants," for a total of just less than 2,000 MCM per year.(24)

 Israel's significant sources of water are currently exploited, and the only other source is the Litani, which, in order for Israel to use it, would have to be in Israel's possession, which could possibly happen through seizure. The only other source of additional water would be recycled water.(25)

 It was hoped that "the roughly 400 MCM would have sufficed for 10, possibly 15, more years of growing water use at the old rates of consumption." This appears not possible any more.(26) Israel seems to be essentially at the limit--or soon will be--of its renewable supplies of water.(27) "It is therefore becoming increasingly evident that the only feasible solution, in terms of water quality, volume, and proximity of the resource, to Israel's growing water problem is to tap a nearby source, namely the Litani River."(28) Also, declining water quality in the form of seawater intrusion into coastal aquifers is a critical issue in Israel.(29) To Israel, therefore, it seems that use of the Litani is the best way to meet its water needs.

 Not only this, but also, for reasons of state, Israeli farmers receive heavy water subsidies, which, according to Elmusa, encourage prolifigate water consumption and the growing of export crops with huge water appetite; yet others assert that Israel uses water efficiently for agriculture. Elmusa also states, "Israelis claim that their country suffers a water stress that affects its social and economic development. No one would argue that the region is a water cornucopia. But it is not so obvious that the social and economic develpment of Israel has been hampered by the lack of water, not when it has been able to irrigate nearly all of its irrigable land."(30)
 
 

b. Lebanon and the Litani

Lebanon appears to "have renewable supplies adequate relative to population and [or but] even these face major problems of adjustments"and the necessity of reservations.(31) Still, the Litani River is important to Lebanon for agriculture and industrial development.(32)

 "35% of Lebanon's total production of electricity comes from the Litani waters directly or from the Markaba-Awali diversion." There is a diversion of 236 MCM annually from the Litani through the Markaba tunnel to the Awali River, which is used to supply Beirut and other coastal areas with hydroelectric generation.(33) Lebanon is definitely making use of the Litani River.
 
 

c. Reasons for conflict

In this region, "oil is abundant, water is not." Although water is the "renewable resource," it is in short supply. "Scarcity, obviously, means conflict; oil wars are less likely than water wars."(34) Water is a source of conflict between Israel and Lebanon because both countries have less than they want, and so there is a tug-of-war over what is available.

 Contributing to the conflicts over water in the Middle East is "the limited development of technology to improve the supply and management of resources." This makes "cooperation among states in the region more difficult as water becomes a source of power and security."(35)
 
 

2. International law

International law establishes that water ought not to be diverted from this area. It states "water within one catchment area should not be diverted outside that area--regardless of political boundaries--until all needs of those within the catchment area are satisfied."(36) A reason to respect this includes that "in spite of the nonbinding nature of international water law and lack of enforcement mechanisms, it may be the best we've got' as a guide for negotiations."(37) We ought to apply international law to the conflict over the Litani.
 
 

3. Reasons to want the Litani

a. Israel

Israel could increase its annual water supply by 800 MCM (approximately 40% of its annual water consumption in 1993) if it had continued access to the Litani through continued/permanent occupation of southern Lebanon.(38) Another reason for Israel to want the Litani is that, especially along the Israeli coast, many aquifiers are stressed and their water is increasingly brackish.(39)

 Chaim Weizmann, head of the World Zionist Organization, wrote (around 1919-1920) to Prime Minister David Lloyd George that Lebanon was "well-watered" and that the Litani was "valueless to the territory north of the proposed frontiers. They can be used beneficially in the country much further south." He concluded the Litani was "essential to the future of the Jewish national home.'" Yet the British and French mandate powers kept the Litani entirely in Lebanon.(40)

 Returning water-rich western slopes to the West Bank (acquired in the 1967 war), may be seen as relinquishing Israel's water sovereignty and threatening its national existence.(41)

 A major reason that Israel gives for its use of the Litani is that Lebanon is not doing so. As evidence, Israel cites Lebanon's "Litani Project," of which only a third has markedly been realized. Yet, Lebanon argues that if it does not have control over its water and land, it will not be able to realize the potential of its water or land, or use it to the utmost.
 
 

b. Lebanon

Some in Israel believe that Lebanon has relatively more water than Israel does and does not need or use all of its water. Yet it is because Israel is occupying part of the land containing the Litani that Lebanon cannot use it. In response, Fouad Bizri, former minister and adviser to the Lebanese president, asserts that "Lebanon needs all its water...studies prove that there is more land to irrigate than there is water in the Litani basin."(42)

 For instance, there is a lack of domestic running water for 22 villages immediately north of the springs where the Litani rises, in the province of Biqa'a. In the south, there are 36 villages which lack domestic running water. It is easy to see that if Lebanon gave Israel the waters of the Litani, opposition from antigovernment forces, especially the fundamentalist movement, would be strengthened, and there would be continued instability in Lebanon.(43) For instance, if Lebanon gave the Litani to Israel and denied the Shia Muslims, who are predominate in the area, use of the water for agriculture and domestic purposes, they would be increasingly frustrated with the Lebanese government. An example of this is that in 1974 there were rumors that water from the Litani were being diverted to Beirut to meet predicted shortages, which caused large anti-governmental demonstrations.(44)

 If Lebanon allowed Israeli diversion of the Litani, the economic development of Lebanon would be adversely affected, and groups calling for the cantonization or Islamization of the country would be strengthened. Also, much of southern Lebanon would become desert, and irrigation would be nearly impossible.(45)

 A further reason for concern is that for water, "stated in terms relative to their income level, Palestinians pay a minimum of 15 times more than Israeli settlers--a phenomenal difference for water systems managed by the same company."(46) In addition, Elmusa also argues that water stress is relative, and the Palestinians are much more water stressed than the Israelis.(47)
 
 

4. Logistics for securing the Litani

a. Lebanon's plan

In the 1960's and early 1970's, Lebanon had a plan, presented by Dar al-Hendesah to irrigate the Shi'ite territories in southern Lebanon through "a series of dams and weirs." But the US and Israel blocked this plan by pressuring project lenders.(48)

 The Litani is therefore undeveloped in Lebanon, but it is not Israel's either. "Israel tried to preserve the waters for itself, once in 1978 and again in 1982, but failed, the first time because the US administration under Carter inexplicably balked, and the second time because the local population in southern Lebanon fought the Israelis to a standstill, no less surprisingly."(49)
 
 

b. Israel's plan

Israel has considered exploiting the Litani where it "makes a 90 degree angle, turning deeper into Lebanon, only 2.5 miles from the Lebanese/Israeli border." Due to the fact that this is diplomatically and economically costly for Israel, some have viewed this as unlikely.(50) And yet it remains that the Litani runs within easy tunneling distance from Israel. It is less than 10 kilometers from the upper regions of the Jordan, which Israel controls, and it is only a couple of kilometers between the bend of the Litani and one of the upper tributaries of the Jordan. By using a relatively easy way to construct a tunnel through the mountains, it is believed the Litani would flow by gravity into Israel's National Water Carrier system (in part because the bed of the Litani is higher than the inlet to Lake Tiberias).(51)

 The particular point of concern is where the Litani breaks its southward course and turns west toward the Mediterranean below the Chateau de Beaufort. "This proximity is, in fact, the geopolitical link between the rivers, because Israel had hoped to connect the Litani with the Jordan, thus enabling it to pump those waters, duly blocked, into Israel proper."(52)

 Diversion of the Litani was not all that easy for the Israeli planners. In order to facilitate diversion near Beaufort, the river must be managed from central Biqa'a to Beaufort. The entire course of the Litani would need to be controlled to have the necessary water level at the inlet to the tunnel. Also, at the inlet, in order to maintain the suction pressure needed, one or more weirs would be needed to raise the water level. To further complicate things, throughout the seasons, the Litani's flow greatly varies and the result would be too much water at the flooding season and too little water during the dry season. Therefore, the River would need to be controlled from the Biqa'a Valley, which the Israelis would need to occupy in order to do so.(53)

 Additionally, much of the Litani flows through a deep gorge and is not only very difficult to manage but for Israel to conquer. Obviously, it isn't simple to use this water for irrigation. In order to use the Litani, one would have to, through civil works, control nearly the whole upper part of the river.(54)

 In order to control the needed part of southern Biqa'a, including the valley and its river, Israel would need to control the ridges on both sides of the valley. For this, money was available and technology rudimentary, but it was politically unfeasible. The Shi'ites helped defeat Israel's plan by, in conflict in 1982, successfully resisting Israeli occupation. Geographically and ethnically, the situation was not favorable.

 Although Israel still occupies the southeastern corner of Lebanon, it has not completed the major portion of the project. Satellite pictures are unavailable, but eyewitnesses do report evidence of construction. The US and Israel deny this. There is no evidence that water supplies are being increased as a result of diversion from the Litani. Therefore, Stauffer concludes, if there is any diversion, it is small.(55) Soffer (1994) asserts: "Israeli invasions of southern Lebanon (1978, 1982) were a direct result of PLO attacks on Israel, and in no way does Israel control the Litani zone, nor has it ever transferred even one cup of water from Lebanon to Israel."(56)

 Zionists long ago claimed the Litani.(57) For example, one case of downstream preemption is: "Israelis have long considered a scheme for building a low dam on the Litani and a tunnel connecting it with the Upper Jordan tributaries in order to pump the waters into Israel proper."(58) In fact, the occupation of the Golan Heights was a first step toward Israel securing the Litani by securing its eastern part by the proposed diversion works.(59) In addition, in the conflict in 1967, Israel wanted more water than it could get from the war and there are reports that it then started preliminary engineering work.(60)
 
 

5. Problem of proof

a. Possibility of the diversion of the Litani

Soffer (1994) maintains that there have been charges made that Israel has either redirected the Litani for its use or is planning to do so. These charges include the three following:
 
 
1.) Lebanon's fear is that Israel may have already begun diverting the waters of the Litani...There are strong suggestions, although no proof, that Israel may already be siphoning water underground from Lebanon to its northern Galilee settlements. 2.) It was small wonder that the first Israeli diversion plans for the Litani has come into being. 3.) It is widely believed that Israel has diverted water from the Litani river...through a tunnel, thereby delivering Israel an additional 500 MCM annually. This development has, of course, reduced the amount of water available to Lebanese farmers. (61)
Given Israel's relatively great need for water, in part due to its large consumption of it, it is conceivable that Israel is taking water from the Litani. There are reports of siphoning water from it to the Jordan River basin, which covers a distance of less than 10 kilometers.(62) There is no concrete evidence of this.
 
 

b. Denial of diversion of the Litani

The area in question is occupied by Israeli troops. This prevents researchers, UN observers, and journalists from investigating the area.(63) There are reports from independent analysts saying that Israel is tapping underground water resources and diverting it from the Litani into the Jordan. If this is being done, the measured flow of the Litani is not being influenced.(64)
 
 

C. Solution

As a solution, Elmusa proposes the following:
 
 
Israel, if it can muster the requisite attitude and political will, is in a position to end the water conflict by ceasing its unilateral taking away of the common water resources and yielding to the Palestinians their fair share in accordance with international water law. Israel would no t suffer appreciable harm or play a zero-sum game. It already possesses greater quantities of water than the Palestinians from its endogenous and other international resources to meet its baseline needs. It also has greater economic and technical capabilities to tap the rich alternative water resources it has. It can considerably gain in the water sector and trade in water-related technologies in the wake of a peaceful settlement.(65)
Elmusa also asserts that the Israeli-Palestinian water conflict is complex, and that the key to its resolution is working out an equitable apportionment regime, with possible joint management of the common water resources in accordance with international law. He recommends that "the Palestinians must repossess their endogenous water resources. This is the issue that negotiations must tackle at the outset, if quick progress is to be made."(66)

According to Elmusa, Palestinians are entitled to a much larger share than Israel, much larger than their presently imposed share, because Israel has access to greater quantities from other sources than the ones had in common with the occupied Palestinian territories (OPTs) with which it can satisfy its basic water needs. "It also possesses much larger quantities of, and greater economic and technical capabilities to tap, yet untapped resources...In addition, Israel has a broad sea front on the Mediterranean, which affords it practically limitless amounts of water for desalinization technology, which it sells worldwide."(67)

An argument for Lebanon to exploit the water resources it has in the Litani is that one of the reasons for the economic state of Lebanon is its inability to develop due to lack of water. Water is not only essential to the economic development of Lebanon, it is also vital for its improvement of health and quality of life.(68)

Given the scarce amount of water available, recycling and desalinization may help. If there is a conflict because there is not enough water, a necessary response is to recycle and implement other programs to conserve water. This involves the most efficient use of water, which, according to Lee and Brooks, the Israelis have mastered out of necessity. Maybe Israel could share such technology with the Lebanese and possibly even develop joint projects with them. For instance, the Israelis could assist the Lebanese in the most efficient use of the Litani, which might involve the establishment of a modern water infrastructure in Lebanon. These sorts of confidence building measures are needed.

Much more water is needed to meet demand than water in existence. Increasing the supply without depleting finite ground reserves will be difficult. Desalinization seems the only answer and yet one that is very expensive. Compared to maintaining armies to secure water, desalinization is a less costly alternative. In fact, money could be diverted from the use of the military to secure water, to desalinization and other nonmilitary ways to secure and attain water. If countries develop surpluses, they could sell them, as "Lesotho is selling water to South Africa."(69)

 It must be known that desalinization is a possible but expensive recourse to the dearth of water. It would cost about $2.5 billion to desalinize enough water (500-600 MCM) to secure peace, Professor Dan Zaslavsky, Israel's water controller, proposed in 1992.(70)

In conclusion, water security may be the new context for the Arab- Israeli conflict. This involves solving who may claim and exploit existing water resources, and in this case, the Litani. As it is now, the Litani is not of optimal use to Lebanon or Israel because of Israel's occupation of southern Lebanon.
 
 

3. Duration: 1967 to now

This conflict first became armed in 1967. It has been armed off and on since then. Now the conflict is not armed, but Israel occupies the area and there is still the struggle over who should use the Litani and as a result, now country is using it to the utmost.
 
 

4. Location

Continent: Mideast

Region: Mideast Asia

Country: Lebanon

5. Actors: Lebanon, Syria, and Israel

II. Environment Aspects

6. Type of Environmental Problem: Water

7. Type of Habitat: Dry

8. Act and Harm Sites:

Act Site       Harm Site           Example

Israel         Lebanon             Plans for diversion of Litani

III. Conflict Aspects

9. Type of Conflict: Interstate

10. Level of Conflict: Low

11. Fatality Level of Dispute: about 1,000

III. Environment and Conflict Overlap

12. Environment-Conflict Link and Dynamics: Direct

RESOURCE NEED ---> CONFLICT <---POWER IMBALANCE

Right now, Israel and Lebanon both have less water than they need and want. This has led to conflict over the Litani River. There is also a power imbalance between these two countries and this contributes to the conflict as well.
 
 

13. Level of Strategic Interest: Region

14. Outcome of Dispute: Stalemate

IV. Related Information and Sources

15. Related ICE and TED Cases

TED Cases

ATATURK

ISRAELH2

MARSH

ARAL

AQUABA

ICE Cases

NILE

ERITREA

SUDAN

JORDAN

KUWAIT

BLUENILE

GANGES

DANUBE

KUWAIT

16. Relevant Websites and Literature

Websites http://www.fsk.ethz.ch/encop/13/en13-ch3.htm http://socserv2.socsci.mcmaster.ca/~econ/rsrch/n95/subsectionstar 3_6_1.html http://www.cni.mynet.net/lebanon.html http://www.coastalpost.com/96/5/13.htm http://www.arij.org/profile/vol2/chapter4.htm http://www.fsk.ethz.ch/encop/13/en13-ch1.htm http://www.islamforum.org/opedlies.html http://www.arij.org/water/pub/roots.html http://www.arij.org/pub/sober.html http://www.rhdc.com/lebanon.htm

Literature

Bibliography
Amery, Hussein A. "The Litani River of Lebanon." The Geographical Review. Vol. 83, No. 3, July, 1993, 229-237. A Strategy for Managing Water in the Middle East and North Africa. (Washington, DC: The World Bank, 1994). Elmusa, Sharif S. The Water Issue and the Palestinian-Israeli Conflict. Information Paper Number 2. (Washington, DC: The Center for Policy Analysis on Palestine, 1993). Lee, James R., and Maren Brooks. "Conflict and Environment: Lebanon's Historic and Modern Nightmare." Paper for Conference on Environment & Sustainable Development in Lebanon, NGO- Private/Public Sector Partnerships Rene Moawad Foundation, Dec. 1996. Serageldin, Ismail. Toward Sustainable Management of Water Resources. (Washington, DC: The World Bank, 1995). Soffer, Arnon. "The Litani River: Fact and Fiction." Middle Eastern Studies, Vol. 30, No. 4, October 1994, 963-74. Stauffer, Thomas R. "The Price of Peace: The Spoils of War." American-Arab Affairs, 43-54. Stauffer, Thomas R. Water and War in the Middle East: The Hydraulic Parameters of Conflict. Information Paper Number 5. (Washington, DC: The Center for Policy Analysis on Palestine, July 1996).
Notes
(1) Serageldin, Ismail. Toward Sustainable Management of Water Resources. (Washington, DC: The World Bank, 1995), 1. (2) Soffer, Arnon. "The Litani River: Fact and Fiction." Middle Eastern Studies, Vol. 30, No. 4, October 1994, 963. (3) Amery, Hussein A. "The Litani River of Lebanon." The Geographical Review. Vol. 83, No. 3, July 1993, 234. (4) Stauffer, Thomas R. Water and War in the Middle East: The Hydraulic Parameters of Conflict. Information Paper Number 5. (Washington, DC: The Center for Policy Analysis on Palestine, July 1996), 8, 10. (5) Amery, 235. (6) Ibid., 236. (7) Stauffer, 4. (8) Lee, James R., and Maren Brooks. "Conflict and Environment: Lebanon's Historic and Modern Nightmare." Paper for Conference on Environment & Sustainable Development in Lebanon, NGO- Private/Public Sector Partnerships Rene Moawad Foundation, Dec. 1996. (9)Elmusa, Sharif S. The Water Issue and the Palestinian-Israeli Conflict. Information Paper Number 2. (Washington, DC: The Center for Policy Analysis on Palestine, 1993), 1, 15. (10) Stauffer, 11. (11) Amery, 232. (12) Ibid., 233. (13) Stauffer, 11. (14) Amery, 233. (15) Soffer, 966-7. (16) Amery, 233. (17) Ibid. (18) Soffer, 967. (19) Lee and Brooks. (20) Amery, 233. (21) Ibid., 233-4. (22) Stauffer, 11, 13. (23) Soffer 963. (24) Stauffer, 11. (25) Ibid., 12. (26) Ibid., 13. (27) A Strategy. (28) Amery, 235. (29) A Strategy, 14. (30) Elmusa, 9. (31) A Strategy, xiii, 12. (32) Amery, 229. (33) Ibid., 235. (34) Stauffer, 1. (35) Lee and Brooks. (36) Amery, 10. (37) Elmusa, 11. (38) Amery 235. (39) Ibid., 235. (40) Amery, 233. (41) Ibid. (42) Lee and Brooks. (43) Amery, 236. (44) Amery, 235-6. (45) Ibid., 236. (46) Elmusa, 9. (47) Ibid., 10. (48) Stauffer 10, 4. (49) Ibid., 4. (50) Lee and Brooks. (51) Stauffer, 10. (52) Ibid., 8. (53) Ibid., 10. (54) Ibid. (55) Stauffer, 10-11. (56) Soffer, 968. (57) Stauffer, 2. (58) Ibid. (59) Ibid., 8. (60) Ibid., 11. (61) Soffer, 968-9. (62) Amery, 234. (63) Ibid., 235. (64) Ibid. (65) Elmusa, 14. (66) Ibid., 4. (67) Ibid., 12. (68) Ibid., 15. (69) Lee and Brooks, 23. (70) Ibid.


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November, 1997