Iraq Sanctions (IRAQSANC)

          CASE NUMBER:        390
          CASE NAME:          Iraq Sanctions

I. IDENTIFICATION 1. The Issue In 1990, Iraq invaded Kuwait because of disputes Iraq had with Kuwait: Iraq claimed that Kuwait had extracted oil from a pool beneath the Iraq-Kuwait border that belonged to Iraq; Iraq contended that Kuwait purposefully saturated the petrol market with large supplies of oil, therefore, keeping oil's spot market price low (low oil prices, rendered Iraq unable to pay the massive debt it had accrued during the Iran-Iraq War); Iraq alleged that the borders drawn for it by the United Kingdom, after the fall of the Ottoman Empire, unjustly shorted it of territorial seas. After invading Kuwait, sanctions were placed on Iraq; in 1996, sanctions on Iraq are still in place. In the meantime, sanctions have caused Iraq's poor to suffer immeasurably and Iraq's ecology to suffer deleteriously. Furthermore, sanctions have not forced Saddam Hussein to change his sanctioned actions: He continues to drain the southern marshes, conducts chemical warfare on Iraqis, continues to threaten the safety of Kurds and Shiites, and continues to threaten the territorial autonomy of his neighbors. Rather than loosening his control over Iraq, sanctions have accomplished just the opposite, that is, Saddam Hussein's grip on power has actually tightened. (In fact, Saddam Hussein may be more powerful today than he was prior to the sanctions.) In the case of Iraq, sanctions have seemed to fail miserably. It is within the discourse of this case study that the reasons for the failure of those sanctions will be examined.

2. Description After invading Kuwait in 1990, the U.N. began to sanction Iraq's egregious action. Since then, new sanctions have been placed on Iraq for its human rights violations and programs of mass destruction. In total, those sanctions are listed chronologically as follows: TIME LINE OF U.N. ACTIONS TAKEN AGAINST IRAQ *On August 2, 1990, Iraq invades Kuwait. Subsequently, the United Nations Security Council condemned the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in United Nations Security Council Resolution (hereafter U.N.S.C.R.) 600, and called for the immediate and unconditional withdrawal of Iraqi forces, and the return of the Iraqi's legitimate government.(1) *On August 6, 1990, U.N.S.C.R. 661, was levied and froze Iraqi assets, with exceptions allowed for "supplies intended strictly for medical purposes and, in humanitarian circumstances, foodstuffs." *On August 25, 1990, U.N. S.C.R. 665 was passed; it called for the use of force, if necessary, to force Iraq to withdraw from Kuwait. *On November 29, 1990, U.N.S.C.R. 678 set a deadline of January 15th for the withdrawal of Iraqi forces from Kuwait, and called for the use of all necessary means to force the Iraqi withdrawal after the deadline expired. *On January 15, 1991, for a peaceful withdrawal of the Iraqi forces from Kuwait, set under U.N.S.C.R. 678, expired. Subsequently, on January 17, 1991, allied forces began "Operation Desert Storm," with a massive air offensive to liberate Kuwait. On February 26, 1991, Kuwait was liberated. *On March 2, 1991, U.N.S.C.R. 686 called on Iraq to immediately revoke all Iraqi claims, therefore, annexing Kuwait. *On April 3, 1991, U.N.S.C.R. 687 dictated cease fire conditions. The Resolution specified three categories of demands: unilateral disarmament, compensation to Kuwait for damage inflicted during the occupation and war, and acceptance of the 1963 Iraq-Kuwait border.(2) The Iraq dispute over the Iraqi-Kuwait border, as mentioned previously, arises from their dissension with the border that the United Kingdom drew for it after the fall of the Ottoman Empire.(3) A United Nations Special Commission (U.N.S.C.O.M.) was charged with implementing and verifying destruction of Iraq's chemical and biological weapons capability, destruction of medium and long-range ballistic missiles, and installing monitoring mechanisms to ensure that these capabilities were not rebuilt. Resolution 687 confirmed that the humanitarian circumstances were such that food imports should be allowed after notification to the Sanctions Committee. *On August 15, 1991, U.N.S.C.R. 706 allowed Iraq to sell up to $1.6 billion of its oil. The proceeds were to be deposited into an UN administered account. The money in the account was to be used to buy humanitarian supplies for Iraq, to compensate Kuwait for war damages, and to reimburse U.N.S.C.O.M. for its costs. (Iraq did not agree to the terms of this Resolution and publicly has not sold oil.)(4) *For more than two years, Iraq would not cooperate with disarmament demands, particularly on verification and monitoring. In November 1993, however, it doggedly accepted the Security Council conditions, and U.N.S.C.O.M. began its task. In June 1994, U.N.S.C.O.M. reported that it had eliminated Iraq's known chemical weapons stockpile. Sanctions, as a result of Iraqi compliance were to be loosened.(5) *A few days before delivery of U.N.S.C.O.M.'s report in October, Iraqi troop movements prompted a new Gulf crisis. As a result, lifting sanctions on Iraq has been permanently been relegated to "the back burner." EFFECT OF SANCTIONS ON TRADE Although food is available, sanctions have caused skyrocketing inflation and plunging wages. Skyrocketing inflation and plunging wages make it impossible for most people to buy on the free market, relying instead on the limited food rations the government provides at subsidized prices. As a result of sanctions, the economy has declined by an estimated 40%; Iraq's rate of inflation runs in the triple digits.(6) Furthermore, sanctions have cut living standards to half their pre-war level. The cost of living (as a result of U.N. sanctions) has increased drastically for Iraq. To keep inflation in check, the Iraqi government has periodically cracked down on merchants-- accused of fueling inflation by overcharging products. Increasingly as worrisome to price control is the plunging value of the Iraqi dinar. On the black market, it has plunged far below its official rate of U.S. $l = Iraqi Dinar 0.60. The price of the dollar on the black market is well over 1000 dinars and continues to rise. In addition to shortages in the market place, Iraq's inflationary spiral is attributable to counterfeiting and its Central Bank's official laxed monetary policies.(7)
  • Official Exchange Rate U.S.$1=ID .60 Black Market Rate U.S.$1=ID .001

    Although Iraq has sustained much damage from the sanctions, there has been some reconstruction. Much of the reconstruction which has gone on in Iraq has been temporary; Iraq has obtained the parts for its reconstruction by cannibalization of other industrial sectors. Rebuilding has been emphasized in areas visible to outsiders, thus, giving the impression that the sanctions are less deleterious than they truly are. Although civilian factories incurred little damage during the war, sanctions have forced most of the factories to either close or to drastically scale back their production. Sanctions have caused shortages of raw materials and spare parts used in production; as a result, unemployment is widespread.(8) SANCTIONS EFFECT ON THE ENVIRONMENT Sanctions have reduced Iraq to becoming a poor nation: a nation unable--with its rather meager funds--to feed itself let alone take measures to protect Iraq's environment. Currently, in Iraq, water and sanitation services are said to be in a critical state of disrepair. This is because Iraq has a lack of spare parts to repair damages both caused by the Iran-Iraq War and breakdowns of equipment. Such disrepair has led to Iraqi water tables becoming contaminated. Posing as equally detrimental to Iraqi water sources is the dumping of sewage into all major rivers: the source of drinking water.(10) Additionally, shortages of equipment have forced Iraq's cities into becoming garbage dumps. With a shortage of spare parts to repair garbage trucks, garbage piles up in the cities. These garbage dumps pose as health hazards to the cities' poor, because the poor often forage through them looking for food. The shortage of equipment caused by sanctions has also made Iraq more prone to oil spills (See Komi). Nonetheless, on the upside, sanctions, in some regards, may have been good for the Iraqi environment. This is because Iraq's exports of oil have been banned. Without a market to sell petrol, Iraq's chances of an oil spill are presumably less likely. Whether the chances of an oil spill has been decreased, when taking into consideration the shortage of equipment, is as of yet to be determined. In addition to the deleterious effects of equipment shortages on the environment, Iraq's agricultural infrastructure has been "badly impaired." It has been impaired by a shortage of seeds, pesticides, fertilizers and harvesting equipment. Without proper planting and harvesting, once fertile Iraqi lands may become unfertile and arid. SANCTIONS EFFECT ON HUMAN RIGHTS Because the Iraqi military is unwilling to give into the economic pressures of sanctions, the mortality rate of Iraqi's sick, children, are increasing. In fact, three and a half million people are at risk of dyeing in Iraq, a half million of which are children under five. Iraqi's lives are threatened by shortages of drugs, medicines, and food. Although theoretically exempt from sanctions, Iraqi's health system has no money to buy pharmaceuticals. Therefore, drugs and other medicinal products are found in short supply.(11) A recent mission monitoring the progress of an International Federation food and medicine relief program revealed: (A) The shortages of equipment within hospitals has been widespread. Intravenous infusion fluid is sometimes so scarce that children in hospitals share drips in rotation. Furthermore, hospitals have a shortage of disposable syringes; one is used on several patients. Shortages of disposal syringes is particularly dangerous given a surge of hepatitis B has occurred in Iraq and Iraqi's risk of H.I.V. infection is growing. (B) Within leukaemia centers, there is a lack of drugs. The lack of drugs which has affected the treatment of patients. Lack of drugs has caused interruptions in treatment of patients, and interruptions in treatment of patients is especially dangerous, given these interruptions prove inevitably lethal to children with leukemia. (C) Hospitalized children, especially outside Baghdad, are feed substandard meals. For example, in one children's hospital, 80 percent of the children are malnourished. (D) Diseases that previously occurred seasonally, now occur all year long. For example, summer diarrhoea is now common in winter, and winter acute respiratory infection is common in summer. The frequent and persistent occurrence of these diseases are attributable to poor nutrition, contaminated water, and broken domestic heating systems. Proving problematic to the growing frequency of these viruses is the lack of drugs to treat them. As a result of the growing frequency of these viral infections, mortality is rising particularly among children and the elderly. (E) As a result of substandard living standards, almost 22 percent of births are premature or involve critically underweight babies (a figure five times higher than before the Gulf War, reports the Iraqi Red Crescent Society). Poor nutrition and mothers' stress levels can be attributed to these deaths. Due to both the lack of special milk preparations and broken respirators and incubators, care for these patients has been grossly insufficient.(12) EFFECTIVENESS OF SANCTIONS As previously mentioned, sanctions have been disastrous to Iraq's economy and environment: They have caused shortages of goods in the marketplace and have contaminated Iraqi water supplies. Nonetheless, after five long years of sanctions, Saddam remains in power. The sanctions purpose was to force Saddam out of power; however, the sanctions have strengthened his resolve, while weakening his opposition. Under the Sanctions, Saddam has rebuilt his army from the shattered wreck left in 1991. To this day, he continues to evade United Nations inspectors, trying to hide Iraq's weapons of mass destruction. Before the beginning of September 1996 (when Saddam increased his onslaught on the Kurds), the U.N. Security Council was prepared to ease its economic sanctions enough to permit Iraq $2 billion or more in oil sales. Nonetheless, with the onslaught of the Kurds came new economic pressures.(13) Of the 30 nations that contributed to the American-led, Gulf War coalition, only Britain, Germany and Kuwait openly supported Clinton's September 1996 cruise-missile retaliation. Even Saudi Arabia, the oil-rich crown jewel of American interests in the Persian Gulf region, pointedly demurred from endorsing a new round of retaliatory action against Saddam. It is not that Saddam is any less despised by his neighbors today than he was five years ago. The difference now is that the region deems him likely to survive.(15) Moreover, the Saudis and others see the world's will to subdue Saddam steadily eroding. After all, Russia, France, and China have publicly called for an easing of U.N. sanctions; and Western multinational corporations, such as Total and Elf, have recently signed onto agreements with Iraq, to be implemented after the lifting of sanctions.(16) As a result, Saddam seems no worse off today, than he was before the Gulf War and--in several respects--he may have actually improved his prospects. 3. Related Cases (a): CUBA (b): MACEDON (c): SERBSANC (d): HAITI (e): THAIBIRD (f): USCHINA 4. Draft Author: J. Lynch (December 24, 1996) II. Legal Cluster 5. Discourse and Status: [AGREE and INPROG] The international community was unanimous in condemning the Iraqi invasion and occupation of Kuwait on August 2, 1990, as one of the most ignominious crimes in modern history. The act violated international laws and treaties, traditional brotherly relations between Arab and Islamic nations, and the principles of good neighborhood. Proclaiming that Kuwait was Iraqi territory, the Baghdad regime endeavored to obliterate Kuwait's identity and history. In pursuing this policy, it committed unbelievable crimes against the land of Kuwait, and its resources, infrastructures and people. The international community immediately realized the gravity of the occupation of Kuwait from both a humanitarian and political point of view. It recognized the invasion and occupation as a violation of the international treaties governing the relations between states, as well as an act that violently disrupted progress towards international peace and a new world order. Based on these considerations, the international community adopted a series of historic resolutions. They called for the liberation of Kuwait, and the restoration of its territories and legitimate government, even if this required the use of force. Kuwait was thus liberated through an unprecedented show of international will and solidarity. 6. Forum and Scope: (UN AND MULTI) 7. Decision Breadth: Plaintiff: International Community, Defendant: Iraq 8. Legal Standing: Treaty Iraq violated Chapter VII of the U.N. charter. Chapter VII deals with actions that threaten peace. The first Article of this chapter (Art. 39) stipulates: "The [United Nations] Security Council shall determine the existence of any threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression and shall make recommendations, or decide what measures shall be taken in accordance with Articles 41 and 42, to maintain or restore international peace and security." Article 41 allows the Security Council to decide what measures--precluding the use of armed forces--are to be to used to restore peace. Article 42 allows the Security Council--if it finds the measures taken under Article 41 are ineffective--to use military forces to restore international peace. III. GEOGRAPHIC Clusters 9. Geographic Locations a. Continental Domain: Mideast b. Geographic Site: East (Mideast) c. Geographic Impact: Iraq 10. Sub-State: YES Since the sanctions on Iraq are partially attributable to its eradication of (Shiites and Kurds), this issue can be defined as Sub-National. 11. Type of Habitat: [DRY] IV. TRADE Clusters: [IMPBAN] 12. Type of measure: Import Ban 13. Direct vs. Indirect Impacts: [DIR] On the one hand, the impact of the sanctions were direct, because they directly impacted Iraq. However, on the other hand, the sanctions impact were indirect or, more appropriately put, were misdirected. The sanctions were misdirected because they strengthened the power and resolve of Saddam Hussein and his regime, while they weakened the Shiites and Kurds. Hussein's power was strengthened because his regime was able to circumscribe the intended effects of the sanctions, i.e., to make him weaker. Hussein's survival has been based upon the following: SADDAM'S SURVIVAL Iraq continues to export oil to Jordan (about 50,000 b/d). Jordan contends that the funds that Iraq would receive for the oil would instead be used to pay off Iraq's debt to Jordan. However, Jordan made no commitment about refraining from new loans to Iraq. Therefore, Jordan can contend with the letter of the sanctions while violating its spirit; Jordan can import Iraqi oil to repay old Iraqi debts, while extending new loans to Iraq in a transaction that amounts to the same thing as paying Iraq directly for the oil. Further, Turks have taken advantage of the $2.20 price differential between heavily subsidized Turkish oil and Iraqi oil. Turks are now estimated to be importing between 3,500 and 4,000 b/d. (Nonetheless, because of the shortage of equipment, Iraq's continued pumping of petrol means the probability of an environmentally deleterious oil spill occurring is extremely high.) Following the Gulf War, the Iraqi government moved quickly to set up a rationing system, which allowed for the price of some goods to fluctuate based upon market demand: the higher the demand the higher the price. The system cut consumption, but, at the same time, managed to keep goods on the shelf. In addition, the Iraqi government took vigorous action to increase domestic food output. For example, there has been an emphasis placed on trimming the number of livestock, so as to free up cereals for human consumption. The reasoning behind this is that cereals are cheaper to produce and can be used to feed more people.(21) Thus, these adjustments have allowed Iraq the capacity to hold out against sanctions for a longer period of time. Iraq is in part supporting its economy by the gold reserves and other assets it stole from Kuwait during the Gulf War. It is estimated by Intelligence reports that Iraq stole $4 billion in gold from Kuwaiti government coffers. The automobiles, durable goods, and antiquities that Iraq took from Kuwait and re-exported were estimated to be worth $300 million. An example of goods stolen from Kuwait were Mesopotamian antiquities. Their were reports of hundreds of looters swarming over archeological sites, carrying truckload of cuneiform tablets back to Iraq. So successful was the largely illegal trade in Mesopotamian antiquities, that a thriving business in Mesopotamian fakes has also grown in Iraq.(22) In addition to Iraq's ability to finance itself through stolen gold and durable goods, there are rumors abound about large, undeclared Iraqi bank accounts abroad. Richard Newcomb, director of the U.S. Treasury Department's Office of Foreign Assets Control says, "It is my belief, and an operating assumption of the U.S. Treasury, that through secret accounts and investments, covert Iraqi front companies and clandestine agents of his regime, Saddam Hussein is attempting to sustain and proliferate his tools for disregarding the U.N. embargo."(23) 14. Relation of Measure to Environmental Impact a. Directly Related : Many b. Indirectly Related : NO c. Not Related : NO d. Process Related : Many 15. Trade Product Identification: Many 16. Economic Data Unlike the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, Iraq's Balance of Payments figures prior to the Gulf War are not complete: Iraq's export levels fail to be listed. What can be discerned form Iraq's balance of payments figures, however, is that their import levels declined in 1990--when sanctions were placed on Iraq.
  • 1989 Import Level $6,965,000 1990 Import Level 4,834,000

    17. Degree of Competitive Impact: HIGH 18. Industry Sector: Many 19. Exporters and Importers: Many V. Environment Clusters 20. Environmental Problem Type: Many Due to contaminated rivers, Iraq's bio-diversity has been adversely effected. Fish and Birds are dyeing from the waters toxicity levels. In addition, once fertile Iraqi land is being destroyed by improper land management. 21. Name, Type, and Diversity of Species No data, as of yet, has been given for the negligible effects the contamination of rivers has had on fish and birds. Nonetheless, upon speculation, it is estimated that the devastation the contamination has caused for the Iraqi eco- system is moderate to widespread.
  • Name Fish and Birds Type Animal

    22. Resource Impact and Effect: Medium and Product 23. Urgency and Lifetime: Medium and 10-20 years 24. Substitutes: Like products VI. OTHER Factors 25. Culture: YES Iraq is split between three major ethnic groups: Kurds, Shiites, and Sunni Arabs. Hussein's regime, in order to provide for the Sunni Arab minority that provides the backbone for Hussein's regime, has Supplied Sunni Arab's with ample supplies, while providing little to no supplies to Kurds and Shiites. 26. Trans-Boundary: Yes About 650,000 Iraqi refugees have crossed over the Iraqi border to Iran to escape Iraqi military operations directed against them. 27. Human Rights: Yes More than 70,000 Iraqis, nearly half of them children under 5, died in the first half of 1996 because six years of U.N. sanctions have made medicine scarce; according to a government newspaper 70,274 Iraqis died because of a lack of medicine. This report could not be confirmed by the United Nations; however, relief organizations have consistently reported higher rates of disease, malnutrition and infant mortality in Iraq, than country's on average.(24) Before the Gulf War, Iraq was one of the most affluent countries in the Middle East, with the government taking in an average of $10 billion a year from oil sales. The health crisis illustrates how much damage the sanctions have done. In 1989, the year before the embargo came into force, only 2,278 people died in Iraq because of a lack of medicine, Al-Thawra said. Of the 70,274 it said died in the first half of this year, 26,436 of them were children under five. According to U.N.I.C.E.F., about 4,500 Iraqi children have been dying each month from a variety of illnesses, compared with 600 a month before the Gulf War.(25) 28. REFERENCES "All Eyes On The Market," The Middle East, May 1995. Arbuthnot, Felicity, "U.S.A.-U.N. sanctions 'to kill a nation'," Shanti Communications. Barber, James, "Economic Sanctions as a Policy Instrument", International Affairs, vol. 33,4 Autumn 19 Beres, Louis Rene', "After the Gulf War: Prosecuting Iraqi Crimes Under the Rule of Law," Vanderbuilt Journal of International Law, vol. 20, Fall 1990. Caldwell, Robert J., "U.S.-Iraq Conflict 1996," The San Diego Union-Tribune, September 22, 1996, Sunday Clawson, Patrick, How Has Saddam Hussein Survived?, Institute for Strategic Studies: Washington, DC, 1993. Clifford Chance Homepage, 1995. "Clinton's Goal: Contain Iraq," Chicago Tribune, September 19, 1996, p28. "Down But Not Out", The Economist, April 8, 1995. Edwards, Robert, "U.N. suppresses report on Iraq suffering, " The Scotsman Publications Ltd., April 8, 1996. Faleh, Waiel (AP), "Iraqi Newspaper Says Shortage of Medicines Killed 70,000, August 1, 1996." Grieves, Forest L.,, "The Gulf Crisis, International Law, and American Foreign Policy," Montana Business Quarterly, vol. 29, Autumn 1991. "Hearing of the Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs Subcommittee of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee: Compliance By Iraq With United Nations Sanctions," Federal Information Systems Corp., August 3, 1995. Hufbauer, Gary Clyde, Schott, Jeffery J., and Ellitot, Kimberly Ann, Economic Sanctions Reconsidered: History and Current Policy, Washington: International Institute of Economics, 1985. Hufbauer, Gary, "The Futility of Sanctions", The Wall Street Journal, June 1, 1994. Huntington, Samuel P., The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century, Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1991. IBC Home Page, Political Risk for Iraq. "ILM Background/Content Summary," International Legal Materials, vol. 30, March 1991. Isenberg, David, "Special Forces, Shock Troops for the New Order," Middle East Report, vol. 22, July/August 1992. "Kurds on the Run," The Middle East, April 1995. Manning, Bayless, "Congress, Executive, and Intermestic Affairs", Foreign Affairs, January 1977. Nathan, James A. and Oliver, James K., U.S. Policy and World Order, 4th ed., Scott Foresman and Company: Boston, 1989. Penna, David R., "The Right to Self Defense in the Post-Cold War Era: The Role of the United Nations," Denver Journal of International and Policy, vol. 20, Fall 1990. Quigley, John, "The United States and the United Nations in the Persian Gulf War: New Order and Disorder?," Cornell International Law Journal, vol. 85, Winter 1992. Schachter, Oscar, "United Nations Law In The Gulf Coast," American Journal of International Law, vol. 85, July 1991. "The Security Council Comes of Age: An Analysis of the International Legal Response to the Iraqi Invasion of Kuwait," The Georgia Journal of International and Comparative Law, vol. 21 #1, 1991. Sorenson, Georg, Democracy and Democratization: Dilemmas in World Politics, Boulder, CO: Westview Press Inc., 1993. Spero, Joan Edelman, The Politics of International Economic Sanctions, 4th edition, New York, St. Martins Press, 1990. Slomanson, Richard, Fundamental Perspectives on International Law, Western State University: San Diego, 1990. Teharami, Shibley, (Brookings Institute Visiting Fellow), "A Baghdad Family Feud With International Effects", Los Angeles Times, August 20, 1995. U.N. Security Council Resolution 706 of August 15,1991, Foreign Policy Bulletin, November/December, 1991. Van Bergeijik, Peter A.G., Economic Diplomacy, Trade and Commercial Policy: Positive and Negative Sanctions in a New World Order, Hants, UK: Edward Elger Publishing Lmt., 1993. "What to do with Saddam?," The Middle East, March 1995. Zedalis, Rex J., "Burning of the Kuwait Oil Fields and the Laws of War," Vanderbuilt Journal of International Law, vol. 24 #4, 1991.


    (1) Clawson, Patrick, How Has Saddam Hussein Survived?, Institute for Strategic Studies: Washington, DC, 1993 pp.15- 75. (2) Ibid, pp.20-95. (3) Quigley, John, "The United States and the United Nations in the Persian Gulf War: New Order and Disorder?," Cornell International Law Journal, vol. 85, Winter 1992, p. 17. (4) Clifford Chance Homepage, 1995 and IBC Home Page, Political Risk for Iraq. (5) Ibid. (6) IBC Home Page, Political Risk for Iraq. (7) Edwards, Robert, "U.N. suppresses report on Iraq suffering, " The Scotsman Publications Ltd., April 8, 1996. (8) Clawson p. 33. (9) Ibid p. 85.. (10) Faleh, Waiel (AP), "Iraqi Newspaper Says Shortage of Medicines Killed 70,000, August 1, 1996." (11) Ibid. (12) Ibid. (13) Caldwel, Robert J., "U.S.-Iraq Conflict 1996," The San Diego Union-Tribune, September 22, 1996. (14) Ibid. (15) "Clinton's Goal: Contain Iraq," Chicago Tribune, September 19, 1996, p. 28. (16) "All Eyes On The Market," The Middle East, May 1995. See also "What to do with Saddam?," The Middle East, March 1995. (17) "Down But Not Out", The Economist, April 8, 1995. (18) "Kurds on the Run," The Middle East, April 1995. (19) U.N. Security Council Resolution 706 of August 15,1991, Foreign Policy Bulletin, November/December, 1991, p.46. (20) Clawson, Patrick,"How Has Saddam...." p.49 (21) Ibid, p. 49 (22) Crosette, Barbara, "Iraqis, Hurt by Sanctions, Sell Priceless Antiquities," The New York Times, June 22, 1996. (22) Op cit, pp. 51-3 and 57. Although highly probable, the existence of secret bank accounts, investments, and front companies has not been substantiated. (23) Faleh, Waiel (AP), "Iraqi Newspaper Says Shortage..." (24) Ibid.


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